KC Royals: Kansas City's biggest mistakes of 2019

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The KC Royals lost 103 games in 2019, a total impossible to amass without making countless mistakes. What were some of the club’s biggest miscues?

The KC Royals had one of their worst seasons in 2019. Entering just their fourth campaign after a World Series championship closed out trips to the Fall Classic in 2014 and ’15, the club lost over 100 games for the second straight year.

That the Royals would not be good in 2019 was expected. Immediate regression followed the club’s two successive World Series appearances–they went 82-80 in 2016, then 81-81 in 2017. There followed the inevitable free agency-fueled departure of KC’s championship core after ’17, a major factor in ’18’s 104 loss campaign. The club then failed to make significant improvements.

To be sure, the 2019 KC Royals played a lot of bad baseball; for excruciatingly long periods, pitchers didn’t pitch well and hitters didn’t get timely hits. But to lose almost 64% of the time, as the Royals did last season, requires more than poor play–mistakes not of the players’ making necessarily play a part.

Mistakes of management certainly marred the Royals’ second straight lost season. Pitchers were left in games too long, others were pulled too soon. Unsuccessful lineups survived far too long. Players brought aboard via ill-advised free agent signings continued to play long after the futility of those signings became obvious. And while some mistakes didn’t cause losses, they reflected poor decisions that could have been better.

Here are some of the club’s bigger 2019 mistakes.

Alex Gordon, a sure future member of the KC Royals’ Hall of Fame, had long wanted to pitch in a live game. He got his chance in late August. But was it really a good idea?

Some baseball moves are mistakes not because they significantly affect a player, game or season. Context, rather than immediate impact, can turn a seemingly innocent move into a subtle (or not so subtle) mistake. Such was the case with a move made by KC Royals’ manager Ned Yost during a late-season 19-4 loss to Oakland.

With the Royals trailing 15-3 after six innings, Yost chose Gold Glove left fielder Alex Gordon to pitch the seventh. That Yost would summon a position player for mound duty in such a lopsided game wasn’t surprising; it was surprising that he picked Gordon instead of a bench player. Indeed, Yost had Humberto Arteaga, a seldom-used Royals’ utility infielder, to relieve Gordon in the eighth, and utility man Chris Owings pitched almost two innings of a 16-1 loss to Texas earlier in the season.

Yost, however, and as reported by mlb.com’s Jeffrey Flanagan, was apparently helping Gordon fulfill a wish to pitch he’d long harbored, and accepting Gordon’s offer of help.

Once on the mound, Gordon worked rapidly but awkwardly. Fans seemed to welcome the distraction from the beat down the novelty of his pitching provided; Gordon made a few good pitches, but his effort added to the unsightly mess that the game had become for the Royals as he surrendered hits to half the 10 batters he faced, including a home run to Matt Chapman, and gave up three runs in his 1.1 innings of work.

Pitching Alex Gordon didn’t cause the Royals to lose and had no real impact on the outcome. It was a mistake of another kind, one that emphasized the loss of not only the game but also the season. And although the KC pen was tired and depleted–seven Royals’ hurlers pitched the afternoon before in a 10-inning win at Cleveland–others were available. So, too, were bench players like Arteaga; it is a harsh reality of the game that such players are typically pressed into pitching duty before regulars like Gordon, simply to minimize the risk of injury to the latter.

Yost’s heart may have been in the right place, but his veteran baseball mind may not have been. Although Gordon may have wanted to pitch, the manager’s decision to let him could have led to serious injury to one of the best outfield arms in the game. Gordon is considering retirement–an injury caused by an unnecessary mound appearance could have rendered such a decision moot.

Hopefully, any desire Gordon had to pitch in the big leagues has been satisfied. The decision to let him do so didn’t figure in the game or season, but it was a mistake nonetheless. It didn’t look good and could have caused a result far worse than the loss.

Uncertainty surrounded center field as Spring Training 2019 approached for the KC Royals. Unfortunately, the club failed to adequately resolve that uncertainty and questions about the position remain.

