KC Royals: Top storylines of Kansas City’s offseason

Not long after the offseason ushered in new ownership for the KC Royals, a longtime owner many credit with saving the franchise died. And a new manager replaced the second skipper to lead the club to a World Series championship.

When Charlie Finley took his Athletics and abandoned Kansas City for Oakland after the 1967 season, pharmaceutical giant Ewing Kauffman, a man with little previous exposure to baseball, stepped up and bought the rights to bring the big leagues back to town. Kauffman assembled and maintained a team of keen, savvy baseball people, let them run the baseball side of his new business, and soon led the franchise to years of success and a World Series championship.

A board ran the team for a time after Kauffman’s death; its head, David Glass, an extraordinarily successful and wealthy businessman in his own right, stepped in and bought the club in 2000 when fear ran rampant that outside interests would buy the Royals and move them away.

Success was rare during Glass’ first dozen years at the helm–the Royals had just one winning season during that span. Things changed in 2013–the club made an earnest run for a playoff spot that didn’t end until late in the campaign, then went to the World Series in 2014 and won it in ’15. But the club’s fortunes soon declined, reviving previous complaints that Glass’ approach to baseball finances was too conservative and he simply wouldn’t spend the money necessary to maintain a winning franchise.

There were fans who rejoiced at the news, announced in August of last season when the Royals were well on their way to another 100-loss season, that Glass was selling the team to John Sherman, a longtime Kansas City resident and part-owner of the Cleveland Indians; with no real evidence, those fans believed the move signaled a change for the better–an increase in spending on players. Baseball approved the sale to Sherman and his ownership group in November. So far, Sherman’s fiscal approach seems a match for Glass’.

Sadly, Glass won’t realize his reported plans to attend 2020 Spring Training with the club. He died January 9, leaving an indelible mark on the history of Kansas City baseball.

Now it is Sherman who will run the Royals. He, too, is an eminently successful businessman who made his fortune in energy. He’s now overseen almost an entire offseason, one characterized not by a departure from Glass’ conservative spending, but instead one mirroring that approach. Time will tell how frugal Sherman’s reign will be.

Change in ownership wasn’t the only offseason alteration to the Royals’ landscape–before the sale to Sherman was consummated, Ned Yost, the only manager other than Dick Howser to skipper the team to a World Series championship, retired after 2019’s final game. Mike Matheny replaced him a month later.

Matheny and Yost followed similar paths to the Royals’ job: General Manager Dayton Moore hired Yost as an adviser after Yost’s unceremonious 2008 firing from Milwaukee when the Brewers were in a hot race for a playoff spot, then made him manager when Trey Hillman was fired; Moore hired Matheny for a similar role after he was fired, despite a winning record, four division titles and a World Series appearance, by St. Louis in July 2018, then named him to succeed Yost.

Matheny comes to the job with baggage, not the least of which is criticism of his handling of his clubhouse, tactical decisions and pitching staffs. But he was consistently successful in St. Louis, a strong indication that he can manage. And his self-improvement efforts can’t hurt his prospects for success in KC–since Moore hired him, Matheny has studied analytics and leadership and hired a media consultant.

The still rebuilding Royals have a stable of young talent–especially pitchers–on the verge of making the big leagues. Whether Matheny is, for those players and the current roster, the right manager at the right time remains to be seen. His hiring added interest to the offseason.

The KC Royals characteristically made no earth-shattering free agent signings or blockbuster trades this offseason. But a seemingly middle-of-the-road signing significantly impacted the lineup.

Hunter Dozier did just about everything he could last season to land the KC Royals’ everyday third base job. After hitting .229 with 11 home runs and 34 RBIs over 102 games in 2018, Dozier broke out with 29 doubles, 10 triples, 26 homers, 84 RBIs, a .279/.348/.522 slash and 125 OPS+. Although he can play elsewhere, and despite the club’s continuing concerns about his defense, third base appeared to be his.

But a late December trade intervened and shook the Royals’ lineup–the club signed Maikel Franco, Philadelphia’s veteran third baseman, to a free agent contract worth an approximately $3 million base on December 27, spoiling Dozier’s third base chances and sending him to the outfield.

The move was specifically tailored for third base and settles, at least for the time being, the Royals’ concerns about hot corner defense; although Franco’s hitting has become suspect, the club is obviously more comfortable with his glove than Dozier’s. But the deal’s ramifications extend beyond third base and right field, where Dozier’s presence may spell the end to the uncertainty that has plagued the position.

