Apr 12, 2013; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals catcher Salvador Perez (13) drives in a run with a single in the first inning against the Toronto Blue Jays at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: John Rieger-USA TODAY Sports

I start with an observation and a statistic. The Royals see very few pitches; that’s the observation. Here is the statistic. They see 3.75 pitches per plate appearance, which is next to last in the American League; the Angels are last at 3.74.* Of course, conventional wisdom states that the more pitches a team sees the better. It means the other team has to burn through pitchers more quickly, allowing the patient team to face the opposing team’s bullpen more often. Typically, bullpen pitchers aren’t as good as starting pitchers, which is why they are in the bullpen. Seeing more pitches also allows hitters to understand a pitcher’s stuff better, thus, giving those hitters a better chance at the plate. The top five teams in P/PA are Boston, Oakland, Minnesota, Cleveland, and Toronto. Four of those teams rank above league average in runs scored per game with Cleveland, Oakland, and Boston scoring 5.09, 4.79, and 4.76 R/G respectively.

*All stats in this post come from before the first game of the Angels series.

Digging a little deeper into the numbers, it’s fairly easy to see why the Royals see so few pitches: 1) The Royals swing at 47.7 percent of pitches, second only to the Angels; 2) They make contact with 81.2 percent of pitches they swing at, which is fourth in the AL; 3) They swing at 32.4 percent of pitches outside the strike zone and make contact with those pitches 72.2 percent of the time. That’s tops in the league. From this data we get a picture that our eyes probably already began constructing as we watched the games. The Royals swing at a lot of pitches, but they don’t strike out that much. Instead, they put a lot of balls in play. This might be ok if it were true that all balls in play are created equal, but as has been one of my battles for at least two years against the notion that BABIP is a matter of “luck,” all batted balls are not created equally. This data hints at that. The Royals make contact with a lot of balls outside the strike zone. Some of those are fouled off. Some of those drop as hits, but a large majority of those are put in play weakly for outs. To state it simply, the Royals put too many balls in play. They put balls in play that should be left alone.

This doesn’t just include balls out of the strike zone. It also includes pitcher’s pitches, balls placed on the corners and low. These are tough pitches that make hitting safely difficult. If a hitter swings at a pitcher’s pitch, he is most likely going to miss it or put it in play weakly. We already know the Royals actually don’t swing and miss much, only 8.7 percent, which is ninth in the American League (Jeff Francoeur be damned). Instead, they put the ball in play weakly a lot.

It’s an interesting and incredibly frustrating combination. The Royals swing at pitches they shouldn’t, but instead of striking out at an Astros-like rate, they simply hit weak ground balls to the second baseman. Of course, it seems like striking out is worse, but maybe we shouldn’t take that for granted. If Francoeur swings at a pitch outside the strike zone on the first pitch and hits a weak ground ball to second, that’s one pitch and one out. If he swings and misses at three bad pitches, that’s three pitches and one out. Sure, his ball in play gave him the slight chance to get on base (error, infield single, bloop hit, weak ground ball through the infield). But it also cost him two pitches. It’s not a coincidence that starting pitchers go deep against the Royals. The only way they have of running up pitch counts is to get a lot of hits because they don’t see enough pitches otherwise.

So, if I had to boil their philosophy down into a few words it would go like this: When you see a pitch you think you can hit, hit it. Simplified, but it seems like this is how they approach hitting. This is, in fact, a bad philosophy. It discounts all the benefits that come from seeing more pitches for the belief that one may get the best pitch to hit early in the count. It’s actually predicated on fear, a fear of missing out on the pitch early in the count that would have been the best one to hit. This scenario plays out all the time in real life when people decide to settle for something they can hit instead of waiting, gathering more information, and hitting the pitch they should hit. Why is this bad? Because more information is almost always better than less information i.e. seeing what a pitcher is throwing and understanding it is better than not. Plus, pitchers live to exploit hitters willing to swing at quality strikes. Swinging early and often places them right in their comfort zones and misunderstands the game of hitter versus pitcher.

September 20, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals third baseman Mike Moustakas (8) at bat in the ninth inning of the game against the Chicago White Sox at Kauffman Stadium. The Royals won the game 4-3. Mandatory Credit: Denny Medley-USA TODAY Sports

In the hitter versus pitcher battle, it begins with the hitter at a slight disadvantage because it takes four balls to walk and just three strikes for an out, which is why I never understood why people call 2-2 an even count. That’s not even; that’s advantage pitcher, same with 1-1, but I digress. At 0-0, the pitcher has virtually no pressure to pitch to any one area of the strike zone or using any particular pitch. The information slate is nearly blank for that particular plate appearance. At 0-1, there is greater leeway to throw fringe pitches, thus, greater incentive to stay out of the middle of the plate. At 0-2 this is doubly true, which is why hitters who get in 0-2 counts produce negative results much more often. The pitcher expands the strike zone and so do hitters to protect. But in some ways, being 0-2 creates an advantage for the hitter because the hitter now has information about what influences exist on the pitcher. They now know that the pitcher is probably going to consciously stay away from the middle and is much more likely to throw a certain pitch (out pitch).

This is all conversely true as well. In 1-0, the hitter is aware that more pressure exists in that moment to throw a strike. And so on and so on. All the while, the hitter is reformulating his approach or at least, he should be. In 2-0, he should be thinking one pitch in one spot. If he doesn’t get that pitch in that spot, he shouldn’t swing. In 2-1, he can recalculate. As the count turns in the pitcher’s favor, he will expand to cover the plate but he will also understand the potential pitch selection better.

Without seeing more pitches, none of this happens. Or rather, less of this happens. It keeps the Royals from getting into counts like 2-0, 3-1, 2-1, counts that help the conscientious hitter more than the pitcher. I say it helps the conscientious hitter because it really does very little for the Francoeurs of the world who really only understand the notion of swinging at all cost.

The Royals BABIP right now is .302, which is fifth in the AL—not bad. Of course, they never walk so they need their BABIP to be in the .315 range to score a significant amount of runs. Do you see the perfect storm of why they aren’t producing offensively? Swinging at non-premium pitches. Putting balls in play weakly. Pitchers going very deep into games. It starts with their approach at the plate. Yes, they aren’t hitting for power, but that’s in large part because they are swinging at non-premium pitches and putting them in play early in counts. Yes, they aren’t walking, but that’s because they have a philosophy that doesn’t stress patience at the plate (By the way, the top five teams in walk percentage are all above league average in runs per game including the Tigers who are tops in runs per game at 5.37. They are also tops in BABIP, which means they’re walking and then hitting those runners in).

There might be some who want to blame the hitting coach(es) for this. It’s really not their fault(s). This is an organizational problem, and Kevin Seitzer was just as disinterested in seeing pitches. The organization as a whole does not stress the importance of seeing pitches and consequently does not emphasize it enough in the minors nor consider it enough when constructing a roster.

And because it’s organizational, it’s a problem not easily solved.

It was a tough week to swallow. The boys in blue went 1-6, with four of those losses being by two runs or less. For their sloppy play as much as their terrible record over this week, I’m giving them a D for this week. If they continue playing like this, which I don’t think they will, some of the Royals faithful might need to be placed on psyche watch. Including me. I will lead us to the padded cells.

To the themes:

I have the power (if you grew up when I did you should get this reference)

Early in the week, the Royals showed why Kauffman Stadium really isn’t a homerun park by smashing the ball out of Camden Yards. They hit six homeruns in the Baltimore series, which even though they lost the Baltimore series, had some fans breathing a little easier. It showed that maybe the Royals aren’t completely incapable of hitting homeruns. It’s really hard for a team to win if it can’t hit the ball out of the yard. Conversely, it gets easier to win if you hit balls out of the yard, as the Yankees proved during their sweep of the Royals. I’m not sure this power surge is sustainable; I’ve never really seen the Royals as a homerun hitting team, but the guys they count on for power (Eric Hosmer, Billy Butler, Mike Moustakas, Alex Gordon) have to find a way to hit the ball over the fence now and again or the Royals are once again going to be a team whose high batting average doesn’t correlate to high run totals (there are other factors as well though).

May 6, 2013; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals right fielder Jeff Francoeur (21) cannot make the catch in right field in the sixth inning of the game against the Chicago White Sox at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Denny Medley-USA TODAY Sports

Lineups and linedowns

Does anyone on Earth know what Ned Yost is doing right now?  This week saw the move that many of us, including me, hoped for: Jeff Francoeur and Chris Getz riding pine …  sort of. A day after Jarrod Dyson and Elliot Johnson took their places, they were right back in, indicating that it might be a platoon situation that would have Francoeur hit against lefties. But Yost told the keyboard cowboy Bob Dutton that this is not a platoon situation (see Dutton’s twitter feed for confirmation). Then what the hell is it? On Sunday, Yost decided to really screw with anyone who wants logic from the world by starting Dyson in center and Francoeur in right against a righty. Huh? Where am I right now? Is this … what the … what!?

The Getz situation seems to have a temporary fix but isn’t really resolved. Johnson started every game of the New York series, which really starts begging the question, what role is Getz filling at this point? I don’t know anyone who thinks Johnson is the answer at second base so it’s probably just a matter of time before the Royals do something to change that situation (hopefully call up Johnny Giavotella and send down Getz).

As for the Francoeur-Dyson situation, anyone’s guess is as good as mine at this point because something other than logic seems to be driving Yost’s decision making. Or I should say a logic that I cannot decipher is driving Yost’s decision making. It makes sense to righty-lefty platoon the two; I wouldn’t do it that way, but it makes sense. It makes sense to simply sit one of the two and play the other. It does not make sense to randomly play one and sit the other based on a seemingly arbitrary set of factors or perhaps no factors at all.

It’s one of those situations that makes me wonder if I’m losing my mind and slipping into an alternative reality.

The best defense is a good defense

I’m one of those people who went into this season believing in the defensive capability of the Royals. They have great range, I thought. They’ll get to balls no other team can, I thought. This will be one of the edges they have over Detroit, I thought. It turns out it doesn’t matter how much range you have if you can’t catch or throw the ball. The Royals made nine errors this week. That’s right—nine errors THIS WEEK. The Arizona Diamondbacks don’t have nine errors all season (8). The Royals have 27, fifth most in the Major Leagues, and they haven’t played as many games as anyone above them on that list.

I do love the range, and I do love the playmaking potential. But damn! Nine errors in one week? There are many little league teams looking at that and saying Put a tent on that circus.

In times like these, I’m reminded how very simple this game is at times: You throw the ball. You hit the ball. You catch the ball.

Oh Billy-Billy-Billy

Butler has one job. He only has one job because he only does one thing well: hit. Ok technically, he’s a two-tool player. He can hit for average and he can hit for power, but it’s all a part of the only thing he can do … hit. Luckily for him, hitting for average and power happen to be two very valuable and fairly rare tools. Those tools will keep him in country breakfasts for the rest of his life.

But right now, he’s looking less like Country Breakfast and more like a breakfast Hot Pocket in that he’s terrible and making me want to vomit. I love Butler. I really do. He seems like a swell guy, and he’s a great hitter. But he’s hitting .228/.350/.377. For a designated hitter, that’s pretty bad, though the on-base does cushion the blow a bit. For a designated hitter who is supposed to be the team’s offensive force, the team’s best hitter and run producer, it’s very bad. Right now, he’s strugglin (read it with a country accent for emphasis).

It’s actually not surprising at all that the Royals aren’t winning right now with Butler adding virtually no value. Over the last week, he has been an empty spot in the lineup. Normally, Butler is one of the most comfortable looking players at the plate. There are times when it looks like he was born and raised in the batters box, but right now, he’s guessing, flailing, getting frustrated and confused. It’s hard to watch for those of us used to his mastery at the plate. Yes, I think he’ll turn it around, but perhaps that’s because I know that he has to for this team to win.

That’s all I got. Time to drown my sorrows in a Milky Way cake while crying uncontrollably and listening to Tears for Fears.

Apr 28, 2013; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals center fielder Jarrod Dyson (1) singles in a run against the Cleveland Indians during the fourth inning at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Peter G. Aiken-USA TODAY Sports

I don’t want to sound the all-clear too early, but according to the most trustworthy person I’ve never met—Bob Dutton—Ned Yost is considering making some changes to the lineup that include less of Jeff Francoeur and Chris Getz. (awkward white-guy dance in my office while no one is looking to celebrate).

I’ve been one of the most critical of the decision to play these two but most especially of the decision to play Francoeur (I was actually in favor of giving Getz the job out of Spring Training because he earned it and Giavotella did nothing to earn it). So, what I want to do with this post is make the argument I’ve made repeatedly across different posts but in one central location for those who have yet to read it. The argument is that Jarrod Dyson should be starting over Francoeur.

Francoeur and Dyson represent a somewhat difficult line of comparison for two reasons: 1) they are remarkably different players; 2) Francoeur has a lot of major league data to draw from while Dyson has relatively little. In order to accommodate these differences we’ll have to use that thing that allows statistics to come to life: intuition. This is closely related to reason and logic but is not exactly the “eye test” so beloved by Hawk Harrelson. It’s a way of seeing what is most important to the ultimate goal of winning baseball games within the context of what’s already in place.

So, here is the overarching reason Dyson should be playing instead of Francoeur: he’s more valuable. We’ll start with their WAR, a flawed but useful stat. In 2012, the only season in which Dyson saw significant playing time, he posted a 1.6 bWAR (that is WAR as it is measured by Baseball Reference). To be fair to Francoeur, I won’t use his 2012; it was the worst season of his career. Instead, I’ll look at 2011, arguably the best season of his career, in which he posted a 3.2 WAR. Dyson posted his 1.6 WAR in 330 PA and a few handfuls of pinch running appearances. Francoeur earned his 3.2 WAR in 656 PA.

If we simply ended the analysis there, Francoeur looks to have a case for starting over Dyson or at the very least, has a case that he is equally as valuable. If we extrapolate Dyson’s 2012 into a full season, it equals roughly Francoeur’s 2011. We can really keep this analysis extremely simple by asking ourselves one question at this juncture. Do we think Dyson’s 2012 was an anomalous career year? If it wasn’t, if Dyson can do better or at the very least consistently do that well, the answer is simple; Dyson should be starting over Francoeur. Because we know that Francoeur’s 2011 was a pretty anomalous career year. He hadn’t had a year like 2011 since 2007, and those two seasons represent his only full seasons over 3.0 bWAR. He has had a few seasons of negative bWAR, meaning he was worse than replacement level. This includes his 2012 season in which he was -2.3 WAR and the worst everyday player in baseball.

I feel confident saying that Dyson is either capable of maintaining his 2012 performance or improving on it. Here is why. Dyson only hit .260 in 2012, which isn’t great. That comes from a fairly good BABIP of .318, which is pretty typical of fast guys who can scrounge a few extra singles with their legs. The reason his batting average was so low was an unusually high strikeout percentage of 17 percent. It was usually high because in the minors his strikeout rate has been closer to the 12-14 range. However, he also had a fairly high walk rate of 9.1 percent. This gave him a .328 OBP. Dyson’s value is very tied to his ability to get on base and run. As he gets more acclimated to major league pitching, it seems reasonable to believe that he can cut down on strikeouts and put more balls in play, which with his speed should mean a higher average and thus, a higher on-base percentage.

But even if Dyson doesn’t improve at all, even if he only ever performs at the level he did in 2012, he would be a better starting option than Francoeur because the likelihood of Francoeur replicating his 2011 is very low. The inconsistency experienced over his career is remarkable, but if there was a safe bet on Francoeur’s WAR over a given season, it would lie in the .5-1.5 range, which is just below major league average. Nothing to write home about. Some argue that Francoeur has value because he has more power than Dyson and a better arm. This is partially true. Francoeur’s arm and power are better than Dyson’s but not nearly enough to make up the difference in range defensively or the wildly inconsistent offense. And really, Dyson has a pretty good arm as well.

The fact is Dyson is a better defender, and he’s the better base runner by a wide margin. Those are certainties, not open for debate among reasonable people (though I’m sure a few will chime in below to show just how “reasonable” they are). At the plate, Dyson has shown that he can hit at a level that is comparable to Francoeur in every area but power and probably exceeds Francoeur in on-base ability, especially once given a chance to get more plate appearances and see more major league pitching.