Three things seemed certain about the KC Royals’ outfield as Spring Training opened last February–Alex Gordon would play left; no one was quite sure who would patrol right; and Brian Goodwin and Billy Hamilton would get shots at jobs, with Hamilton having the inside edge on center. Even if Hamilton won that job, Goodwin seemed destined for no worse than a backup spot.

The Royals obtained Goodwin from Washington as the July 2018 trade deadline approached, viewing him as a versatile and speedy candidate to slow the club’s revolving door approach to center and right fields. He was experienced at both positions; although his defense needed work, his bat was passable and he’d displayed some pop in 2017 with 13 home runs in 74 games.

Goodwin, however, wasn’t the only Royal outfielder chasing a job. Bubba Starling, the club’s promising first-round pick in the 2011 draft whose unfortunate injury history had slowed his progress to a crawl, was expected to make a serious (and possibly final) run at a roster spot and Brett Phillips, obtained via the trade that sent Mike Moustakas to Milwaukee, had seen action with the Royals in 2018. Like Goodwin, the club was high on his speed and base-stealing prowess.

And Billy Hamilton, averaging over 46 stolen bases per season in the majors, entered the mix when he signed a free agent contract two months before Spring Training opened. Hamilton’s signing further muddled the picture–he was the favorite to open the season in center, leaving several others to battle for the remaining right field and backup positions.

Spring Training seemed to settle the issues. Although Starling had a torrid spring, batting .344 with two homers, the club sent him to Omaha to play regularly; Phillips’ .167 average landed him in the same location. Because Jorge Soler was expected to split time in right with Whit Merrifield when he wasn’t DH’ing and Hamilton eased into center with a .294 spring average and four steals, the backup spot came down to two choices–Goodwin and light-hitting Terrance Gore, who had rejoined the club and whose real skills were stealing bases and pinch-running.

Consistent with their similar histories of poor spring training performances, neither candidate excelled. Goodwin slashed .116/.188/.256 in 17 games; Gore, .182/.341/.303 in 25. Gore had one more hit than Goodwin in 10 fewer at-bats. In the end, and probably owing to his better OBP, history with the club, popularity with KC fans, and management’s plans to use him primarily as a pinch-running specialist late in close games, Gore won out.

Goodwin was shocked. The Angels picked him up on waivers before Opening Day. The KC Royals’ season-long center field mistake began.

Hamilton was excellent defensively in center, but weak at the plate–combined with the Royals’ interest in auditioning Starling and Phillips, his .211/.275/.269 slash through 93 games led to a mid-August DFA. Atlanta picked Hamilton up and he played in the postseason. The club recalled Phillips the same day it DFA’d Hamilton; Starling had been back in KC for a month.

The Royals sold Gore to the Yankees in mid-July.

With center now their stage, Starling and Phillips shared time there but neither played well enough to win the job full-time. Starling slashed .167/.213/.262 in August and .227/.261/.364 in September; Phillips slashed .200/.286/.262 in August and .086/.214/.200 in September. Starling’s season slash was .215/.253/.317, with four homers and 12 RBI’s in 56 games, while Phillips ended with two homers, six RBI’s and slashed .138/.247/.262 in 30 games.

And what of Goodwin? He stuck with the Angels; in 136 games, he hit 29 doubles, three triples, 17 homers, batted .262 and had a 109 wRC+. The Royals, it seems, gave up on him too soon.

So, with Spring Training 2019 coming, uncertainty reigns in the outfield. Although the recent acquisition of third baseman Maikel Franco moves Hunter Dozier to right, and it’s clear Merrifield will play center, Gordon hasn’t disclosed his plans for 2020–if he returns, expect Starling and Phillips to fight for the backup job but, if he retires, their battle will move to left.

