KC Royals: Did Royals GM Dayton Moore Tank To Win?

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Nov 3, 2015; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals general manager Dayton Moore waves to fans at the World Series parade. Mandatory Credit: John Rieger-USA TODAY Sports /

KC Royals general manager Dayton Moore is enjoying his day in the sun this winter. But did he “tank” (intentionally lose) in order to build his World Series winning team?

Dayton Moore’s team has won two straight American League pennants. He’s won the World Series. Some argue that the Kansas City Royals have been the most successful team in baseball over the last two seasons.

However, not everyone is joining the chorus of accolades.

Anonymous owners and executives of big-market clubs have grumbled to media insiders about teams “tanking” seasons to accumulate multiple seasons of high draft picks in order to build a winner. They say small-market teams have pursued such a strategy while pocketing “balancing” subsidies from large-market teams.

The big market teams grouse that such a practice harms league revenue by driving down attendance, and TV ratings, for teams that pursue a “tanking” strategy. These critics insist that small market subsidies should be invested in free-agents to improve the on-field product rather than pocketed by ownership, or even held to finance future winning rosters.

The teams most frequently mentioned are current “rebuilding” teams like the Phillies, Braves, Reds, and Brewers. Emerging teams facing such accusations include the Houston Astros, Cubs, and Minnesota Twins. all of whom are loaded with young prospects transitioning to the major-leagues.

Should the Kansas City Royals be included on this list?

The KC Royals have ranked in the bottom third of major-league payroll seven out of the 10 years Dayton Moore has held the general manager job in Kansas City. In 2011, the KC Royals’ fell to dead last in the major-leagues with a payroll of $38 million. The same season, the Royals also set a record when Baseball America ranked nine KC prospects in the top 100 in baseball.

The KC Royals continued to lose in 2011-12, posted the franchise’s first winning season since 2003 in 2013, won the AL pennant in 2014, and the World Series in 2015.

The first question I will address is whether the Kansas City Royals have, indeed, rode a “tanking” strategy to their current success. Then, I will discuss whether “tanking” is actually a problem that major-league baseball needs to correct.

Next: How To Distinguish 'Tanking' From 'Rebuilding'

Nov 3, 2015; Kansas City, MO, USA; Mandatory Credit: Denny Medley-USA TODAY Sports /

How To Distinguish ‘Tanking’ From ‘Rebuilding’?

This answer is going to be unavoidably subjective. Where is the line between “tanking” and “rebuilding”? The cynic in me suggests that anyone jealous of a rival’s success will consider their rebuilding period to be “tanking” at other franchise’s expense. Aside from obvious self interest, I think it is possible distinguish “tanking” from “rebuilding”.

But, it might be damned difficult to see from the outside.

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To me, legitimate rebuilding is when you focus on player development at the major-league level, rather than wins. Where a team crosses the line into “tanking” is when a team attempts to lose in order to obtain prospects, rather than develop prospects already in the system.

So how can we translate this definition into something we can point to and say, “That team is tanking!”

A tanking team will field a roster filled with cheap veterans with little to no upside, and few legitimate prospects. Oh, they might call up a number of minor-league players to the big league roster. But they’ll be over-aged players who are more minor-league filler than guys anyone can reasonably believe have a significant major-league future.

I know that definition sounds rather subjective, but I believe there’s a clear difference between giving one late-bloomer with a minor-league breakthrough a shot, vs. a roster filled with cheap veterans and a pile of older prospects that don’t have the tools to succeed.

I don’t think the above description applies even to the Allard Baird Kansas City Royals teams going back to the late 90’s, much less the Dayton Moore KC Royals teams of the last decade.

While Baird fielded many ineffective veterans around the turn of the millenium, he was trying to build an offense around a core of exceptional young talents like Mike Sweeney, Carlos Beltran, Jermaine Dye, and Johnny Damon. Those players were legitimate prospects who all went on to significant careers. Heck, Beltran and Damon have borderline Hall-Of-Fame cases. You can also include Zack Greinke in that mix, who debuted with Kansas City in 2004.

Any team rolling out young players with Hall-Of-Fame upside isn’t tanking. The problem with the Allard Baird Royals was that their rotation prospects failed and they couldn’t afford to patch the holes on the free-agent market. As the Beltran, Damon, and Dye group approached free-agency, Baird made disasterous trades that ruined his tenure.

Next: Did Dayton Moore Tank?

Jun 18, 2015; Kansas City, MO, USA; Mandatory Credit: Denny Medley-USA TODAY Sports /

Did Dayton Moore Tank?

In a word, no.

When Moore took over from Allard Baird in 2006, he tried to add veterans to his prospects. He signed Jose Guillen to a three-year, $36 million deal before the 2007 season after failing to interest big-name outfielders Torii Hunter and Andruw Jones. This was Moore’s first winter as GM.