The only question people should really be asking is why did this take so long for Yost to see?. 

P.S. Many favor a platoon split in this situation (Francoeur against lefties; Dyson against righties). While this is more appealing than seeing Francoeur all the time, I’d still start Dyson over Francoeur against most lefties. That’s how little faith I have in Francoeur’s ability to be a positive force at this point, regardless of his career numbers against lefties, which aren’t terrible. And while Dyson is worse against lefties, he hasn’t had enough big league plate appearances to tell us that the split will be significant enough to take the dire action of playing Francoeur.

Though they only played five games, which is tough on diehards like myself, the Royals did well in those five games going 4-1, which brings their overall record to 17-10. That’s very encouraging, especially when they took two of three from the Rays and the White Sox (we’ll see if they can get the sweep tomorrow). For that, they get an A grade for this week.

Here are some themes for you:

Apr 30, 2013; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals third baseman Mike Moustakas (8) connects for a home run in the sixth inning of the game against the Tampa Bay Rays at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Denny Medley-USA TODAY Sports

‘Call the park ranger because the Moose is on the loose!’

I promised a friend that once Mike Moustakas started heating up, I would use this Dan Plesac line (potentially misquoted) that he and I find hilarious. It’s kind of hokey, and that’s why I like it. It might be an overstatement to say that Moustakas is back or that he’s hot or that he has “found it,” but last week, I predicted a turn around from him. And he certainly is turning it around. I’m not one to pass up an opportunity to point out when I’m right. So, I’m going to point it out while it’s still true. This last week, Moustakas went 6-16 with a double, a homerun, four RBI, two runs scored, and one walk. That’s a very solid week. He has also played tremendous defense in the Chicago series so far. It’s not a coincidence that Moustakas and Eric Hosmer are playing decent (not necessarily to their potential but decent), and the Royals have won four games in a row and look pretty dangerous.

The next step for Moustakas is to start driving the ball out of the park. His power seems to come in bunches so if he gets a couple of homers in the next few days, watch out. He could have a big May in the homerun column.

‘Life’s a dirty game. You gotta play dirty to win it.’

I’m sticking with quotes for the subheads this week. This is from The Wire, but it’s also in a hilarious standup comedy bit from Aziz Ansari (watch it). I use it to reference the dirty nature of statistical analysis, and by dirty, I mean noisy. And by noisy, I mean the stuff that doesn’t add up completely. Recently, Nate McLouth said something really stupid about advanced statistical analysis that was praised by this writer at MLB.com. But it is important to note that there are things teams do to beat odds or to squeeze every bit of win potential from their team that don’t show up statistically. This is why a team like the Orioles, or the Royals, can outplay their Pythagorean win-loss or perform better than their statistics profile says they should because they will do things to win a lot of one-run games. That said, those statistics are still very valuable, and most often teams can’t maintain outperforming their major statistical outputs.

I bring this up because the Royals are 17-10. Yesterday, the most recent baseball reference update, they were 16-10, but their Pythagorean win-loss was 15-11. So, in essence, they have stolen a game. The Royals are now 7-4 in one-run games, and 3-0 in extra-inning games. Does that mean, they’re getting lucky and eventually that luck will run out? No, not necessarily. It could mean they’re a team that is well constructed to win close games. More likely, it means that they’re a team that has pitched really well and not hit much, which leads to close games. In some ways, sabermatricians look at outplaying one’s Pythagorean win-loss, or one’s statistical profile, as a bad thing because it suggests that a high win total isn’t sustainable. But the Royals will probably need to out perform their statistical profile in order to make a playoff push this year, only because they get a lot of value from areas that are tougher to measure. They get value defensively. They get value on the base paths. These are the advantages they hold over teams like the Tigers. Those areas are tougher to measure than the value of hitting home runs and striking people out, but they allow you to win tight games.

Don’t get me wrong. I’m not saying that the “little things” are more important than smashing homeruns. They aren’t. But for the Royals, Life’s a dirty game. They gotta play dirty to win it.

‘We couldn’t do diddley-poo offensively.’

A classic Jim Mora sound byte. My personal favorite is “Playoffs,” but we’re not there yet. This is an obvious theme so I won’t spend much space on it: the Royals are scoring more runs lately. Before this week, they couldn’t do diddley-poo on offense. This week, they were shutout once to start the week but then scored eight, nine, two, and six runs respectively.

‘And like that, poof. He’s gone.’

Chris Getz!? Chris Getz!? Where are you!? Wait, I just remembered I don’t care. Getz has been MIA, and it’s been F-A-N-T-A-S-T-I-C. At first, Ned Yost fed the media some nonsense about allergies, which I had actually never heard before. What professional athlete misses a game because of allergies? These guys play through real injuries, and Getz can’t play because his eyes are itchy? The man plays on grass for a living. What’s he allergic to, extra-base hits? Walks? Hitting above .250? I thought the allergies thing was pretty funny. He started Saturday and Monday, but frankly Elliot Johnson and Miguel Tejada did a much better job in their turns at second base. They aren’t the answer but neither is Getz.

It’s been said before, but it’s Johnny Giavotella time. I know the arguments against, so no need to make them in the comments section. But at this point, Giavotella can’t be worse and has the potential to be much, much better.

That’s all for this week. Hopefully, next week I’ll be writing on the massive win streak the Royals are on.

Apr 28, 2013; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals second basemen Chris Getz (17) makes a throw to first over Cleveland Indians base runner Lonnie Chisenhall (8) during the fifth inning at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Peter G. Aiken-USA TODAY Sports

Another five-game week for the Royals, and I think a large majority of fans have had enough off days. When a team like the Royals is playing winning baseball, momentum is important, and it’s tough for them to build momentum when they have off days every other day. Grrrr!

The Royals went 3-2 this week, which brings their overall record to 13-9. Not bad, but the sting of losing to Cleveland and some bum named Corey Kluber 10-3 makes me want to grade this week out at a B. The Royals get some props for splitting with Detroit and for taking the first two from Cleveland, thus assuring a series split, but there is no reason they should have lost that game to Kluber. They didn’t even look like they wanted to play the second game of that double header, and I’m finding it more and more difficult to stomach the terrible lineup decisions of playing Chris Getz and Jeff Francoeur.

Onto the themes before I start breaking stuff:

Moose, out of the woods?

Not yet, but he’s looking better at the plate than he was (here’s a post from Michael Engel about it). He’s popping the ball up less, and he’s taking more pitches and walks. In Sunday’s first game, he took three walks and had a base hit. In the second game, he went 1-4 with a double. I haven’t been a fan of the conversation about sending him down. To me, that’s ridiculous. There’s no one who can perform much better than him, and I don’t see anything at this point to indicate that it’s more than just a significant valley.

If a problem does occur, it will come just as Eric Hosmer’s did last year. He’s start to press, lose confidence, change some stuff, and before you know it, the wheels fall off. I see Mike Moustakas as a more resilient guy than Hosmer so I think this is the start of his turn around. His numbers for this whole season will probably never rebound completely, but that doesn’t really matter. If he can forget the season before now, and start helping the team win again, all will be forgiven.

And he needs to stop kicking the ball around, too.

Split the good teams; bash the bad ones

There’s no great science behind winning in baseball. Beat the teams you should. That’s pretty simple. This week, the Royals got the opportunity to show their fanbase that they could employ this strategy to a degree. They faced Detroit first, a team that by all accounts is “better” than the Royals. In a series shortened by rain, they split two games. Nicely done. Then, they faced the Cleveland Indians, a team that’s struggling right now. They took two of the first three, and they’ll try for three out of four tomorrow. If they end up splitting this series, that’s a disappointment.

In my very humble opinion, this Cleveland series was a wonderful chance to get on a nice winning streak. Cleveland was ripe for a sweep. I think The Royals let them off the hook Sunday night, but they can still win the series, which is the ultimate goal.

Ned Yost benches a ton

The bench play this week has been interesting. Yost has dipped into it quite a bit this week, and right now, the Royals are getting solid play from George Kotarras and Jarrod Dyson and less than stellar play from Elliot Johnson and Miguel Tejada. Early on, Yost seemed to have a personal vendetta against Kotarras, but lately, he’s showing why he’s probably good enough to start for many teams. He’s taking walks and hitting with power. That’s what he does.

Dyson, who I will reiterate should be starting for this team, played like a champ in the early game Sunday going 2-4 with two RBI and a stolen base. If only he had the chance to play everyday … hmmm … who makes that decision?

For some reason, though, Johnson isn’t even touching the ball. He’s got seven strikeouts in 17 plate appearances. I was excited about getting Johnson as the PTBNL in the James Shields deal, but that excitement is contingent on him making contact with the ball.

That’s all I have for this week. Let’s hope we’ve seen the end of rainouts, off days, Francoeur, and Getz.

The Royals only played five games this week, which is a fairly rare thing in major league baseball, but it was a five game stretch that tested them against two of the hottest teams in baseball. What grade do they receive for this five-game gauntlet of scorching hot oppenents? A-. Why? Because they went 3-2 against the Braves and Red Sox on the road under really tough conditions. They’d get an A if Kelvin Herrera hadn’t given up that three-run bomb to lose the game Saturday. This brings their overall record to 10-7, tops in the AL Central by a full game.

Now, onto some themes of this week:

April 08, 2013; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals first basemen Eric Hosmer (35) at bat against the Minnesota Twins during the third inning at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Peter G. Aiken-USA TODAY Sports

Hosmer? I barely know ’er.

I came to a realization the other day while watching Eric Hosmer flail at a fastball: he can’t hit fastballs right now. So, I started watching pretty carefully, and I put on my amateur hitting instructor cap. I determined that Hosmer looks late on every fastball because his load either 1) takes way too long OR 2) starts too late. I don’t have fancy GIFs to show you, but go back and watch some of his at-bats this year. He starts his load when the pitchers already released the ball and consequently is behind fastballs that aren’t anything special. As most of us know, and as Brian Henry so wisely pointed out in this post, he’s actually doing a great job swinging at good hitter’s pitches. He’s just not squaring them up; a lot of this is do to his tardiness on fastballs, which he keeps fouling off.

This analysis actually mirrors the conclusion of Clint Scoles over at Pinetarpress.com in his post about Bubba Starling, which is interesting. Starling is, of course, much further behind in his development so it’s not surprising that he’s struggling even more mightily than Hosmer, but there issues seem to be similar.

For Hosmer, it could be a timing thing, maybe he needs to start his load sooner. It could be a mechanics thing, maybe he needs to shorten the path of his load. Whatever it is, it’d be nice to see it fixed very, very soon.

CountryBreakfast is eating lean

Billy Butler is stumbling a little right now, but I don’t think anyone is too worried. If you dive into the numbers, there’s nothing that suggests we should be super worried. He’s not striking out any more than usual; he’s just not getting hits. His BABIP right now is .212*. Part of that is certainly of his own doing. His ground ball rate is 57.1 percent, which is about 10 percent above his norm, and with his speed, groundballs are not the best option. Just from watching the games, it seems like he’s getting behind the count more often. This might be the result of pressing or of pitchers not giving him anything good to hit, knowing the Royals have been ice cold from the four spot this year.

I think he’ll be fine.

*Roughly, these numbers were before Sunday because Fangraphs wasn’t updated yet. Butler did hit a clutch homerun in the second game of the double header, but didn’t impress much otherwise.

The true colors of Francetz

There it is. We’re used to that old tune. It’s familiar and comforting, like the Bossa Nova or “The Thong Song”. For a moment, Chris Getz and Francoeur were playing a trick on us, letting us believe they were going to behave like real, major league ball players. But now, we see their true colors. After warm starts, the two have struggled this week, and are now sporting shiny OBPs of .281 (Francoeur) and .240 (Getz). Getz has apparently decided that taking a walk is beneath him (he’s a power hitter now), and consequently hasn’t taken one yet this season. These two players are another example of a decision the Yost-Moore tandem will have to make, and that decision will say a lot about their development as decision makers.

That’s all for this short week. There were other great things (LoCain, Santana, etc.), but a world fully explored is a world without possibility.

With that in mind, let’s get to the major themes of this week:

Averages can be deceiving

On average, the Royals score 4.3 runs per game, which would have put them just below but right around league average for last year. But has this offense looked even average? Not really. Instead, it might be beneficial to do what economists often do and look at the median runs scored, which in this very limited sample size, is three. In fact, the Royals have scored three runs or less in eight of their 12 games. Their average is buoyed by a 13-run game and a nine run game. It’s great to score that much, but those still only count as one win so if the Royals hope to contend into September, they’ll need more consistent offensive output.

Apr 14, 2013; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals center fielder Jarrod Dyson (1) singles against the Toronto Blue Jays during the seventh inning at Kauffman Stadium. Kansas City won 3-2. Mandatory Credit: Peter G. Aiken-USA TODAY Sports

Optimal lineup

If Mike Moustakas had started the game today, I’d call that the Royals optimal lineup. Jarrod Dyson playing in center field, Lorenzo Cain in right field, and Jeff Francoeur and his winning smile on the pine. Dyson played really well today. He scored one of the team’s three runs and would have scored another if Alex Gordon could have hit a sacrifice fly. Yes, he made a mistake in center field that cost the team a run, but how often is that going to happen? At the very least, this ABSOLUTELY should be the Royals lineup against right-handed pitchers.

Power outage

If you’re looking for power, right now Kauffman is no place to find it. The Royals are tied for last in the AL in homeruns, and there are currently 18 players with as many or more homeruns than the boys in blue. Moustakas’s bat has been MIA. Eric Hosmer is hitting line drives and base hits instead of driving balls out of the park. Gordon’s spring power seems to have evaporated. It’s just not great to be a souvenir seeker at the K right now. If you believe Ryan Lefebvre, and I don’t know why you would, the Royals will start parking the ball once the weather gets warmer (i.e. in the next series when they play in Atlanta). Of course, that seems likely only because the homerun numbers seemingly couldn’t get any worse without a major injury to Billy Butler. It might be time to rethink our notion that the Royals could have five or six 20-homerun guys.

Beating the teams they should

Fans need to give props to the Royals for sweeping the Twins. Last year, they went 7-11 against a Twins team that was awful. This year, one of the constant refrains is The Royals have to beat the teams they should beat. And it’s true. It makes very little difference if they do well against the Tigers if they do terribly against the Twins. The winning strategy will be to at least break even with the Tigers (or somewhere around there) and destroy the Twins. So far, it’s working out.

That’s all for this week. It’s time for a tough road trip. This next week will really say something about the state of the Royals.

Aug 14, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals shortstop Chris Getz (17) drives in a run with a sacrifice fly against the Oakland Athletics in the fifth inning at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: John Rieger-USA TODAY Sports

A week in the books, and for me, it was a week of great excitement and great frustration. Excitement because meaningful baseball is back. Frustration because I’m a Royals fan. This week saw many anticipated and interesting moments. Here are links to a few:

• James Shields’s first start was good but spoiled by Chris Sale.
• Luis Mendoza was stellar in his first start, but Greg Holland blew it.
• The Royals offense exploded in game one of the Philadelphia series after Wade Davis struggled in his Royals debut.

Of course, if you don’t know these things, why do you read this blog? Anyway, I’d like to look at a few patterns or themes that piqued my interest in week 1:

Strikeouts good, walks bad

Just before the season started, I wrote a post about how strikeout to walk ratio would be a very important stat to keep your eyes on this season. This is a fairly obvious statement, but apparently the Royals broadcast teams picked up on it too because they keep harping on how many strikeouts and how few walks the team has. It’s true, of course; the Royals have done very well so far with their strikeout and walk numbers. In 42.2 IP, they have 49 SO and only 12 BB. They can’t keep that rate up, but if they can stay somewhere in the area of 2.5-3 strikeouts to walks, they should be in good shape.

All we need is some patience. Yeah, yeah.