The Royals long knew Gordon might retire and apparently had designs on moving Dozier to right field, making a choice between Starling and Phillips more important last season. While it’s tempting to attribute the club ‘s decision to divide center between them for the last two months of the campaign to righty-lefty matchup considerations–Starling bats right-handed and Phillips swings from the left–Starling actually fared better against right-handed pitching and Phillips was better against left-handers.

It appears that the Royals, in the midst of a lost season, may have elected instead to discard three other outfielders to create a perfect stage upon which Starling and Phillips could audition; the players then failed to stake their claims.

What was the club’s outfield mistake? KC mismanaged its desire to take long looks at Starling and Phillips in 2019. Their decision to carry Goodwin over in 2019, and to then sign Hamilton and Gore, jammed the outfield. Gore’s limited value was better suited for a contending club, making his signing ill-advised–and he took a roster spot Starling or Phillips could have filled. The prospect of deriving short-term benefit from Hamilton and then trade-chipping him in July failed–his inability to hit discouraged trade partners and the Royals had to DFA him.

The decisions prevented the Royals from taking timely and sufficient stock of Starling and Phillips. And that was a mistake.

The KC Royals signed Lucas Duda to DH and play first base after Eric Hosmer‘s departure following the 2017 season. He didn’t work out as planned; nevertheless, the Royals signed him again for 2019.

Eric Hosmer was a key ingredient to the mix that propelled the KC Royals to back-to-back trips to the World Series and the Fall Classic title in 2015. But his departure via free agency following the 2017 season–part of the exit of other championship core players that triggered the club’s present regression–left a void at first base the team desperately wanted and needed to fill.

Their search for Hosmer’s replacement led the Royals to a member of the New York Mets’ team the Royals defeated for their 2015 title. On the last day of February 2018, after the club had already opened Spring Training, it signed former Met first baseman Lucas Duda to a one-year, $3.5 million contract. General Manager Dayton Moore was forced immediately to deny concerns that the move would impede the progression of Hunter Dozier, then considered the team’s first baseman of the future–because Duda’s deal was for a year, Dozier could get more seasoning in the minors before heading to the big leagues.

The deal wasn’t perfect, but seemed reasonable. Duda was averaging just over 17 homers over eight seasons and had twice hit 30, including 2017 when he clubbed 17 for the Mets and 13 for Tampa Bay. Those numbers compared favorably to Hosmer, then a seven-year veteran averaging about a homer more a season than Duda. And Duda was a good defender at first base; although some peripherals indicated Hosmer’s defense was overrated, his four Gold Gloves suggested otherwise.

Duda split his time between first base and DH; for the most part, however, he took Hosmer’s place at first, playing 61 games there and DH’ing 24 times. His production was passable but not what the Royals needed–he hit 13 homers, drove in 48 runs and hit .242. But he struck out too much and posted a below-average OPS+. Dispensable but not matching anyone’s needs by the July trade deadline, Duda found himself dispatched to the Braves for cash.

A free agent once again after the season, Duda signed with Minnesota but didn’t last through Spring Training. Then, despite having enough players who could play first base–Ryan O’Hearn was ready to take a full season shot at the position, Frank Schwindel had considerable experience there, and Whit Merrifield and Cheslor Cuthbert had seen time at first–the Royals rescued Duda with a minor league deal. There was little doubt he would make the club.

And make it he did. But the deal soon turned sour and ended badly. His bat ineffective from the start, Duda didn’t last the season, playing in only 39 games until the club released him July 28th. His .171 average, four home runs and 15 RBI’s told the story.

Bringing back Duda for 2019 made little sense. The Royals were well-stocked with players who could play his position and DH; he occupied a roster spot that temporarily blocked younger, more deserving players. By any measure, “Duda redux” was a mistake.

The KC Royals have probably the major leagues’ best utility-type player. But that didn’t stop them from signing another utility man for 2019. His Royals’ career was short-lived and the deal turned out to be a mistake.

The KC Royals spent $3 million to sign a free agent on December 5, 2018. That the cost-conscious Royals spent such a comparatively low amount on a free agent wasn’t surprising; it was who they spent it on that was. The club really had no need for Chris Owings.