Now, the club wants Whit Merrifield, its undisputed jack-of-all-trades, to settle into one primary position and man center field, the Kauffman Stadium expanse upon which Bubba Starling and Brett Phillips were expected to continue their battle for a regular outfield spot. It’s a contest some thought would now shift to left, but Alex Gordon‘s return sets the outfield with him, Merrifield and Dozier, leaving Phillips and Starling (and perhaps Nick Heath) to contend for a backup role. Heath is close to being ready, but KC seems committed to give Starling and Phillips one more chance.

Those position changes may not, however, mark the limit of the Franco deal’s impact on the lineup. Combined with the impending expansion of major league rosters to 26 players, Merrifield’s center field assignment means the Royals may need another player with his versatility. Signing a proven utility player like Wilmer Flores would be a direct result of Franco’s signing.

The acquisition of a single player without superstar credentials, a characteristic incremental offseason move for the KC Royals, typically doesn’t shake up a club. But bringing Maikel Franco aboard has done just that and KC may be a better club for it.

While the signing of Maikel Franco significantly altered the KC Royals’ lineup for 2020, the club’s other offseason moves were characteristically Royal and match their traditional conservative approach.

The acquisition of Maikel Franco was as much vintage KC Royals as it was uncharacteristic in effect. The approximately $3 million cost of Franco’s deal, a small price to pay in baseball dollars for an everyday infielder, didn’t break the Royals’ bank and is consistent with the club’s typical one-player-at-a-time offseason approach; at the same time, it atypically worked substantial lineup changes.

The news was that the club made a move with such impact; the fact it was the only immediately significant move simply continued the Royals’ annual offseason trend.

Alex Gordon’s recent return to the Royals for $4 million and at least one more season (unless the club takes advantage of his 10&5 rights waiver and trades him) is, of course, significant, but its importance is limited to his defensive prowess and what occasional damage his bat might still be capable of inflicting. Indeed, Gordon’s re-up affects the lineup only to the extent it contributes to the change of the Bubba Starling-Brett Phillips battle from one for an everyday outfield spot to one for a backup role.

The remaining winter moves mirror those to which fans have become accustomed–primarily acquisitions of pitchers yearning for another, and perhaps final, chance to make it in the majors.

Most prominent among those transactions was the signing of Trevor Rosenthal, the former lock-down St. Louis closer whose career decline began shortly before surgery sidelined him for 2018 and culminated with his miserable 2019 stints with Washington and Detroit. Rosenthal is a classic, low-cost Dayton Moore project designed to repair and rebuild a former star–he signed Rosenthal to a minor league deal worth a base $2 million should he capitalize on a Spring Training invitation and make the club.

The acquisition of former Yankee prospect Chance Adams is another typical Moore offseason move. Adams had some stellar minor league moments in the Yankee system (he held hitters to WHIPs less than 1.080 for three consecutive years and went 13-1 in one season and 15-4 in another) but has little more than a disturbing 8.18 ERA to show for two brief trips to the big leagues. His struggles since 2017 elbow surgery make him another inexpensive Moore reclamation project–KC gave up only a minor league infielder to get him.

Stephen Woods comes to the club not as damaged goods, but instead as a talented pitcher with solid minor league credentials. Selected in the Rule 5 draft from Tampa Bay (and thus required to be offered back to the Rays if the Royals don’t keep him on the major league roster for the upcoming season), Woods has a three-season ERA of 2.61 and posted a 9-3 High A record and 1.88 ERA last season.

The Royals also picked up Braden Shipley, a former Arizona Diamondback with a remarkably unremarkable minor league record of 41-42 and disturbing major league numbers–a 5.49 ERA and 1.600 WHIP in 26 games.

Gordon’s inexpensive one year deal, and the low-cost, low-risk signings of a handful of pitchers, makes the bulk of the KC Royals’ offseason acquisitions just as normal as ever.

The offseason storylines of the KC Royals are at once characteristic and uncharacteristic of past Kansas City winters. While the club’s player moves were, with the exception of the Maikel Franco deal, classically inexpensive and low-risk transactions, a new ownership group took control of the team and a new manager came on board. And, sadly, David Glass died shortly after selling the team he loved.