Those who got a chance to watch and listen to the games, probably noticed that the fifth inning has been magical for the Royals so far. In their 13-4 win over the Phillies on Friday, the scoring got started for the Royals in the 5th. It happened again today. If you look closely at those two games (either just watching them or digging into the stats), you’ll notice that their upturn in offense corresponded with increased patience at the plate. On Friday from the 5th inning on, the Royals saw many more pitcher per plate appearance. It’s not coincidence that three of their four walks happened after the 5th either. So, in their two high scoring victories, the Royals have 11 BB. In their three low scoring losses the Royals have 5 BB. Walks aren’t everything, but good plate discipline is important.

Frenchy and Getz gets hot!

(See what I did there?) It’s hard to argue with results. Right now, Jeff Francoeur and Chris Getz are playing well, and I know all of those who have rightly criticized both in the past, including me, are happy to see it. Francoeur is reliving his 2011 by swinging at everything that leaves the pitchers hand but actually putting it in play hard sometimes. Getz is out of his mind right now, hitting the ball hard and for extra bases sometimes. He still hasn’t walked yet, which means has on-base is still pretty low, but beggars can’t be choosers right. Let’s just hope that they continue this level of play throughout because I find it hard to believe that Yost won’t look at these last six games as proof that both are legitimate starters.

This bullpen is scary

In two ways. 1) They’re scary good, like how they dominated in the first four games of the season. 2) They’ve been scary bad the last two games. Really, Greg Holland has been scary bad and J.C. Gutierrez had a bad day. Losing game two of the Phillies series was rough. Holland was so bad, and it felt like the Royals had that game in the bag. We have so much faith in the bullpen it’s especially crushing when they don’t come through. It’s also tough because we as fans know that our margin for error it not big. We can’t give away wins like that. I think Ned Yost knows it too. He didn’t exactly blindly support Holland in post-game comments, and he was quick to pull him today for Kelvin Herrera. I wouldn’t be surprised if a switch is made sometime in the next couple of weeks, especially if Holland continues to struggle. It’ll be interesting to see how that situation shakes out.

Those are the things I found most interesting this week. I almost mentioned Billy Butler’s early struggles; then, he went out and cranked in 7 RBI today. So, I think he’ll be ok.

March 12, 2013; Phoenix, AZ, USA; Kansas City Royals starting pitcher James Shields (33) throws in the first inning during a spring training game against the Oakland Athletics at Phoenix Municipal Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Rick Scuteri-USA TODAY Sports

The Royals, of course, were below league average, which in 2012 was 2.45 SO-BB. They sat at 2.17 SO-BB with a starter ratio of 1.72. That’s bad like Andrew Ridgeley’s career after Wham!. The relievers were better, but not that much better at 2.36. We know the relievers strikeout a lot of hitters, but they also walk too many. Add to that the fact that they had plenty of long relief outings last year from pitchers like Nathan Adcock, Everett Teaford, and Vin Mazzaro, and the Royals bullpen struggled with walks. Hopefully, fewer innings will help with that.

It’s one of the most basic principles of baseball: don’t give away first base. And if you can, don’t even let the hitter put the ball in play because if they put it in play, there’s a much greater chance they’ll get on base. If they don’t put the ball in play (I’m counting a homerun as in play), and the pitcher doesn’t walk the hitter, there’s a near zero percent chance that hitter will reach base. Simple math.

The Royals know this. When they went out and overhauled their rotation, I imagine they believed the strikeouts would go up and the walks would go down. And they will. I tried to take a rough average of each member of the starting five’s SO-BB ratio throughout his career. I fudged a bit on Davis and Mendoza since elements of their careers complicate their numbers as starters. Instead, I took numbers from Davis’ 2011 (when he was last a starter), and I took Mendoza’s numbers from his three years with the Royals which equal about a season of starting. The results were that this rotation, if they perform only at their career averages, will have a SO-BB ratio of 2.25. That seems discouraging, and maybe it should be. But we must also remember that this is just a rough picture of what these pitchers might be in 2013. James Shields had a number of just average strikeout years before 2010 when he started piling up strikeouts, and that skews the data. Wade Davis had very high strikeout numbers from the bullpen last year, and we have yet to see if that will translate back into the starting rotation. It’s not as if there is no possibility that the Royals will make it into the 2.5 range.

If there’s hope that the Royals will rise above league average in the SO-BB category, it lies in a few things. Shields pitching as he has the last couple of seasons. That seems pretty reasonable. Davis showing the strikeout potential he showed in the bullpen as a starter this year. This seems doable. And Jeremy Guthrie continuing to pound the strike zone like he did with the Royals last year. We watched as Guthrie put on a show in his final 14 starts of last season, but he wasn’t striking a ton of people out. He fanned only slightly more than his usual amount while in Kansas City (5.5 K/9). The difference was he dropped his walk numbers down to 1.9 BB/9. That’s very good, closer to the numbers he put up in Baltimore in 2010 when he had a 3.83 ERA in 32 starts and a SO-BB ratio of 2.38.

It’s a stat to keep your eye on for this season. Obviously, it’s not the only way to gauge a pitching staff’s success, but it will be tough for the Royals to contend if they don’t get that number to around 2.4. Are they capable? Absolutely. But like so many things for this season, it will require progress on the part of a few key players.

The Royals chose Luis Mendoza over Bruce Chen.

A revelation. A breath of fresh and reasonable air. In my post on moving a certain terrible pitcher to the bullpen, I noted that the fifth starter decision might be a signal that Royals decision makers are changing their approach/perspective … are maturing really. So, it seems, they have … at least a little … maybe.

Mar 18, 2013; Surprise, AZ, USA; Kansas City Royals manager Ned Yost (left) during the fifth inning against the Texas Rangers at Surprise Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Jake Roth-USA TODAY Sports

The evidence for this decision was clear; Mendoza pitched much better last season and this spring. He’s at the peak of his career; Chen is about a month away from Social Security. The fact that a few years ago Chen had a slightly above league average season means very little compared to the travesty of last season, and everyone (that is anyone with eyes and the capability to reason) saw it. Everyone saw that Mendoza is a better option for the fifth spot (I use hyperbole with the term ‘everyone’ for emphasis on just how many people thought Mendoza the better option than Chen).

But that’s never stopped the Royals before. Everyone saw the awfulness of the Yuniesky Betancourt signing, and that didn’t stop the Royals from signing him and then compounding the situation by giving him a starting job at second base. Everyone saw that paying Jose Guillen money to play baseball would be a bad idea. Sign away. Over the course of many, many years, the Royals have turned their backs on reason, and there was evidence suggesting that this year, the year they’re supposed to be going for it, might be the same (tendering Luke Hochevar a contract!!!!).

Choosing Mendoza as the fifth starter flies in the face of their terrible decision making and seems to support the very simple notion that they are trying to play the best players most often (it seems so simple, right!?). It also seems to indicate that they can accurately evaluate who the better of two players is, a flimsy claim for this team from time to time. It’s not that my evaluation ability is better than those calling shots for the Royals. I mean, it is, but that’s not the point. The point is the Royals have typically been in the extreme minority in their opinions on players and still gone with grit over game performance, guts over the ability to hit a baseball.

The good spring decisions they’re making are, of course, only one step. Other important decisions lie on the horizon that will indicate if those calling the shots at Kauffman really have a new approach capable of winning. They’ve already settled on J.C. Gutierrez as the final man for the bullpen, which is, I think, not a terrible decision just a calculated one. Many on Twitter are unhappy that Donnie Joseph didn’t get the job, and while I might have chosen him, I certainly see the logic in a small-market, relatively low-budget team maintaining some priority on inventory. The backup catcher spot went to George Kottaras, another reasonable decision. But once the season gets rolling and a player starts to struggle (perhaps a certain right fielder), this ‘new approach’ will be tested, as it will near the All-Star break when Danny Duffy and Felipe Paulino come back and when it will be decision time on whether or not to move Ervin Santana.

Approaches to running a baseball team are not based on one or two decisions, they are the lens through which an organization sees the game, the perspective of their gaze. The Cardinals and Rays have winning perspectives. They don’t just make a good decision every now and then; they make consistently good decisions. In the past, when Ned Yost saw Hochevar allow 7 runs in an inning, based on his post-game comments and talk surrounding Hochevar, it seemed like he literally saw something different than I did. That’s because his perspective seemed much different than a sane person’s. It’s hard to change perspective, and I hope that we can begin to mark this time as a time the Royals decision makers found a way to change theirs. It’s looking like that might be the case.

August 19, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals pitcher Jeremy Guthrie (33) reacts in the dugout against the Chicago White Sox at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Peter G. Aiken-USA TODAY Sports

I happened to watch the Spring Training game against the Chicago White Sox earlier today, and found myself taking a lot of positives from it. I thought I’d share some thoughts about the game that seem significant to me:

I’m happy with where Jeremy Guthrie is. I was worried for a while. He looked pretty bad in his first few outings of the spring. He couldn’t locate. His fastball didn’t seem to have much zip or movement. Essentially, he looked like his Colorado self (in terms of results anyway).

Today, though, he looked like the Guthrie that made the Royals eager to give him $25 million in the offseason. He made one mistake in the fifth and gave up a homer, but other than that, he was very clean. The run he gave up in the first inning was a fluke—contingent on a soft bloop to left field on a good pitch and a hit that would have been fielded but instead ricocheted off third base. His secondary pitches looked deadly today, and his fastball had some life. Most importantly, he located.

Alcides Escobar looks ready to go. Like Guthrie, Escobar looked a little lost to start the spring. He was fighting some back spasms for a few days and looked a little pull happy early in the spring. Consequently, it looked like he might fulfill the prophecy of regression many have set for him or perhaps dip even further than most are predicting.

But against the White Sox, Escobar stayed focused up the middle and to right field. He had a nice line-drive base hit up the middle and lined out to second once. That’s what he needs to do, drive the ball to right and right center. Pull inside fastball when necessary. I’m still waiting for him to lay a few down successfully. That was a big part of his game last year—bunting for base hits—and I haven’t seen him do it much (though I haven’t been able to watch most of the games). If he can once again enact the identity of a number two hitter, he will be a very good number two hitter. Makes sense, right?

Feb 21, 2013; Surprise, AZ, USA; Kansas City Royals right fielder Jeff Francoeur (21) poses for a picture during photo day at the Royals Spring Training Facility. Mandatory Credit: Jake Roth-USA TODAY Sports

This might kill me to write, but Jeff Francoeur isn’t looking terrible lately. I watched the game against Anaheim the other day and thought Hmmm, Francoeur’s swing looks shorter than usual. In that game he absolutely CRUSHED a ball over the batter’s eye in center field. Against the White Sox today, he had two doubles, both hit very sharply with good, tight swings (that is, good for Francoeur; he’ll never be Albert Pujols). I’ve been a staunch opponent of starting Francoeur in right field, and I’m of the belief that whatever is working for him now is probably fleeting. But if he has to be the starting right fielder for the Royals, I’d rather he be playing well than playing poorly.

Interestingly, this swing seems to allow Francoeur not only to hit the ball more but to foul pitches away as well. He’s always going to swing at whatever is thrown, but if he can foul off the pitches he shouldn’t be swinging at instead of missing them, he’ll give himself more chances to put balls in play.

Alex Gordon is flat out destroying the ball. It is Spring Training, and the White Sox used minor league pitching against the Royals, but Gordon is having terrific at-bats. He’s piling up extra-base hits (including home runs) and doesn’t seem fooled by what any pitcher is doing (major league or otherwise). If he carries this over into the season, the Royals will have a serious weapon at the top of their lineup, and Gordon will force himself into the All-Star game where he should have been in the last two seasons (2011 for sure).

Hawk Harrelson is a terrible play-by-play guy (the game was on MLB.tv via the White Sox Broadcast).

I realize that these are all positive (except for the last one). Maybe that’s because the game went pretty well; maybe it’s because I’m getting more and more optimistic as the season approaches. I don’t know. Right now, the Royals look ready to put their best foot forward to start the regular season.  Let’s hope nothing changes that over the course of the next week.

December 12, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals general manager Dayton Moore speaks during the press conference at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Denny Medley-USA TODAY Sports

About a week ago, I wrote a post vilifying the Royals for their flippant use of the term “competition”. I chastised them for using a rhetoric of lies while giving players like Luke Hochevar the chance to continually disappoint. I even had a very witty Ron Mexico joke in there.

The very next day, they pulled Hochevar from the rotation, and my post was DOA.

Go ahead and search the major Royals blogs (especially Kings of Kauffman, which his in my opinion the bestest blog ever!). You’ll find plenty of writing about Hochevar’s move to the bullpen so I’m not going to go there. I’ll just state that moving a guy who can’t pitch with runners on base into a position in which one primary function is to pitch well with guys on base is a little confusing. But here’s hoping he turns into Mariano Rivera.

Instead, I’m thinking about the shift in approach that this move signals … if it does in fact signal one … which I don’t think it does. Those same writings on Hochevar mention this potential shift, but I’m not so optimistic that a shift has necessarily occurred. In fact, I’m not sure that Hochevar being moved could even be evidence of a shift in approach.

Moving Hochevar is not an un-Royals move. It’s actually a very Royals move once viewed as a whole. Because you can’t look at this move in the moment; it must be looked at in its entirety. What have the Royals really done here? They drafted a guy number one overall, moved him quickly threw the minor leagues, pushed him to be their number one starter, and then stuck by him through one of the worst starting pitching careers in history. They stuck with him much, much longer than anyone in their right mind would have, and finally, when they were the last ones left to realize what he was, they made a move to salvage that product.

In what way is that un-Royals like? On different scales (over different periods of time) that’s the story with Jason Kendall and Mike Jacobs and Jose Lima and so many others that if we crowd sourced might fill multiple rosters. Go ahead, name the one’s I’ve left out for the sake of brevity in the comments section.

No, Hochevar is not the measure of a shift in approach or attitude or perspective. The Hochevar move is a team making a big mistake, realizing it way, way, way too late, and trying to salvage. The real test of whether or not a shift in approach has occurred might be in the two other fifth starter candidates: Luis Mendoza and Bruce Chen. Anyone with eyes knows that Mendoza is the better pitcher and deserves that job. Anyone who knows baseball a little, knows that Chen’s best years (the two roughly average years he had with Kansas City) are behind him. Choosing Mendoza over Chen might signal that the Royals have opened up more to bailing on their mistakes when they’re apparent, a small shift in attitude but an important one. It might signify that they no longer get oddly protective of certain players who can’t perform, as if those players are all David Glass’s favorite nephews.

Really, it will take a body of decisions to evaluate whether or not the Royals decision makers have evolved their thinking to fit a team that is seemingly in place to win now. Do they stick with Jeff Francoeur if he struggles mightily in the first month? Do they send Donnie Joseph to AAA even if he is the best option they have as the last member of their bullpen and their best LOOGY option? These are difficult decisions (ok, the first one isn’t) the answer to which changes depending on where a team is at in its progress. If a team is rebuilding, options and service time and protecting large numbers of players is more important. If a might contend, those things should matter less (that doesn’t mean they shouldn’t matter at all; it just means they should matter less).

The next month and a half will give us a clearer indication if the those pulling the strings at Kauffman Stadium have actually wised up or if it’s just business as its often shitty usual.

Dec 6, 2012; Nashville, TN, USA; ESPN anchors from left Jon Sciambi , Buster Olney and Tim Kurkjian broadcast live during the Major League Baseball winter meetings at the Gaylord Opryland Hotel. Mandatory credit: Don McPeak-USA TODAY Sports

Last night, I held a writing workshop for some students at UNL. Because there’s no dress code, and I’m not a fashion person, I wore what I usually wear to teach: jeans and a tee shirt. But not just any tee shirt, my favorite tee shirt. My Alex Gordon jersey shirt.

I just got it for Christmas, and I love it because Gordon is my favorite player. I’m thinking about putting some pine tar across the back of it. You know? Like Gordon gets after taking his practice cuts on deck.

At the end of this workshop, this student came up to me—a real bro-lookin kid, looks like he thinks Ray Bans are a new, cool thing, loves V-necks and some guy named Drake. One of those types of guys. He wasn’t a part of the workshop, just a guy hanging around. He started talking to me, which is fine. He asked me some questions and such, and it became clear that he thought I was a student like him. It happens.

Then, he noticed my shirt.