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In 2008, Moore signed Mariners starter Gil Meche to the largest contract in team history at five-years, $55 million. When the 2008 team posted a better than expected 75 win season, Moore attempted to patch his roster holes by trading for center-fielder Coco Crisp and first baseman Mike Jacobs, then signing free-agent set-up men Juan Cruz, John Bale, and Kyle Farnsworth. Moore also added bottom-of-the-rotation guy Luke Hudson and utility man Willie Bloomquist.

These moves failed, in large part because many of the “prospects” in the system were duds due to the penny pinching ways of owner David Glass during the Baird regime. So while the Kansas City Royals did pile up high draft picks due to on field failure early in Moore’s tenure, it wasn’t due to design. Moore inherited a terrible organization with bad scouting, player development, and prospects.

It wasn’t going to be an overnight fix, no matter how hard he tried.

We can see Moore’s efforts by looking at KC’s payrolls. The KC Royals payroll zoomed to $67 million in 2007, up from $47 million in 2006, according to Cot’s contracts. The payroll dipped to $58 million in 2008, but jumped to $70 million in 2009 and $74 million in 2010.

Now, the Kansas City Royals payroll did dive to $38 million in 2011. But the team debuted 15 rookies (who made major-league minimum) that season, including many guys who formed the core of the 2015 World Champions such as: Salvador Perez, Mike Moustakas, Eric Hosmer, Kelvin Herrera, Greg Holland, Danny Duffy, and Jarrod Dyson.

Along with those rookies, the 2011 roster featured developing young players like Lorenzo Cain and Alcides Escobar. Former top-prospect Alex Gordon blossomed from “bust” to “star” with a breakthrough season at age 27.

Not only was Moore developing legitimate prospects, he added bargain free-agent signings in outfielders Melky Cabrera and Jeff Francoeur. While Cabrera and Francoeur did not sustain their 2011 success in Kansas City, you can’t say that Moore was tanking when he was simultaneously developing legitimate prospects as well as adding useful veterans.

In retrospect, the low-payroll losing seasons in 2011 and 2012 weren’t used to obtain prospects. They were necessary to help young KC Royals players grow into a team capable of winning.

That’s not tanking.

Next: Is Tanking Really A Problem?

Oct 14, 2015; Kansas City, MO, USA; Mandatory Credit: Denny Medley-USA TODAY Sports /

Is Tanking A Problem Even If Teams Really Are Doing It?

The best argument that tanking is harmful to the game comes from a 2014 analysis by Dan Farnsworth on Fangraphs.com that concluded “rebuilding” wasn’t profitable (which he defined as completely tearing down a team to acquire prospects) unless: 1) a team can cut 40% of their payroll, or 2) manage to pair rebuilding with a new stadium.

Otherwise, tearing down the team reduces team revenue over the long-term. Farnsworth’s analysis does not include potential losses to the visitor’s pool of team attendance and national TV contracts. “Tanking” could also hurt the team’s local TV contract revenue, 34% of which is shared with other teams.

What critics forget, however, is that for every loss that a tanking team “gives” away, ANOTHER TEAM gets wins. Those wins increase fan interest in other teams, and the marginal victories for winners could very well provide a greater boost to league revenue than the decline from losers.

This issue merits further research.

Aside from revenue projections, accumulating a “wave” of prospects is almost the only way for small-market teams to win in a world where their competitors can buy main roster pieces on the free-agent market. Dropping 10 more games in a lost season isn’t what kills a fanbase. What destroys all hope is losing for decades, and even generations.

The current labor agreement has yielded a reality where baseball has recently enjoyed more parity than any other major sport in North America.

Why does this laudable state of affairs need fixing?

Nothing creates more fans for small market franchises than winning a title, as anyone who has seen the KC Royals recent run of success renew the fanbase should know. Without hope of loading up and winning a title, fans from small market cities are doomed years of mediocrity.

Eventually, apathy sets in.

Critics of tanking also forget that it’s a self-limiting strategy. Only the top draft spots give access to either: 1) elite prospects, or 2) disproportionate slot money at the top of the draft that can allow a team to load up on depth if the draft lacks a “great” player when their pick comes. If, say 10 teams tank, only five will get top picks with big slot money attached.

It seems to me that the (inevitably) big market teams that complain about tanking don’t care about the health of the game. Instead, they’re unhappy that their market size no longer guarantees them a place among the game’s elite.

Next: Five Groundhog Day Do-Overs For Dayton Moore

To me, the teams complaining about tanking sound like they’re afraid to compete. They’d be better served to stop whining about their lost aristocratic privileges, and slug it out with everyone else.

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