As evidenced by his six-year career with the Arizona Diamondbacks, Owings’ value was as an unusually versatile player. Owings played six positions well for Arizona until, on the verge of arbitration with him, he was non-tendered following the 2018 season. KC picked him up.

It was Owings’ greatest asset–versatility–that called into serious question his signing with the Royals. Simply put, the Royals didn’t need him. They already had Whit Merrifield, a utility man in his own right and probably the best in the game. And the club desperately needed pitching help; another utility player was not a pressing need.

But consistent with their recent trend of head-scratching free agent signings, the Royals gave Owings his $3 million, together with some performance-based incentives. It didn’t take long for the folly of the deal to reveal itself.

Owings was an offensive disaster from the start. He just couldn’t hit. In 40 games, he hit .133 with two home runs and nine RBI’s; even the fact he played seven positions (he even pitched once) couldn’t justify keeping him. As discussed previously in this space, the negative reaction his signing and poor bat triggered made things worse and ranks among the worst free agent deals in Royals’ history. Keeping him as long as it did was one of the club’s biggest mistakes of 2019.

Some believe Adalberto Mondesi represents the future of the KC Royals. The way a Mondesi injury was handled in 2019 was questionable.

This story began, and now ends, with the premise that the multitude of mistakes necessary to lose over 100 games aren’t on the players’ alone, and while they may not impact individual losses, some mistakes can have other consequences. The KC Royals’ response to an injury to Adalberto Mondesi may be a prime example.

Without question, Mondesi is an all-tools player with almost infinite potential. There is nothing on a baseball field he can’t do well. So great are his potential, and the Royals’ opinion of him, that they entrusted a 2015 postseason roster spot to him and used him as a pinch-hitter in the World Series before he had played even one regular-season big-league game.

After struggling in 2016 and ’17 and spending parts of each season in the minors, Mondesi proved in 2018 that he belonged in Kansas City. In 75 games, he hit .276 with 14 home run and 37 RBIs and stole 32 bases. The Royals’ shortstop job was his.

His average dipped to .263 in 2019, but Mondesi stole 43 bases, tied for the league lead in triples with 10, added 20 doubles and nine home runs, and had 62 RBI’s. But for two shoulder injuries that cost him significant playing time, Mondesi’s season could have been even better.

The Royals’ response to those injuries could have imperiled their star’s career.

The first injury, a left shoulder subluxation (partial tear of his left shoulder joint) occurred on July 16th during the Royals’ 11-0 drubbing of Chicago when Mondesi dove for a foul pop. He went on the Injured List the next day, then started a rehab assignment with Omaha on August 20th. Mondesi was activated on September 1st and immediately rejoined the club.

But the club imposed restrictions on his play, ordering their star shortstop and base-stealer not to dive for balls or into bases. Allowing Mondesi to play with such significant limitations made little (if any) sense, especially with less than a month to go in a dismal season and players headed nowhere but home for the postseason.

Expecting Mondesi to abide by the club’s restrictions was unrealistic–inevitably, he’d instinctively dive for a ball or into a base. The club’s limitations on his play acknowledged the risk; playing naturally increased it.

And so it was that on September 22nd, in the first inning of the Royals 157th game of the year, Mondesi did what shortstops instinctively do to prevent grounders from finding holes through the infield–he dove and reinjured his left shoulder. He immediately left the game, but worse news was coming.

He needed surgery that would eliminate any baseball activity for several months, making his return for the opening of Spring Training probable but not certain.

Playing without diving for balls or into bases wasn’t realistic. Why the Royals played Mondesi in September is a legitimate question.

Next. Top 5 Royals' moments from August 2019. dark

The KC Royals proved in 2019 that countless mistakes, both on and off the field and by both players and management, are part of the game. Hopefully, the club will make fewer mistakes in 2020.

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KC Royals: Kansas City’s biggest mistakes of 2019