“Are you a Royals fan,” the kid asked.

“Yes. A big one, actually,” I said.

“Well, they’re good.” His sarcasm was very plain.

“I’m hoping they will be this year,” I said with a smile veiling disdain.

The kid then proceeded to tell me why the Royals are bad, effectively, why I’ve chosen poorly. Apparently, I was uninformed of their history, and that was why I had aimlessly wondered into Royals fandom like a child who wonders into a movie. Of course, his approach was tactless, but hey, the kid’s 20-years-old and the mayor of Bro-town. What can I expect? The interesting thing was that his critique did not provide the reasons why the team is bad (weak lineup, no depth, whatever). Instead, his argument rested on the notion that the Royals are just bad. Always and forevermore. The end. As he saw it, it is in their nature to be bad. He has no way of conceptualizing them as anything other than bad.

His position is an interesting one to think about and reminded me of an article I read earlier yesterday. It was ESPN’s ‘Future Power Rankings’ where they rank teams based on how good they will be over the next five years. If you read it, you’ll see that the Royals are 20^th, which is pretty low on the list. When I see articles like this, and hear comments like Mayor McBro’s, I’m reminded that the national media and the wider baseball fan base view the Royals much differently than I, and many inside the Royals bubble, do.

This ‘Future Power Rankings’ list was put together by Buster Olney, Keith Law, and Jim Bowden—all people I respect very much. But I bet even if you put a panel of three very pessimistic Royals bloggers together, they would place the Royals higher on this list. And they’re much harder on the team than most.

Of course, some would question such a panel of Royals bloggers as bias because they’re emotionally invested in whether or not the team wins. Perhaps it would be. But let’s not assume it would certainly be bias, and let’s also not assume that a bias doesn’t exist in the rankings provided by Olney, Law, and Bowden. It’s a compelling conundrum because Olney, Law, and Bowden must spend their time thinking on a national scale, which means they certainly do not have the same single-minded focus as writers like Mike Engel or Rany Jazayerli. They may be influenced by the national narrative that seems to have frozen the Royals into the position of American League doormat. These are biases of a different sort, but impact one’s view just the same. At the same time, Engel and Jazayerli want the Royals to win and are emotionally tied up in the team. Their bias is obvious (though not obviously positive).

I don’t know that one point of view is better than another; I just know it surprises me to see that most people in this country expect the Royals to finish in the cellar this year … every year. I’ve been focusing heavily on the 2007 Rays a lot lately, but how many people (Olney, Law, and Bowden included) would have placed the Rays in the top-10 of the ‘Future Power Rankings’ in 2007 or 2006*? Probably not many. And now, they’re perennial playoff contenders in the toughest division in baseball. Obviously, that’s what I want for the Royals though I understand that the past narrative of the Royals indicates otherwise.

*These rankings didn’t exist until 2012.

For me, it will be a happy day if/when that narrative is proven false. When it is, I’m taking a trip to Bro-Town.

But there’s not much I can do about that. I’ve tried to be as objective as I can, giving credence to data, patterns, comps, and general understanding. I tried to limit the influence of things I feel matter less—how I wantthe team to do and certain statistical elements. With that in mind, here is my prediction for the Royals’ 2013 season: 90-72.

June 14, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals left fielder Alex Gordon (4), center fielder Mitch Maier (12) congratulate center fielder Jarrod Dyson (1) after sliding in safely for the winning run in the ninth inning of the game against the Milwaukee Brewers at Kauffman Stadium. The Royals won 4-3. Mandatory Credit: Denny Medley-USA TODAY Sports

I know; I know. It’s much more optimistic than most people’s, but someone has to be the outlier, the nut job. I have no problem being that guy. Let me tell you why it’s so high.

For starters, read my last post. The basis of my very generous prediction is my belief that the Royals are set for a breakout similar to that of the Rays in 2008. The Rays greatly improved an atrocious pitching staff in 2008, which allowed them to make a tremendous jump in wins.* The Royals probably aren’t set for as large a jump in pitching performance—mostly because their bullpen wasn’t as bad in 2012 as the Rays bullpen in 2007. But the Royals have the potential to improve greatly both offensively and in pitching (the Rays improved only slightly offensively).

* I am currently working on a theory that improving starting pitching may disproportionately improve a teams win total.

What would it take for the Royals to orchestrate a Rays-like turnaround? I’m glad I rhetorically asked. Essentially, the Royals need flip their run differential from -70 to +100—keeping in mind of course that the number of runs they scored and surrendered last year will not effect the number they score and surrender this year. A +100 run differential puts them in the general neighborhood of 90 wins. (Note: run differential is the difference between how many runs the score and how many they give up.)

It all starts with starting pitching. If the Royals get their starting staff’s ERA down to roughly the American League median (4.30) and increase their innings by 100 to 990 and their bullpen simply stays the same, their runs allowed would drop from 746 to 635. An increase in starter innings to 990 is very reasonable, perhaps even conservative, as Ned Yost and James Shields have already stated that their expectation is 1000 innings from the starting rotation. For the sake of conservative estimate, this is also predicting no improvement at all from the bullpen, though it should improve with the starting staff going deeper into games. Last year, the bullpen was woefully overused forcing the Royals to rely on a large number of bullpen arms some of which were not their best. Which is to say, 635 is a conservative expectation for runs allowed; it could be lower.

Of course, the Royals only scored 676 runs last season so ONLY improving the starting pitching would put them at what most people are predicting, roughly 85-87 wins. The Tigers had a Pythagorean win-loss of 87-75 last season with a run differential of +56. But if the Royals improve offensively, they should make a significant jump in wins. In 2011, the Royals scored 730 runs with fantastic years from five of their top-nine players (in terms of playing time) and four pretty bad years from Chris Getz, Alcides Escobar, Mike Moustakas, and a combination of Matt Treanor and Brayan Pena. Given where players like Moustakas, Escobar, Eric Hosmer, Salvador Perez, Lorenzo Cain, Jarrod Dyson, and Johnny Giavotella are in their development, I think it’s very possible that the Royals make it to around 730 runs. Maybe in another post I’ll do an analysis of this lineups potential to score runs, but for now, let’s just say I think they can make it to around 730. The caveat, of course, is health, but I think they’re more capable of dealing with a few injuries than in the past few seasons (though perhaps not certain injuries to key players).

A run differential of around +100 gives the Royals a chance to win around 90 games. Last season, Texas had a run differential of +101 and had a Pythagorean win-loss of 91-71 (actually record, 93-69). And all it really requires is that the starting pitching pitch average (which is honestly asking too little of the first four, especially James Shields), and the lineup progress as young lineups do.

Honestly, I think the low predictions for the Royals by most people are the result of viewing 2012 conservatively: The Royals ONLY won 72 games in 2012. I see 2012 and say Wow the Royals were able to win 72 games despite the never-ending stream of crap that came their way. Four Tommy John surgeries, including the two most effective starting pitchers. Cain–out for half the season. Perez–out half the season. Jeff Francoeur—the worst everyday player in baseball. Hosmer—a year no one expected. Jonathan Sanchez—12 of the most horrific starts I’ve ever seen. All of this stuff happened and more, and yet, they still managed to win 72 games—one more than in 2011. And their Pythagorean win-loss was 74-88 (in 2011 it was actually better at 78-84).

September 27, 2012; Detroit, MI, USA; Kansas City Royals catcher Salvador Perez (13) during the game against the Detroit Tigers at Comerica Park. Mandatory Credit: Rick Osentoski-USA TODAY Sports

Now, I know bad stuff happens, but I just cannot image all of this bad stuff happening again. And I think if something bad does happen—if Francoeur has another abomination of a season, if Perez misses time—the Royals are more equipped to handle it. George Kottaras is better than Humberto Quintero and Pena. The Royals have two people in place who can play a serviceable right field and seem more willing to bench Francoeur if he’s not performing.

Yes, on the flip side, some of the players who had great seasons in 2012 may regress, but really, only three players had better than expected seasons in 2012: Escobar, Billy Butler (with increased power), and Jeremy Guthrie (with the Royals anyway). I don’t think anyone thinks Butler is going to have a bad season. He may not hit 29 homers again (I think he’ll hit at least as many), but he will produce. Escobar seems likely to regress a little, but he’s a young guy so it’s not unusual for him to be getting better. Don’t be surprised if he can stick in the .280-.290 range. Guthrie may regress, but I don’t think he’ll fall too far—certainly not to where he was in Colorado. I imagine he can regress and still be at least league average.

Essentially, my prediction for the Royals sees what most people see; I just think it will yield more wins than they do. Most people see Hosmer having a bounce-back season. Most see the starting staff getting better. Most see the Royals getting a better year out of right field. Most see Moustakas improving as well. So, why won’t they win 90? And you can’t say because they’re the Royals.

For more encouragement, look at the addition by subtraction. Sanchez will not make 12 starts this year. Yuniesky Betancourt will not make 228 plate appearances. I love Pena, but he and Quintero will not have a combined 370 plate appearances. Luke Hochevar will not be allowed to make 32 starts with a 5.73 ERA, and the Royals have pieces to replace him.

To me, this is a recipe for a big turnaround. So … I’m predicting a big turnaround. Sure, some things have to go right. The Royals need to stay healthy, especially Perez, Alex Gordon, and Shields. But that’s every team in every season. Maybe my prediction is overly optimistic, but I just can’t look at the data and see only average in this team. The talent is better than that. If they play as they can play, they have a chance.

October 02, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals starting pitcher Jeremy Guthrie (33), first baseman Eric Hosmer (35), center fielder Jarrod Dyson (1), and shortstop Alcides Escobar (2) celebrate after the game against the Detroit Tigers at Kauffman Stadium. The Royals won 4-2. Mandatory Credit: Denny Medley-USA TODAY Sports

I watched Moneyball again last night. That movie is my crystal meth; I just love it so much. In my smitten swoon over baseball and logic and analysis, I started looking at stuff online and ended up on the baseball reference page for the 2007 Tampa Bay Rays.

If you’ve been paying close enough attention, you’ve heard James Shields compare the Royals of 2013 to the 2008 Rays, a team Shields helped lead to the World Series. Like the Rays, Shields claims the Royals are on the cusp of a breakthrough. In Yostian English, the Royals are about to turn a corner.

So, in the context of this comparison, the 2012 Royals should look like the 2007 Rays. And you know what’s kinda crazy? They do.

Let me halt this train for a moment to first state this. I find the notion that a team’s previous win total limits their potential win total troubling. While I know it may be true that the Royals winning 72 games in 2012 might reflect that their talent level is that of a 72-win team, thus keeping us from predicting 95 wins in 2013, I also know that the number of wins in 2012 really has nothing to do with its play in 2013. And yet, we—bloggers, fans, commentators—write and speak as if it does, as if that win total will somehow prevent the team from reaching certain heights the next year. This gets expressed in arguments that sound like I really can’t see the Royals jumping from 72 wins to 90 wins because they added James Shields. Or the more coded I just don’t think the Royals have gotten “that much” better. These are all focused on the idea that a team’s win total from last season is necessarily a predictor for its win total for the next.

Of course, I am not crazy and do realize that a team’s win total might just be a reflection of how good that team is and/or will be. But we know this isn’t always the case because we see teams like the 2012 Baltimore Orioles and Oakland A’s—and the 2008 Tampa Bay Rays. Our challenge, I think, is to recognize when a teams record doesn’t necessarily reflect where it’s at developmentally.

In 2007, the Rays went 66-96. In 2008, they better than flipped that at 97-65, maybe the most remarkable turnaround in MLB history. That’s a 31-game swing. When I started looking at the 2007 Rays page though, I wanted to know is this team really like the current Royals? Why were they so bad in 2007 and so good in 2008? Can the Royals duplicate that swing, at least to some degree?

The first one is easy. They were so bad in 2007 because their pitching was terrible. Here’s a little table thing of the 2007 Rays pitching staff:

A 5.20 starter ERA! That’s worse than the Royals in 2012. In 2007, that ranked 28^th in MLB. Somehow, their bullpen was even worse—dead last with a 6.16 ERA. They had the worst team ERA in baseball (5.53) by nearly half a run and gave up more runs as a team than every team by over 50 runs. Important to note, though, that Shields was their oldest primary starter at 26.

Their offense was better than their defense but still not great. They were 15^th in runs scored (782) and had a team slash line of .268/.336/.433. The Royals were a little worse than that last year at 20^th. Of course, that 2007 Rays team had some good hitters—B.J. Upton, Carl Crawford, Carlos Pena, Ty Wigginton, Delmon Young. Pena had a monster year (1.037 OPS); so did Upton. The Rays lineup was a little further along in the maturation process. But Upton, Young, and Crawford were all still young in 2007, and virtually none of their good hitters were even 30.

Is this starting to sound familiar? A terrible pitching staff coupled with a young, talented group of hitters who have yet to completely mature. What’s interesting to me is that the Royals 2013 lineup probably has a chance to be better than the Rays 2008 lineup if Eric Hosmer and Mike Moustakas realize their potential.

So, what happened to the Rays in 2008? It’s very simple. Their defense (by defense I mean pitching and fielding) went from unbelievably bad to elite. They shaved well over a run off their team ERA dropping it to 3.82, third in the majors. Their offense ranked two slots higher, 13^th, but scored fewer runs at 774—offense was dipping all over baseball. Really it was almost entirely the defense (again pitching and fielding) that picked up 31 extra wins. The Rays allowed 671 runs in 2008, a 273 run drop from the 944 they allowed in 2007. If it hasn’t dawned on you yet, that is freakin incredible.

How did they make this seemingly remarkable jump? Well, it actually isn’t all that remarkable looking at the starting staff. They shaved over a run off the starting staff’s ERA, but none of their top-5 starters had an ERA under 3.49 in 2008. They brought up Matt Garza whose 3.70 ERA took the place of Jason Hammel’s 6.14. Edwin Jackson and Andy Sonnanstine matured into roughly league average seasons—4.42 and 4.38 respectively—after playing much worse the year before.  Their bullpen took a giant step forward as well, which is bound to be the case when it’s historically bad. The improved bullpen was a big chunk of the puzzle, but as we know, the Royals bullpen is already pretty stellar, which is probably why they managed to win 72 games instead of just 66.

Do I think the Royals rotation has what it takes to get them into the top-five in the league? I’m not sure. I won’t say no. I think Shields is capable of an ERA around 3.00-3.20. I think Santana and Guthrie are capable of ERAs in the 3.70-4.00 range, and I think Wade Davis is capable of getting into the 3.50 range if he learned from last season. On the flip side of that, each could be the bad versions of themselves.

This is all in the way of saying that we shouldn’t discount the similarities between the Rays circa 2007-2008 and the Royals 2012-2013. They’re actually developing in fairly similar ways. I know as a fan base we’re trained to see only what might go wrong, but we should at least be aware of exactly what and how things might go right.

In a week or so, I think I’m going to come out with my prediction for the 2013 season. Don’t be surprised if it’s higher than some of the others.

August 01, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals starting pitcher Luis Mendoza (39) signals to the crowd after being relieved in the eighth inning of the game against the Cleveland Indians at Kauffman Stadium. Kansas City won 5-2. Mandatory Credit: Denny Medley-USA TODAY Sports

Recently, Craig Brown over at Royalsreview.com wrote on an interesting question: Why not Luis Mendoza as the fifth starter?

He notes the response the Royals have to that question, that Mendoza will perform best in a long-reliever/swing-man role. We’ve heard similar arguments for keeping Aaron Crow in the bullpen and Jarrod Dyson as a fourth outfielder. The premise for that line of reasoning is that it’s best to give players roles in which they will be most successful.

This logic is flawed. Or rather, this logic is flawed if a team’s primary goal is to win the most games it can.

I know it seems solid. It seems like a no-brainer. Of course the Royals should want players to have roles in which they can be most successful. DUH!

Wrong. The Royals should want players in roles that will make the team most successful, and no they are not the same thing … well, most often they are the same thing … but not always.

Let’s use Mendoza as an example, as he’s one of my favorite Royals because his potential value is underestimated (also because he’s got a killer head of hair and seems like a good dude). Before last season and this season, Ned Yost indicated that he felt Mendoza’s most fitting role was as a swingman. Oddly enough, I agreed*. Mendoza had the potential to be most successful as a swingman in comparison with all the other swingmen in the league. He’s a prototypical swingman. He’s flexible, can eat innings, and can pitch well enough to keep teams in a ball game during spot starts. Plus, the Royals don’t have to worry about his future because he’s maxed out his potential. That’s the textbook definition of swingman.

*If you check out this article I wrote about Mendoza, you’ll see I thought he’d be a great swingman. Of course, this was before I knew how effective he could be as a starter.

But as I stated earlier, in this case, it doesn’t matter what’s best for Mendoza; it matters what’s best for the Royals. And in this case, what is best for Mendoza (in terms of pitching well relative to a role) is not what is best for the Royals. The 2012 Royals rotation was awful, and Mendoza was the best pitcher in it (second best when Jeremy Guthrie came to Kansas City). As anyone who knows anything about baseball is aware, an average starting pitcher is more valuable than an above average swingman, especially when the alternative to that is a below average starting pitcher.

If we imagine the options, we can think of it with this question: Which scenario will help the Royals win more, a starter with a 4.20 ERA and a swingman with a 5.00 ERA OR a starter with a 5.00 ERA and a swingman with a 4.20 ERA? If you’re struggling, the answer is the first scenario will help a team win more because starters pitch more innings. Also, it’s easier to find players who can fill backup roles like swingman and fourth outfielder with average numbers for those roles.

August 28, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals center fielder Jarrod Dyson (1) is congratulated by teammates after scoring in the sixth inning of the game against the Detroit Tigers at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Denny Medley-USA TODAY Sports

When looked at this way, it seems like common sense, right? A team should want their best players playing in the most valuable roles. But if the rhetoric is to be believed, Yost (and perhaps Dayton Moore) see things differently. That is to say that they’re very concerned with putting players in the most fitting roles perhaps to the detriment of putting the best players in the most valuable roles.

I give you Jeff Francoeur and Dyson. By statistical measure, there is not much of an argument to be made that Francoeur is a better player than Dyson, even before his horrendous 2012. Francoeur’s career OBP is .310; Dyson’s is .320 (and last year was .328). Francoeur hits for more power but is a liability on the bases and not a tremendous outfielder (of his five full seasons since 2008, he’s had negative UZRs in three of them). In all the advanced metrics, and the old-fashion stats as well, Dyson was a MUCH better player than Francoeur in 2012 and also played better than many of Francoeur’s other seasons, arguably better than 2011 too.

And yet, Dyson is probably best suited as a fourth outfielder. But on this team, they don’t have anyone better than him as the third outfielder. Logic dictates that the Royals play Dyson in center to maximize his value to the team and move Cain to right, thus playing their three best outfielders the most and maximizing their value to the team. Of course, they aren’t going to do this. Perhaps, it’s because they mistakenly believe that Francoeur is better than Dyson. I hope this isn’t the case, but I’m guessing that’s part of it. Along with that, though, is this ridiculous notion that Dyson IS a fourth outfielder and Francoeur IS a starter. These identities are fixed in the collective mind of Royals decision makers, unchangeable and forevermore.

This mental rigidity prevents the Royals from maximizing the talent they have. It’s rooted in old notions of what certain players look and act like—backup catchers are defense only guys, knuckleballs are weird, any lefty pitcher can get out any lefty hitter. Antiquated thinking. It will keep them from giving Irving Falu a shot at second base, because how can a guy be successful if he spent so long in the minors? It will keep them from using Mendoza in the rotation, because why would they want a league average starter over Luke Hochevar? It will cost them wins in 2013 as surely as it cost them wins in 2012.

I came to this conclusion the other day when, in a particularly strong bout of optimism, I thought maybe the Royals can find a way to do it this year. If they keep it close into September, maybe they can take this division with 90 wins after a late season run. *eye twinkle*

This led to an unfounded belief that maybe the Tigers aren’t as good as people think. So, I dug into the numbers, and was crushed by the reality that the Tigers are freaking incredible on paper. It’s kind of hard to look at.

October 02, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals third baseman Tony Abreu (34) gets the out on Detroit Tigers second baseman Danny Worth (29) at second base and throws to first in the seventh inning at Kauffman Stadium. The Royals won 4-2. Mandatory Credit: Denny Medley-USA TODAY Sports

Start with their pitching staff, third in the AL in ERA (3.75) last year, and that was with a suspect bullpen. They were second in starters’ ERA at 3.76, which is fantastic. Their top four starters had ERAs under 3.74; Justin Verlander led the group with a 2.64. The only starter in their top six in starts with an ERA over four was Rick Porcello, and I could see him losing his spot in the rotation to Drew Smyly. Every one of these pitchers other than Porcello had a K/9 rate of at least 7.64, and each of them had a BB/9 rate under three.

On the offensive side, the picture doesn’t get much prettier (that is if you’re hoping for the Royals to compete; if you’re hoping for the Tigers to win 95 games, things are looking great). The Tigers’ team slash line was .268/.335/.422. They were fourth in the AL in OPS at .757 behind New York, Texas, and Los Angeles. Of course, that was without their starting DH, Victor Martinez, who was out the whole year with a torn ACL. He’ll be back this year because clearly they need more help hitting bombs off Luke Hochevar.

The most terrifying aspects of this lineup are not Prince Fielder and Miguel Cabrera. They’re incredible; they’re going to hit. Everyone knows it. It’s guys like Austin Jackson and Andy Dirks who really stand out. Jackson hit .300/.377/.479 last season. He was worth 5.5 WAR (according to fangraphs), which was more than Prince Fielder. Dirks, in only 344 PA, hit .322/.370/.487 and was worth 1.6 WAR, a number dragged down by his poor fielding.

To help with all this, noted Royal killer and ageless wonder Torii Hunter has joined the Tigers. YAY!

That’s not to say that the Tigers are without flaws. Jackson and Dirks’ numbers were inflated by very high BABIPs—but so are Alex Gordon’s. There’s no telling where Martinez will be after ACL surgery, a year away from baseball, and being another year older. He’s 34 years old. In fact, this team, while not old, has plenty of miles on it and plenty of padding around the waistline. I wonder sometimes how Cabrera and Fielder hold up as well as they do with all the weight they carry, and essentially, this is the Royals’ only hope: that the Tigers get hit by the injury bug.

Of course, there are other deficiencies in their game that might make an AL Central race more interesting. The Tigers’ added bulk makes them pretty useless running the bases. They’re a one-base-at-a-time kind of team. It also makes them a below-average fielding team. Jackson is good in center field, Jhonny Peralta is decent at shortstop, and Omar Infante is pretty good at second base, but that’s about it. Everyone else actively hurts them on defense, especially Cabrera and Fielder, with the possible exception of Hunter in right field, though most of his value last year came from his arm, and we’ll see if that holds up.

Oct 24, 2012; San Francisco, CA, USA; Detroit Tigers pitcher Jose Valverde (46) walks back to the dugout after being relieved by manager Jim Leyland (middle) in the seventh inning during game one of the 2012 World Series against the San Francisco Giants at AT

The great question is if the Tigers are so great, how come they only won 88 games last year? Well, the defense and base running are a part of it. But the real answer? The bullpen. It was 10^th in the AL in ERA and blew 16 saves last season, which doesn’t include games it blew before a save opportunity was in place. The Tigers lost 23 games via a relief pitcher, which means 23 times last year, the rotation handed a game over to the bullpen either tied or in the lead and lost that game. The Royals only lost 21 games in relief, and their bullpen pitched over 100 innings more than the Tigers’. To put it in greater perspective, the Texas Rangers bullpen pitched roughly the same number of innings as the Tigers’ and lost only 14 games.

And really, there isn’t much to indicate that the bullpen will be a lot better, but bullpens are finicky. Meaning it’s tough to count on their bullpen being bad again. More likely, their bullpen will be average, and won’t lose them so many games next season.

In a way, though, I’m glad the Tigers are as good as they are on paper. It makes the notion of the Royals chasing them a little more exciting. James Shields in interviews compares the 2013 Royals to the 2008 Tampa Bay Devil Rays. I’m not sure it’s a fitting comparison, but the Devil Rays had two mammoth teams in their division to compete against and were better for it. Yes, the Tigers are great on paper. They are most certainly the favorites in the division, but sometimes something special happens.

And I’m back to unfounded optimism.

A few days ago it dawned on me as I was scrolling through a game log from last season. I kept seeing games pass that looked like this: (W 2-1) (L 5-1) (L 4-2) (W 1-0). In this short example, the pattern now seems relatively clear. In 2012, the Royals won most of their low scoring games, but lost many more of their high scoring games.

April 10, 2012; Oakland, CA, USA; Kansas City Royals first baseman Eric Hosmer (35) loses his bat during the eighth inning against the Oakland Athletics at O.co Coliseum. Mandatory Credit: Kyle Terada-USA TODAY Sports

The Royals were 57-13 (.814) when they allowed three runs or less. Even at the high end of that span, when allowing three runs, they were 20-7. In itself, that’s not a remarkable stat. Teams should win games in which their pitching staffs allow three runs or less. In that sense, the Royals took care of business. It is a somewhat encouraging stat, as the addition of James Shields and the revamped rotation can hopefully produce more games in which three runs or fewer are allowed.

The remarkable thing about the Royals record in games allowing three runs or less arises in contrast with their record allowing four runs or more: 15-77 (.163). Of course, it also is not stunning that the Royals lost more games than they won when allowing four or more runs. What’s telling is the huge gap between allowing three runs and allowing four. As noted before, the Royals were 20-7 when allowing three runs, but when they allowed only a single run more, they were 5-16. Add only one more run (five), and the record moves to 2-16. When allowing four or five runs, the Royals were 7-32 (.179). So, the winning percentage jump looks like this:

Allowing 3 runs – 20-7 (.741)

Allowing 4 runs – 5-16 (.238)

Allowing 5 runs – 2-16 (.111)

Let’s provide some context for these marks. The Baltimore Orioles, a team the Royals would like to emulate in 2013, won 93 games in 2012. When allowing three runs or less, they were 68-8 (.895), a little better than the Royals. When giving up four or more runs, they were 25-61 (.291); that’s .128 points better than the Royals. Looking at how well the Orioles did in games allowing four or more runs, the picture starts to form. The Orioles managed to win more of the games their pitching staff didn’t control, the games they “shouldn’t” win. This becomes even starker when we look at the in-between games in which four and five runs were allowed:

Allowing 3 runs – 15-5 (.750)

Allowing 4 runs – 10-9 (.526)

Allowing 5 runs – 6-9 (.400)

Notice the Orioles won more of their games allowing four runs than they lost. The Royals were 25 games under .500 when allowing four or five runs. The Orioles were two games under .500 doing the same. If you watched most of the 2012 season, you know the lineup didn’t produce the way most fans hoped it would, but this level of disparity warrants new ideas about why.

Here’s what I’ve come up with. In 2012, this team didn’t respond well to their pitchers giving up runs. The reality of baseball probabilities states that once you are behind, your odds of winning dip below 50 percent. So, when you’re down 1-0 in the first, your odds of winning drop to something like 42 percent. If you go down 5-0, the odds drop to something like 12 percent (approximated numbers that may be way off). This is true of every team, but the Royals seemed to have even greater difficulty dealing with deficits. Their record when behind in the fourth inning was 8-57 (.123). The fourth inning is still very early, and yet, they lost at a very high rate. Contrast that with our comp team, the Orioles, and the difference is clear. The Orioles were 13-38 (.255) when trailing in the fourth inning.

We can’t clearly determine a cause here. We can speculate: their youth, their inconsistency, their morale, their lack of confidence. I know from watching games that at certain points if a pitcher gave up a few runs it was hard to envision the Royals coming back. They seemed to press in those moments at the plate, try to do too much. Whatever it was, if another team made it to four or five runs, it seemed like the Royals were out of the game.

Anecdotally, we know the Orioles won a lot of games by keeping them close and winning late. The numbers bare that out as well, but there are two really important things to note in this data. 1) The Royals need to win more games when allowing four or five runs if they’re going to be successful in 2013. 2) They need to find a way to battle back. Maybe that will be easier if they don’t have to battle back every game. Maybe the experience of last season will help players understand how to battle back. I don’t know. But it needs to happen.

This new, shiny pitching staff is great because it allows the Royals to put more games into the category of three runs or less allowed. But good teams win a significant portion of higher scoring games. They pull out some games they shouldn’t. It has to happen if the Royals want to have a chance to run with teams like the Tigers. It’s not just about getting better in shiny categories; it’s about getting better in categories that are bound to be ugly. Every team is going to have a losing record in games giving up four or more runs. The Royals need to find a way to have a not-as-bad record in those games.

October 1, 2012; Pittsburgh, PA, USA; Official baseballs lay on the field before the Atlanta Braves and Pittsburgh Pirates game at PNC Park. Mandatory Credit: Charles LeClaire-USA TODAY Sports

Last Saturday, I got the chance to speak with a group of people at the Society for American Baseball Research’s SABR Day in Kansas City. The KC chapter needed a last second fill-in for the Wonderdog Rex Hudler and asked Kings of Kauffman if we could send a representative. I volunteered, and I’m so glad I did.

I got up and did my thing, talking about different Royals players, answering questions about the upcoming season, and consistently making Jeff Francoeur and Luke Hochevar the butts of jokes. Most of my stuff was related to advanced statistics, or SAB(e)Rmetrics if you will. If you read my posts consistently, you know that I use sabermetrics a lot (though I don’t know if I’m actually a sabermetrician because I don’t do my own math; I borrow math from people).

After I spoke, a man named Bob Meyer introduced the audience to a book he’s just published. Bob was a semi-pro baseball player in Iowa for many years but lives in Kansas City now. He’s older, remembers the days of sandlot ball and more localized teams. He told stories about playing ball in the service and how he knew it was time to stop playing when he started arguing with umpires.

His book, Small Town Baseball—Big League Dreams*, is a reflection of the man himself. As Bob put it, “it’s not hard baseball,” meaning it’s not about how to construct a good team, and it doesn’t employ anything as intricate as wRC+. Instead, Bob’s book relates the most simplistic, elegant, and wonderful features of a game that is so much more than a game to so many. Bob’s book tells stories, or, more accurately, it lets people tell their stories, the stories of semi-pro baseball in small-town Eastern Iowa.

Of course, on the surface, Bob and my talks looked very different. I talked about how Francoeur is a less valuable player than Jarrod Dyson; he read from a story about a pageant that takes place at a tournament in Dyersville. Bob had stories of Bruce Kimm’s time in Eastern Iowa; I had opinions on Bruce Chens’ chances to win the fifth starter spot.

Perhaps those talks were very different, but I know that I was enraptured by Bob’s stories. I know that when I heard him talk about how semi-pro baseball is dying I was sad in the way I was sad watching Ken Burns: Baseball when I learned that there used to be vibrant small-town teams that died out as big-league baseball got increasingly popular (television and such). I felt caught up in the romanticism of funny stories from these old, semi-pro players, caught up in a way that I wanted to hold, like a good dream.

And Bob, though he seemed hesitant to talk “hard baseball,” sparked a great discussion during my talk about bunting for hits. He gave wonderful numbers off the top of his head about a player who had a high number of bunt hits many years ago. That conversation went on for 15 minutes or so, and I can say with no certainty that we exhausted the ways in which bunt hits can be talked about.

I sometimes worry that by emphasizing statistics so much that I’m excluding the things that bring us to baseball in the first place: narratives. Nobody watches baseball because Billy Butler has a terrific wOBA. We watch because the narratives weaving in and out of the game, transitioning across decades, being passed from people like Bob hopefully to people like me, captivate us. They grab us by the guts and force us to love something that may consistently let us down—Royals fans.

The great thing about this false dichotomy, statistics v. narrative, is that it’s so easily destructed. It holds up under examination about as well as that whole Mayan apocalypse nonsense (unless none of us are really here, and you’re not really reading this … whoa … mind blown). Statistical analysis only adds to those narratives. It provides context. It’s the realism to Bob’s romanticism. Both necessary, both compelling in their own ways. We do ourselves a disservice when we ignore the importance of one to elevate the other.

*If you’re interested in ordering a copy, you can e-mail Bob at bobmeyerbooks@gmail.com. All the proceeds go to charity (the CFCA and Camp Courageous). That’s the kind of man Bob is.

September 16, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals catcher Salvador Perez (13) drives the ball to right field against the Los Angeles Angels during the ninth inning at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Peter G. Aiken-USA TODAY Sports

*The other two are James Shields and Alex Gordon because I don’t think many think the Royals have a chance to win without either of these three. Someone in the comments will inevitably mention Billy Butler, and while he’s very important, he doesn’t play defense and is a liability on the bases—barely missed the top three.

For proof, let’s look at who replaced him during his time out of the lineup in 2012. While the Royals’ record wasn’t tremendously improved by his return, which was probably the result of his impact being offset by a slide from Mike Moustakas and the continued ineptness from the starting staff, his added value compared to those he replaced was ENORMOUS. In 74 games, Perez produced 2.6 WAR (from Fangraphs). Humberto Quintero racked up .3 in 43 games, Brayan Pena was -.3 in 68 games. In just a few more games than Pena, Perez was worth nearly 3 WAR more. That’s incredible. His 2.6 WAR was ninth best in MLB among catchers, and he only had 305 PA.

From a strictly offensive standpoint, Perez simply produces more runs than most catchers in the league (and he’ll turn 23 in May). Among qualifying catchers, Perez would have been eighth in wRC+ (weighted runs per PA plus) at 114, just behind A.J. Pierzynski—but he didn’t qualify. Many of the other catchers on that list are primarily offensive catchers, guys like Pierzynski, Joe Mauer, and Ryan Doumit, and he hung with them in his age 22 season.

Back to Perez’s stand-ins. Perez has a wRC of 41, which means by this measure he created 41 runs. In 340 combined PA, Quintero and Pena created only 25 runs, 10 for Quintero and 15 for Pena. Both of those were below league average per plate appearance. I’m not certain, but I don’t see Brett Hayes doing much better.

Of course, it’s the amazing defense that makes Perez an oddity. Unlike Pierzynski, the league doesn’t commit repeated grand larceny on Perez. Pierzynski had -5 DRS (defensive runs saved) in 2012; Perez had 9 in 74 games. Many compare Perez to Yadier Molina, and looking at the numbers from last season, that seems reasonable. Molina led the league with 16 DRS—a number Perez may have reached in a full season of work. Only Molina and Buster Posey have the same type of dynamic catching ability mixed with firepower on offense that Perez has. Both of those players have led their teams to World Series championships. Coincidence? I think not.

I like numbers and stats and things, but for this type of assessment, we need also to imagine. Let’s close our eyes and ask this question. Can you imagine the Cardinals winning their championships without Molina? Can you imagine the Royals winning with Hayes catching every day? If you answered yes to the first one, I can see your point. Those Cardinal teams had Albert Pujols and great pitching and a great manager. If you answered yes to the second one, you may be forgetting the Royals do not have Pujols or undeniably great pitching or a great manager. Perez actually means more to the Royals than Molina means to the Cardinals because the Royals have fewer proven players and fewer resources to obtain new players. The Royals need every run saved and created.

This is a sobering idea because Perez didn’t play the whole 2012 season. He’s a big catcher with a lot of potential for injury. If he gets hurt, I cannot imagine the Royals competing for a playoff spot. In that sense, their season rests, in part, on his body. All the projections and optimism and expectations mean very little if he gets hurt. The same might be true of Shields and Gordon; they seem like lynchpins. It’s an article for another time, but it seems like small-market teams have more lynchpins because of their inability to replace fallen players. I think we can safely say that the Royals would have no ability to replace Perez. He’s a weapon few have and one the Royals cannot live without.

October 02, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals second baseman Irving Falu (19) is congratulated by left fielder Alex Gordon (4) after Falu scores in the fifth inning of the game against the Detroit Tigers at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Denny Medley-USA TODAY Sports

We’re in the home stretch now. Or, in baseball terms, we’re rounding third on the off-season. Only about a month and a half before pitchers and catchers report. Thank God. I can’t stand all this lack of baseball. I’ve probably watched 15 archived games from last season—more if you include some games from James Shields and Wade Davis I’ve watched. That’s how starving I am for Royals baseball. I’m watching games I already know the outcome of.

Today, I watched a game from September and got to see my boy Irving Falu play. I just love Falu. He’s got this energy that makes him fun to watch. Also, he hit .341/.371/.435 last year, which kind of adds to the energy. In the game I watched, he also played a mean second base.

Watching Falu, and Jarrod Dyson in center, got me thinking about what I want the Royals 2013 lineup to look like—not what I think it will look like—but what I want it to look like. Of course, the concept is purely academic. Dayton Moore does not consult me on roster construction (YET!), and Ned Yost does not call about the lineup each day (though he should). But I think it might be a decent conversation starter to tell you how I think the lineup should be constructed. Then, you can tell me I’m wrong if you want.

So, here’s the lineup I’d like to see the Royals use starting the 2013 season:

Alex Gordon (7)

Alcides Escobar (6)

Eric Hosmer (3)

Billy Butler (DH)

Mike Moustakas (5)

Salvador Perez (2)

Lorenzo Cain (9)

Irving Falu (4)

Jarrod Dyson (8)

Bench:*

Jeff Francoeur

Tony Abreu

Brett Hayes

Chris Getz

*I included the bench because I want to show who I’d like on the 25-man roster as well.

I think there are three major points that I should support with this lineup.

1. Falu at second base

Why not Falu at second base? Seriously, in what way has his performance over the last two seasons not been worthy of a shot at second base? I know people like him as a utility man, but I can’t see a second baseman on this roster better than him. Chris Getz? Uhhh, no. Johnny Giavotella? He’s looking more and more like a AAAA player every day. Falu’s numbers last season were most certainly the result of a small sample size, but that doesn’t mean that he can’t follow the same formula for success that a free swinger like Salvador Perez has. Falu only walked 4.4 percent of the time in his 97 PA in 2012, but he only struck out 9.9 percent. He puts a lot of balls in play. His BABIP was an astronomical .382, which led to his high batting average, but his might be consistently high if he keeps putting so many balls in play.

The knock on Falu is that he may need a high BABIP to maintain a high batting average and on-base percentage because he doesn’t walk that much. That’s fine because it looks like he might be able to have a BABIP higher than .300 fairly consistently. Plus, his walk rates in the minors have typically been in the 8-9 percent range, indicating that once he settles into a role, he may feel more comfortable taking walks.

In Falu, the Royals have a mixture of Getz and Giavotella. Falu can defend like Getz and hit like the ideal Giavotella (I say ideal because he hasn’t hit yet). In my ideal lineup Falu is the starting second baseman, and I think he can put up a .290/.340/.415 line in that role. I put Tony Abreu on the bench because he can play more than just second base. I put Getz on the bench because, in theory, he could play third base, and that gives the team a little flexibility. So, if Alcides Escobar needs a day off, Getz could take second and Falu could move to short—and a whole bunch of other combinations.

2. Dyson in center; Francoeur riding pine

This is probably not too shocking. I don’t know anyone who thinks that Francoeur should be playing every day. Then again, I don’t know anyone who thinks Dyson should be playing every day either. But Dyson has the potential to be an every day player. Francoeur has fulfilled his potential, and it’s not everyday material.

I put Dyson there because I think even if he has a season like he did in 2012 (.260/.328/.322) he’ll be more valuable than Francoeur. According to Fangraphs, in 330 PA, he was worth 1.6 WAR last season, mostly because he was worth 7.9 baserunning runs above average and 2.4 fielding runs above average.  Even in Francoeur’s standout 2011, he was only worth 2.9 WAR in 656 PA, and his OBP was only .329—one point higher than Dyson’s from last year. I don’t expect Francoeur to be as bad as he was in 2012, but I don’t expect him to be as good as he was in 2011. I do think Dyson can at least reproduce his 2012, but over 660 PA instead of 330, meaning he should be able to make it toward the 3 WAR range.

I also have faith that Dyson can improve on 2012 a little bit. He did ok in 2012 without fully understanding the approach he should be taking at the plate. If he continues to work on that, he could be even more valuable. I made that point a little bit in an early post when I described how Dyson should become a more effective bunter.

With his baserunning ability, defense, and even his bat, Dyson is just more valuable than Francoeur. So, put him in center field and shift Cain over to right. I left Francoeur on the bench because he can hit lefties a little so if they want to rest Dyson against tough lefties, they can move Cain back to center and put Francoeur in right.

3. Gordon leading off

Despite the fact that I like Dyson—maybe more than most—I don’t want him leading off. He doesn’t get on base enough for that, yet. The fact is a lineup needs to give the best hitters the most opportunities. Those who hit at the top have more plate appearances over the course of a season than those at the bottom. So, good hitters at the top, worse hitters at the bottom. It’s pretty simple.

Gordon is one of the best leadoff hitters in the game. It’s weird, but it’s true. He’s not a major stolen base threat, which is fine because he’s a big-time doubles threat. He’ll put himself in scoring position with doubles instead of doing it with stolen bases. But the thing that makes him a very good leadoff hitter? He gets on base consistently—.376 OBP in 2011, .368 in 2012. Yes, he strikes out too much, but that’s not as big of a deal as people make it out to be for a leadoff hitter. I don’t care if he strikes out as long as he gets on base.

And though Gordon isn’t a base stealer, he runs well. He takes extra bases, and he doesn’t clog things up like Butler does. Frankly, there are only two consistent on-base guys on the Royals active roster—Butler and Gordon. Since Gordon can run a little, he’s perfectly placed to lead off. Would it be ideal if he had Dyson’s speed? Sure, but it’s more important that he gets on base.

There are some who think Gordon should hit lower because he can be a run producer. It’s true that Gordon can hit virtually anywhere in the lineup, but it’s tough to produce runs when no one is on base. Gordon’s value to this team is as a do-everything type. He can score 100 runs and knock in 80 runs in the leadoff spot. In 2011, he scored 101 runs and had 87 RBI; 64 runs and 56 RBI in 89 games as a leadoff hitter. As a leadoff hitter in his career, Gordon has a slash line of .306/.381/.501. That’s an OPS of .883. I want that level of production getting a very high number of plate appearances, and I want that guy on base when Butler hits.

*          *          *

That’s all I have for the lineup. As for the bench, I chose 13 for the position players because I think they’ll need fewer bullpen arms. I’d like Manny Pina to win the catching job instead of Hayes, but that’s not a huge difference maker (unless Perez gets hurt, in which case this whole thing is kinda screwed). I kept Francoeur on the 25-man roster because I’d like this to be semi-realistic, and though he’s not a very good fielder, he does provide a good arm in right field and can sort of hit left handed pitching.

This lineup also seems to indicate that I’m pretty much off the Giavotella bandwagon. I hate to say that, but he’s had 376 PA, and the numbers are atrocious. I like Giavotella as a guy; I had very high hopes for him, but I’m just not seeing it. I’d like to be proven wrong, and I’m open to that happening. But Giavotella is either a starter or a AAA player. He’s not a backup infielder because he can only play second, and he doesn’t even do that very well. Maybe he’ll prove me wrong with a strong showing in Spring Training. But if not …. FALU!

The hard truth is there are no reasonable and good answers to the right field problem. There are pipe dream answers—trade for Giancarlo Stanton. There are insufficient answers—maybe Jeff Francoeurwill play like he did in 2011. But there aren’t any realistically hopeful solutions.

Apr 6, 2011; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals batter Jarrod Dyson (1) lays down a bunt during a game against the Chicago White Sox at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Peter G. Aiken-USA TODAY Sports

Previously, I’ve posited the notion of platooning Francoeur and Jarrod Dyson. Presumably, Dyson would play center field and Lorenzo Cain would move over to right field. The idea being that Francoeur can kind of hit lefties, Dyson can kind of hit righties so maybe together they could be slightly above replacement level. That solutions sounds fairly reasonable and more hopeful than simply allowing Francoeur to enact that seizure like thing he calls a swing at the plate 600 times this season.

Of course none of this would be an issue if Dyson would simply fulfill his potential as a ball player. If he became the player he could be, he would play center, Cain could take right field and Francoeur could start his own lawn care service or something. It’s interesting because by signing Willy Taveras, the Royals have brought in a model to show Dyson what type of ball player he could and should be.

Whenever I see Dyson play I think to myself If this guy knew how to bunt, he’d be an every day centerfielder. Dyson had five bunt hits in 2012 in what amounts to a half-season’s worth of plate appearances. So, project him out to a full season of everyday action, and he’d have roughly 10 bunt hits in a season. That may seem like a lot, but it really isn’t.

Now, let’s look at Taveras. If you ever watched him play in his prime—2005-2007 roughly—then you know he was just as fast as Dyson and bunted a lot. In those four seasons, he had batting averages of .291, .278, and .320 (in 97 games) respectively. In those seasons he also had 31, 21, and 38 bunt hits. This led to really high BABIPs, which Taveras really needed because he never walked and struck out a lot.

Something that really set Taveras apart was how successful he was at bunting for a hit. In 2007, he successfully bunted for a hit 64.4 percent of the time, which is why he hit .320. Over his career, he has been successful 46.3 percent of the time when attempting to bunt for a hit. In comparison, Dyson was only successful 26.3 percent of the time last season. So, it’s safe to say that Dyson doesn’t get many bunt hits because he’s not very good at it, which also makes him try it less.

There are differences, of course, between Taveras and Dyson, and they’re virtually all in Dyson’s favor (except for the fact that Taveras is a much better bunter). Dyson has more plate discipline than Taveras ever has. Taveras has walked only 5.1 percent of the time throughout his career (9.6 percent for Dyson). Taveras hits right handed, which is actually a disadvantage when bunting for hits. Dyson, so far, has been a fairly unambiguously good center fielder while Taveras has had a couple of negative fielding seasons.

Let’s imagine that Dyson could bunt like Taveras in his prime. We’ll take Dyson’s numbers from 2012 and project them for a full season of everyday work in center field and adjust them for a more successful bunter. If we extrapolate Dyson’s numbers from 2012, we get this: 660 PA, 584 AB, 10 BUH, 38 BUH attempts with a success rate of roughly 26 percent. That keeps his season numbers exactly where they were in 2012—.260 BA, .328 OBP. Now, let’s exchange some numbers to make Dyson a good bunter. Let’s say his success rate is 40 percent (six percent below Taveras’ but equal to Alcides Escobar’s success rate in 2012). That would give him 15 BUH. With that simple change, his BA goes up to .268, and his OBP goes up to .332.

Those numbers are miles ahead of Francoeur’s .235 BA and .287 OBP from 2012 (though I don’t believe Francoeur will be quite that bad in 2013).

Now, let’s think about a scenario in which Dyson, because he’s a more successful bunter, bunts more often. Starting from the same numbers as before, let’s say he attempts to bunt for a hit 70 times in a season. At a 40 percent success rate, he would collect 28 BUH. That would leave 590 PA and 514 AB. Add Dyson’s usual performance to his increase in bunting ability and frequency, and his batting average rises to .277. If Dyson could get to .277 and roughly .335-.340 OBP, he could be an everyday centerfielder with his excellent defense and baserunning ability.

What are the odds of this occurring? Maybe 5 percent. People need to give Dyson a lot of credit for how much he’s improved over his time in the Royals organization. But he’s 28 years old, and developing a significant new skill is tough with such limited time.

Still, he should try. He should spend time talking with Taveras in Spring Training and working to develop his overall hitting approach to take advantage of his skill set. In fact, the conspiracy theorist in me believes the Royals signed Taveras with the intent of having him mentor Dyson a little bit. Part of Dyson’s problem is that he seems to slip out of the mindset he needs to always have—one of a speed oriented Juan Pierre type player. By the way, Pierre’s career BUH success rate is 34.3 percent. Kenny Lofton’s was 45.1 percent.

I think there’s something to this idea.

And I don’t really understand why. It’s not that people are down on Smith, but they’re not nearly as high on him as I believe they should be. With this post, I’m going to let you know why everyone should be excited about Smith. Fangraphs put Smith into the Royals top-10 prospect rankings, but he’s nowhere to be seen in the Baseball America top-10, and that’s with other pitchers like Sam Selman and Jason Adam in there.

Near the top of that list, which included Wil Myers and Jake Odorizzi, was Kyle Zimmer, and it makes no sense to me that Zimmer is rated so much higher than Smith. Set aside their makeup for now—Zimmer has the prototypical body for a top-notch pitcher while Smith is a bit small. Looking strictly at how they have performed as prospects, they seem to be very similar with Smith being a full year younger.

Both started professional baseball last season by doing a short stint in Rookie ball and then heading to Kane County. People were happy with Zimmer’s performance there. In nearly 30 IP at Kane County, he had a 2.43 ERA, 29 SO (8.80 K/9), and only 8 BB. That’s pretty good, especially for someone who hasn’t pitched much in his life. In fact, Smith may have more pitching experience than Zimmer, though not at the college level.

In comparison, Smith fared a little better than Zimmer at Kane County. He pitched 67.1 innings with 87 SO and 20 BB. Smith’s ERA was a touch higher at 2.94, but that’s probably due to a BABIP of .349. Think about that. Smith had a BABIP of .349 and still had an ERA under three, but that’s not unbelievable because he struck out 11.63 batters per nine innings. He faced exactly 300 hitters in both Rookie ball and low A and struck out 98 of them (that’s almost a third). Of course, Smith is a high school draft pick so he’s doing all of this at 19 years old. Zimmer is a young college signee, and was 20 last year.

For a comparison, Danny Duffy had a 11.24 K/9 rate and a 2.40 FIP at low A. Smith’s FIP was 2.13. So, as far as performance goes, there’s no reason to not love Smith.

Let’s return to that makeup. At 6’ 0” and 170 pounds, Smith is not a big guy, and this is the heart of why people don’t hype him more. Because statistical analysis and looking past appearance has become more a part of the game recently, we sometimes forget that it’s still engrained in us to look at things like a guy’s height and make assumptions about what that guy can be. Does his body structure make him more prone to injury? I’m not sure. But I know he was healthier than Zimmer in 2012. For now, can we not get behind him because he’s doing really well and wait for an injury to sour us on him?

And let’s not forget that there are pitchers who have been successful with shorter statures. Pedro Martinez was 5’ 11”. Roy Oswalt is 6’0”. In fact, Oswalt, I think, is a decent comp for where Smith could end up if everything comes together. Oswalt threw a little harder than Smith does right now, but it’s not unheard of for a pitcher to gain some velocity in his early 20s as his body continues to develop and his motion becomes more refined.

How’s his stuff? you may ask. That’s harder to determine. I’ve never seen him play, but the reports on him range from potentially wicked stuff to above average stuff. Most agree that his fastball will probably end up around the 91-93 range, touching 95 at times. Some claim that his curveball is just devastating, and in this clip of him pitching at the Underarmor game, it looks pretty good. Here’s a report from Royals Revival on him, which I was glad to see was very optimistic.*

*Note in the comment left, a person who knows Smith mentions what a good person he is. This seems in keeping with the different pieces I’ve read on him which mention a terrific work ethic and good character.

Looking at Smith, I can’t see any reason not to be optimistic about him. He’s going to be a 20-year-old pitcher at high A next year, and if the writing on him is any indication, he has a wonderful pitching mind. He faced top-notch competition in high school coming from Florida and blew that competition away. The only conclusion I can reach is that Smith is underrated because of his height, which may be a good thing for the Royals. They took him in the fourth round, and if he continues to develop and becomes an Oswalt or Tim Hudson, the Royals can take a bow for a wonderful find. They can say they looked past his height and saw the competitor in him instead—all that cliché crap.

Regardless, it’s time for people to start talking more about this kid. When Zimmer finds his way to the majors, it may be in the shadow of Smith.

Greg Schaum, the awesome operator of and writer for Pinetarpress.com, recently projected the Royals to win 78 games next year; if you don’t follow him on Twitter you should. I was a little surprised by how low that number was, as were many others who let Greg know about it, I think. But I wanted to think about this myself as well so I started really digging into numbers, mostly projections and numbers from last year.

Schaum’s prediction seemed overly cautious but reasonable. In the offseason, things always look rosier than in reality. I was thinking maybe a little higher, 81, but certainly not 95. Then, I dug into the numbers and started to see that the potential for 90 wins is certainly there. Is it likely? Probably not. But the Royals wouldn’t really need a chorus of career years to get to 90 wins. They’d just need guys to perform as expected and stay relatively healthy.

Here’s why I believe that. I think people are actually underselling the importance of pitching changes and player growth—hard to believe, I know. This makes sense given the battered psyche of Royals fans. But if we dig into the numbers, the future looks a little brighter than the darkest parts of our hearts might believe.

We’ll start with the hitters and the projections Bill James has made for the Royals lineup, which is virtually unchanged from 2012:

September 25, 2012; Detroit, MI, USA; Kansas City Royals left fielder Alex Gordon (4) at bat against the Detroit Tigers at Comerica Park. Mandatory Credit: Rick Osentoski-USA TODAY Sports

Alex Gordon(.284/.366/.457) 19 HR, 95 R

Alcides Escobar (.272/.314/.365) 5 HR, 74 R

Eric Hosmer (.276/.342/.442) 20 HR, 79 R

Billy Butler (.300/.368/.490) 24 HR, 78 R

Mike Moustakas (.264/.316/.455) 23 HR, 75 R

Salvador Perez (.299/.329/.456) 16 HR, 65 R

Lorenzo Cain (.280/.332/.424) 15 HR, 83 R

Johnny Giavotella (.286/.339/.407) 7 HR, 55 R

Jeff Francoeur (.260/.314/.418) 13 HR, 50 R

Chris Getz/Irving Falu (.267/.327/.337) 1 HR, 32 R

Jarrod Dyson (.257/.323/.314) 0 HR, 29 R

Brett Hayes 0 HR, 10 R

I put homeruns and the slash lines in for context, but the most important stats are the runs scored. That’s what we’re interested in. Add up those runs scored and you get 725 runs. That’s not bad. That’s one run less than the Tigers scored last year and good enough for 12th in MLB. It’s also only five short of the 730 the Royals scored in 2011 with career years from Francoeur, Gordon, and Melky Cabrera. But remember, in 2011 Escobar wasn’t hitting and the Royals didn’t get full seasons from Perez, Moustakas, or Hosmer. If those players give full seasons of what is expected of them, the Royals can get to the 730 range again. They might need to maximize players’ opportunity to be successful *cough* sit Francoeur against righties *cough*, but they can be that offensively productive without out-of-this-world seasons from a bunch of guys.

Now, the pitching, and this seems to be where people are underestimating the value of the changes—hard to believe, right. Here are the projections by James for the Royals starting rotation:

James Shields (3.67 ERA, 89 R, 218 IP)

Jeremy Guthrie (4.20 ERA, 92 R, 197 IP)

Ervin Santana (4.04 ERA, 92 R, 205 IP)

Wade Davis (4.20 ERA, 89 R, 190 IP)*

Bruce Chen (4.25 ERA, 86 R, 182 IP)**

*This is my projection for Davis. James’ projection was for Davis as a reliever. I tried to approximate him based on his previous starting experience.

**I made Chen the fifth starter because I believe he should be the fifth starter.

By these projections, the Royals starting staff will account for 448 R over 992 IP in 2013. That’s a 4.06 ERA, which is an incredibly drastic change from 2012 when the starting rotation accounted for 527 R in 890 IP for a 5.00 ERA. This is a remarkable projection. For a team to shave a full run off the starting staff’s ERA while adding 100 innings is remarkable. If the Royals can do that, they will be playoff contenders almost certainly.

However, with starting pitching, injuries ineffectiveness are bound to play a role. So, for the sake of making this projection as fair as possible, let’s raise that ERA a little to 4.20 to account for some of those unknown variables. That’s around major league average. That brings the starting staff to 463 R over 992 IP (I’m still going to assume we get the same number of total innings from starters).

Sep 27, 2012; Chicago, IL, USA; Tampa Bay Rays starting pitcher James Shields throws a pitch against the Chicago White Sox during the first inning at US Cellular Field. Mandatory Credit: Jerry Lai-USA TODAY Sports

The bullpen was fantastic last year, and because there are so many pitchers in the bullpen I’m going to do their numbers as a group. They had a 3.17 ERA last year, and there’s no reason that with a years worth of experience and a better starting staff they won’t at least stay that good. Assuming the Royals pitch roughly the same number of innings this year as last, that means the bullpen will account for 162 R in 459 IP in 2013. That brings the total number of runs allowed to 625 (Again, that’s using our conservative estimate of starting pitching. If we go with James’ estimation, it’s 610 R).

Luckily, we can come up with projections on win totals from projections on run totals. The Pythagorean winning percentage formula gives our projection (725 runs scored and 625 runs allowed) a record of 92-70. Of course, that doesn’t mean that Royals will win 92 games, but I think it means that the Royals have the capability of winning 92 games without some miracle scenario.

Let me be clear. I do not think the Royals are going to win 92 games. Things are going to happen that the numbers, projections, and so on can’t account for, but I think it’s fair to say that their expectation should be between 86-88 wins. They easily have the players to win that number of games. The improved starting rotation will make an extreme difference from last year when not only did they have a staff full of 4 and 5 starters, but that staff underperformed as well. They were expected to pitch like 4s and 5s and pitched like minor leaguers (some of that was due to the injuries to Danny Duffy and Felipe Paulino). On offense, getting a full year of Perez and bounce back years from Hosmer and Francoeur will help tremendously (Yes, Francoeur is terrible, but he’s not as bad as he played last year).

The reason I think some people are coming up with projections lower than 86 wins is that we’re programmed as Royals fans to expect our players to underperform. We’re programmed to expect more damaging injuries than other teams, and it’s fair to have these reactions because it’s happened so many times. But let’s consider the alternative. What if there isn’t massive underperformance? What if there aren’t too many serious injuries? If those two are true, this team should win at least 86-88 games with the potential to win 92 and up.

That will be an extremely fun season to watch.

What I offer the viewing public is a hazy answer to these two questions: What would it have looked like if Shields had been a part of the Royals rotation in 2012? And by extension, to what extent might he impact 2013? Obviously, there are many flaws in this inquiry; most obvious among them is the person conducting it. But also, the high level of turnover makes the 2013 rotation virtually incomparable to the 2012 rotation. But using my favorite friends conjecture and speculation I’ll find a way to make it seem like I’ve stumbled upon some grand statistical truth. Or not. Yeah?

Ok. Check the methods. I started by constructing the numbers for the Royals starters from last year (this is why they may look a tenth off from other sites). I actually added up all the numbers from only their starters and did the averages and everything. So, essentially what I’m doing is replacing an average Royals starting pitcher from 2012 with Shield’s 2012. This is a little disingenuous because in reality, Shields would have crowded out some of the worst performances so chalk it up to a conservative statistical exercise. I chose to use Shields’ 2012 not just because it’s the obvious choice to compare to the Royals’ starting pitching in 2012 but also because it’s pretty representative of what people should expect from Shields in 2013. This inquiry also doesn’t account for Shields’ ability to eat innings—meaning if Shields had been in the rotation last year the Royals starters would have gone more total innings. It’s just a replacement of his innings for average Royals innings.

Here’s what I came up with:

Royals*          Shields          Royals w/Shields

Earned Runs             495                 89                   457

Hits                             981                 208                 938

Walks                          315                 58                   292

ERA                             5.00                3.52               4.62

WHIP                          1.46                1.17                1.38

*These are numbers for all 13 pitchers who started a game for the Royals last season

There you have it, a pretty remarkable difference. Almost half-a-run in improved ERA is pretty significant for one pitcher to bring to the table. He can have that type of impact because he pitches so many innings. His 227.2 innings pitched represent more than a quarter of the total number of innings Royals starters pitched in 2012—890. That is both incredible and not surprising. It’s incredible that Shields gives his team so many innings; it’s also incredible how little the Royals starters pitched last year. So it’s not surprising that Shields’ numbers make such a large dent. In innings, he’s worth 1.25 Royals starting pitchers in 2012, which if you’re a stats person is just nuts.

How do the numbers with Shields in the Royals lineup compare to the rest of the league? Still not great, but better. American League average for starting pitching ERA was 4.39, which isn’t too far away from the Royals numbers with Shields in the rotation. Last year, they were 11th in starting pitcher ERA (AL). Personally, I was shocked to learn they weren’t last or next to last. With Shields, they would have only moved up to 10th, but remember this is a pretty conservative estimate. I think it’s fair to say that in reality, with him replacing the worst performances, they might have made it near the 7-8 range.*

*This is off topic, but sometimes I wonder how this team even won 72 games last year. They were just not very good at all.

Looking ahead, I’m thinking this provides a little rosy glow to a trade many, including me, have criticized as short-sighted and reckless. Assuming the Royals get a Shields performance circa the last two years, he’ll greatly impact the rotation. The odds of a 12 game losing streak decrease dramatically, and there’s something to be said for playing with a lead entering the sixth inning occasionally. Consider that no starting pitcher for the Royals was worth more than 1.8 WAR last season, and Shields was worth 4.3, and this trade makes 2013 look hopeful. Are the Royals the favorite in the AL Central? No. But they’re in the conversation for sure.

I imagine the Royals have the chance to make it to around 4.00 ERA as a starting staff next season if everything falls into place. This would be a HUGE help. Last season, that would have been good enough for 5th in the American League just ahead of the Angels. That, of course, will require good seasons from Jeremy Guthrie, Ervin Santana, and Wade Davis as well. That’s probably asking too much, but what the hell, dream big.

Thanks to copious amounts of propaganda and time to emotionally detach from the transaction, I’m starting to feel much better about it. Is it a HUGE gamble? Yes. Essentially, Moore is betting that in the next two years Shields, and in the next four years Davis, provide enough value in helping the team win to make up for the lost value of Wil Myers and Jake Odorizzi from 2015-2018, at least. That could mean increasing revenue via winning so they can spend to sign position players long term. It could mean buying time to let Jorge Bonifacio develop and counting on him to become a legitimate everyday outfielder at the major league level. Whatever the scenario, it’s a huge gamble.

But I’m starting to fall on the side of those who think the Royals had to gamble at some point. Yes, the price was high; that’s gambling. They don’t give money to people who don’t bet. Trust me, I’ve tried that strategy and it doesn’t work. The alternative may have been to keep Myers and live with a very uncertain rotation for another year or two or more, essentially guaranteeing a non-contending team in 2013 and maybe again in 2014. People can quote all the Anibal Sanchez numbers they want; he was never coming to Kansas City. Anything less than Shields gave them an even worse shot at competing. So, when does that end? Dayton Moore decided it would end in 2013 and that he would worry about 2015 later. That might be the best move for the Royals right now. It sounds like hedging my bets, but it’s true that we won’t know until 2016 or so—maybe sooner if the Royals make the playoffs in 2013 or 2014.

I’ll leave you with a quote from one of my favorite movies, Rounders, that I think perfectly sums up the argument for why this trade might be a good one for the Royals (I say ‘might’). In it Mike McDermott, played by the awesomely badass Matt Damon, is torn between going for a big score in a poker game or playing it safe and walking away:

“I told Worm you can’t lose what you don’t put in the middle.” (He pauses for dramatic effect as he’s nearly out the door)

“But you can’t win much either.”

Zack Greinke, the lovable eccentric and part-time pitcher*, has signed his gazillion dollar deal and set the market for starting pitchers this off-season. He set it extremely high, a problem for cash strapped teams like the Royals, but they still have some room left to spend in the free agent pitching market if they would like to.

*I am, of course, joking. Greinke is an outstanding pitcher.

The problem? There’s not much left in the way of potential impact pitchers.

Sep 28, 2012; Arlington, TX, USA; Texas Rangers starting pitcher Ryan Dempster (46) throws a pitch during the first inning of the game against the Los Angeles Angels at Rangers Ballpark. Mandatory Credit: Tim Heitman-USA TODAY Sports

Let’s have a look at them:

Anibal Sanchez

Kyle Lohse

Edwin Jackson

Ryan Dempster

Francisco Liriano

Shaun Marcum

Roy Oswalt

Joe Saunders

Daisuke Matsuzaka

(this list via the ESPN.com MLB Rumors page)

Once we remove Sanchez, who the Royals either can’t or won’t afford, this list isn’t awe-inspiring. I’m going to toss a couple other names off that list as well, mostly because they’re terrible: Liriano, Saunder, and Matsuzaka.

That leaves five potential free agent targets, and it’s important to look at free agency before trades because a trade is looking less and less likely. The Royals don’t want to give up Wil Myers, and he’s the only player teams want for significant, major-league-ready pitching. I don’t think a trade’s going to happen for starting pitching at this point so free agency is the best bet for the Royals to improve.

Let me also note that not making an aggressive play for Brandon McCarthy was a mistake. Bill James is predicting a 3.46 ERA for McCarthy next season; the Royals could surely use that. Add to that the fact that he went for $7.75 million a year for two years, and it seems like the Royals missed the boat. He’s a guy who can impact the top of a rotation, and that’s the perfect contract for them. Added bonus, he could have educated the Royals coaching staff on statistical analysis.

But back to the guys still available. Do you have any favorites? I do, though each is a significant gamble. First, though, let me tell you about the guys I’m not wild about. I know Rany Jazayerli is into Marcum, but I can’t get on board with that. I know he’s a local guy, but there are too many red flags for me. He gets hurt a lot, and even when he doesn’t I think he’s overvalued. He had two healthy years in 2010 and 2011 and had xFIP of 3.71 and 3.89 respectively. That’s pretty good, but it’s not out of this world. And when you factor in his age and terrible track record making it to the mound (those two years are the only years he’s pitched more than 151 innings), I can’t get on board. It would be one thing to take a chance on an aging and unhealthy guy if he’s had a track record as a lights out pitcher (I’ll give an example later), but to take a chance on a guy whose ceiling is a decent number two, I can’t get behind that.

I can’t get behind Lohse either. To me, he’s an albatross of a contract waiting to happen. Someone is going to give him more money or more years than he’s worth and be stuck with another pitcher who had a couple decent seasons in St. Louis, got a payday, and flamed out. He’s hitting the market at just the right time. Teams are pitching desperate and the market for them is soaring. I hope the Royals stay out of the conversation with Lohse. He’s aging, he’ll demand a big contract, and he’s not nearly as good as people think he is.

There are three pitchers remaining who could help the Royals, maybe not in the front-line starter way they’re hoping, but help them for a reasonable price none-the-less: Dempster, Jackson, and Oswalt. That’s right I said Oswalt. I know he’s older than the dust that collects on dirt, but why not take a chance on him? I don’t think many are courting him. Demand is low after what looked like a pretty bad stint with the Rangers last year. But was it that bad? No. In fact, the peripherals were great. He struck out 22.4 percent of batters (9.00 K/9), walked only 4.2 percent (1.68 BB/9), and had an xFIP of 3.27. His ERA was out of control because he gave up a crazy number of homeruns (1.68 HR/9) and his BABIP was enormous at .378. Bill James projects Oswalt to have a bounce back year with a 3.64 ERA and 3.52 FIP. His average fastball in 2012 was 91.5, the same as 2011 with the Phillies and just a shade under his heyday. The Royals should at least inquire. Maybe he won’t want to come here, but they should try. If they can get 28 starts out of him, it would be more than worth what they would have to pay him, and he’d probably be willing to take a one-year deal.

Jackson is another guy the market seems to have cooled on. He had a lot of juice around him last year because people wondered if he might not emerge into greatness. That didn’t happen. Jackson had another Jackson-like year. Right around 3.75 xFIP, high threes to low fours ERA. That’s what Jackson is. He’s also a reliable pitcher who can eat innings. He’s gone at least 189 innings every year since 2009 and made at least 31 starts every year since 2007. He made $11 million last season on a one-year deal. I’m not sure the market is as hot for him this year, but he might command around the same figure, something the Royals could afford if he’s ok with taking another one-year deal.

Most of the buzz around the Royals and free agent starting pitching over the last 24 hours has centered on Dempster. He wants three years; no one wants to give it to him. Here’s an article from Michael Engel about the situation. In the comments, I posit a compromise in which the Royals make it an option year with incentives that would guarantee it. So, if Dempster makes 30 starts in his first two years with an xFIP of 3.9 or under, his third year becomes guaranteed. I have concern about Dempster’s ability to pitch in the American League, because of his terrible stint in Texas. But for the most part, he’s a known quantity. He had a rough 2011 ERA-wise, but his XFIP was right on track with his usual 3.7 range. He’s good for about 3.0-3.5 WAR virtually every year (excepting 2011 when it was 2.7 and 2008 when it was 5.2). Dempster would be the best pitcher on the Royals’ roster, but they can’t afford to sink the ship for him. According to Mlbtraderumors.com, they’ve offered the most money of any team interested over two years. If I were the Royals, I’d hold on that offer until it looks like someone might up the money for two years and then start talking about an option year with incentives (it’s a good idea GMDM should use it). That would be my ceiling though. No guaranteed third year.

If none of this sounds too hopeful, that’s because it isn’t. Each of these guys is a gamble and a stopgap. The Royals can’t let a contract they give this group be the thing that prevents them from signing talent long term. They also don’t want to have taken on Ervin Santana’s contract for nothing. They need to try to compete in 2013, which is looking less likely as the starting pitching market thins. Sure, if everything goes right, they can compete. But how often does everything go right? That’s a strategy for 70 win seasons.

I suppose in retrospect the odds of the Royals nabbing a front-line starting pitcher were never great. Now, it looks nearly impossible unless they make a really stupid decision and trade Myers. But, hey, I’ve heard Luke Hochevar is just about to turn the corner so maybe all the Royals’ problems are solved.

September 27, 2012; Detroit, MI, USA; Kansas City Royals designated hitter Billy Butler (16) hits a home run during the ninth inning against the Detroit Tigers at Comerica Park. Mandatory Credit: Rick Osentoski-US PRESSWIRE

So many trade rumors swirling around. So much trade talk flying everywhere. It’s hard to keep track of it all. It’s hard to think that the Royals will make it through the next month without sending their whole roster to Tampa, Seattle, or Oakland. It scares me a bit, as I’m always afraid of the lopsided trade that goes against the Royals.

For the most part, I feel like most of this talk is nonsense. I think the Royals are exploring all of these options, but I also think there’s really only one option that makes sense (of course this doesn’t preclude the Royals from making a move that makes no sense): Bill Butler for James Shields.

I came to think conclusion while trying to consider what would serve both teams best, and this is all I came up with. All the other scenarios just don’t add up. Wil Myers is too valuable for different reasons (potential value at the major league level and years of team control at a cheap price). Alex Gordon is also too valuable at 6-7 WAR unless Tampa is considering trading Matt Moore, which I don’t think they are. Mike Moustakas has no value to Tampa, and the prospects for Seattle either aren’t good enough for the Royals’ needs (a number one type starting pitcher) or aren’t ready yet (Danny Hultzen, Taijuan Walker). It’s a matter of the three major compenents coming together: performance value, need, and contract.

Butler for Shields is the only combo that makes that trinity work because each team gets equal value for something they desperately need, and the contracts essentially even out. Shields put up a 4.3 WAR last season, which is really great for a pitcher. He’s good for around a 3.5-4 WAR easily. Butler put up a 3.2, his best ever, and is poised to repeat that performance, as he’s entering his prime hitting years. So, Shields may be a little more valuable using that metric, but I’d call it roughly a wash. I think that metric overvalues defensive contribution and baserunning and thus undervalues players like Butler who primarily DH and can’t run.

Obviously, the Royals need starting pitching, but more pointedly, they need ace-like starting pitching. Is Shields and “ace”? If not, he’s damn close. He’s gone over 200 innings every season since 2007. He’s had a xFIP from 3.24-3.87 since 2007. His K/9 rate has been over eight since 2010. His BB/9 is 2.35 and under since 2007.  And for those of you who like the old-school ERA, four of his six full seasons have been mid-threes or below.

On the other side of the coin, the Rays need a difference maker with the bat. Butler is most certainly that. His slash line last season was stellar, .313/.373/.510. His power numbers were up, 29 homeruns and an ISO of .197. Maybe most importantly, no one for Tampa with more than 400 PA had a higher wRC+ (weighted runs created in relation to league average). Butler’s wRC+ was 140, meaning he created 40% more runs than league average, which tied him with David Wright, Josh Hamilton, and Joe Mauer. That’s very good company to be in, and the Rays need that type of offense to compete in what is now a somewhat weakened AL East. Butler provides a consistent and ascending middle of the order hitter.

September 3, 2012; St. Petersburg, FL, USA; Tampa Bay Rays starting pitcher James Shields (33) throws a pitch in the first inning against the New York Yankees at Tropicana Field. Mandatory Credit: Kim Klement-US PRESSWIRE

One of the big holdups I have with the Royals trading Myers is that he’s under cheap team control for a long time, while the player they get in return may not be. I’d hate to end up in a Brewers-Greinke situation in which we give up a potentially great player(s) with many years of team control for a good player we’re renting for a year or a year and a half. Butler for Shields doesn’t present this problem. Butler has one more year on his contract than Shields does, but for the Royals that shouldn’t make much of a difference. The Royals could keep Shields for 2013 and 2014 for roughly $21 million, with 2014 being a team option year at $12 million.* Butler is due $16 million over the next two seasons guaranteed, but has a team option for 2015 at $12.5 million. This makes Butler a little more valuable contract-wise, but it may make up for what may be seen as a little less value in performance. That said, neither is in the young and cheap phase of his career, but both seem to be worth the money they’re paid. With Butler and Luke Hochevar’s contracts off the payroll (I’ll pack Hoch’s bags for him), and with Bruce Chen, Jeff Francoeur, and Ervin Santana coming off next year, the Royals could afford to keep Shields for both years if they wanted to. And the Rays would save money trading for Butler since he costs less than Shields.

*These contract numbers are according to Baseball Reference, and I’m not sold that their numbers are completely legit. They may just be base salary, no incentives or anything. I’m not sure, but other sites have differing numbers.

The only question I really have is, why isn’t this getting done? What’s the hold up? I mean, either side (probably the Royals), may need to throw in some low-level prospects. Nothing too fancy, maybe someone like Kyle Smith or Jorge Bonifacio or Cheslor Cuthbert. Nothing so prized as Kyle Zimmer or Adalberto Mondesi. Both sides are winners in this scenario. It makes too much sense not to do it.

July 9, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; USA team pitcher Danny Hultzen (21) delivers a pitch in the third inning of the 2012 All Star Futures Game at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Denny Medley-US PRESSWIRE

A post from ESPN.com writer David Schoenfield today explained, essentially, what every Royals fan already knows. If the Royals can find a way to pitch better, they have a chance of winning. He does a good job of explaining the details to a mass audience though, and he also proposes a trade possibility that not too many have explored yet: Mariners pitching prospect Danny Hultzen.

Hultzen was the second overall pick in the 2011 draft after spending three years at the University of Virginia. He is often thought of as a very polished pitcher who, if not for a poor stretch in AAA, may have made his MLB debut in 2012 at the tail end of his first professional season. Some compare him to Cliff Lee, though it’s not clear that Hultzen has ace-level stuff at this point.

During his first professional season, Hultzen had a Jekyl and Hyde type performance. In AA, he pitched like a person deserving of the second overall pick. In 13 starts he went 8-3 with a 1.19 ERA, 79 strikeouts, 32 walks, 38 hits, and just two homeruns allowed in 75.1 innings. Simply put, he was incredible … for 13 starts in AA. In AAA, the wheels came off, and though the statistics point to how the wheels came off, why they came off is unknown to me. Lauded for his command, Hultzen started walking everyone under the sun. In 12 starts in AAA, he walked 43 hitters in 48.2 innings. His ERA was 5.92, though that wasn’t helped by a .351 BABIP. His FIP was a more respectable 4.29, but still not something a team wants to see from a potential ace.

Personally, I think the stint in AAA was a fluke. Hultzen’s FIP and his crazy high walk rate make me think he will rebound in 2013. Maybe he won’t put up the insane numbers he did in AA, but that’s bound to be the case as he faces tougher competition. I also think he’ll be ready for the big leagues very early in 2013, maybe May or June. And honestly, he’ll be ready to crack a terrible rotation like the Royals’ to start the season.

With all that in mind, the question becomes should the Royals attempt to trade for Hultzen? Schoenfield seems to think so, as do others. The offsetting weaknesses and strengths of the Mariners and Royals seems to make them natural trading partners. I must say that I’d love to have Hultzen pitching for the Royals in 2013. The sticking point? The price.

Schoenfield and others forward the name Billy Butler as the price for Hultzen. That is, of course, ridiculous. Hultzen hasn’t thrown a major league pitch, and Billy Butler is an All Star and maybe one of the 10-15 best hitters in the league. That means the Mariners would either need to throw in more or be willing to take less. They could throw in Erasmo Ramirez or Taijuan Walker, but I doubt they’d be willing to give up two high-end pitching prospects. Another possibility is James Paxton, a lesser prospect who still has some potential.

Really, the value swap of prospects is the roadblock to a trade between the Mariners and Royals. Butler is too valuable to trade for Hultzen or any of their pitching prospects straight up. But the Royals don’t really have any other hitters who are major league ready who they can live without (except maybe one). They could trade Wil Myers for Hutzlen, essentially straight up, but then the Royals are left with this gaping hole in right field (this hole has a name, Jeff Francoeur). Alex Gordon is too valuable. Eric Hosmer has too much potential.

The one hitter who might satisfy this imbalance is Mike Moustakas. It hurts me to say it because I love Moose, but he’s just good enough to be valuable to the Mariners and just not good enough to force them to give up two major prospects. The Royals would struggle to find a replacement, but Irving Falu or Tony Abreu or both might be able to fill that gap. If all else fails, they could try to sign a serviceable third baseman and hope that the pitching upgrade makes up for the loss of Moustakas.

Really, there aren’t any great answers. The Royals need pitching and in order to get it, they have to weaken their offense (in a trade scenario anyway). Hultzen is a good target for them, and the Mariners are a good trading partner. But there are as many impediments as there are reasons to get a deal done.

Jul 4, 2012; Toronto, ON, Canada; Kansas City Royals infielder Irving Falu (19) looks on against the Toronto Blue Jays at the Rogers Centre. The Blue Jays beat the Royals 4-1. Mandatory Credit: Tom Szczerbowski-US PRESSWIRE

I know many of us are concerned with how the Royals’ starting rotation will look in 2013. It’s the most important issue, and if they acquired no position players and only starting pitching this offseason, most would call that wise, including me probably.

But that doesn’t mean this team has no holes in the lineup. It does. So, instead of giving you another starting pitching post, I’ve decided to talk about a position that concerns me moving into 2013 (actually two positions concern me, but my concern for right field is simply an understanding that Jeff Francoeur is terrible and holding a place for Wil Myers).

I’m a little concerned with how the second base situation will work out. Mike Vamosi recently wrote that he feels the Royals will continue to give Chris Getz opportunities at second base, not because Vamosi feels he deserves it but because Getz is beloved by Ned Yost and Dayton Moore. I think a fairly solid argument that Getz DOES NOT deserve to hold a position by himself exists. He’s a lifetime .257/.314/.316 hitter and even in his “bounce back” year last season, he only hit .275/.312/.360. He does have a decent glove at second base, but nothing that makes up for his very weak bat.

So, let’s look instead at the candidates who could potentially contribute. We know Getz can’t, or at least should only be used to platoon; that’s been proven. Johnny Giavotella was supposed to be the guy who unseated Getz, who brought offense to the second base position. That, of course, has not materialized, and I’m almost ready to write him off completely. Because if Giavotella can’t hit, he can’t play. He’s had 376 PA in the major leagues for a slash line of .242/.271/.340. That is nowhere near close to acceptable. He strikes out way too much, doesn’t walk enough, and if you watched him play at all looks overmatched by big league breaking stuff. So, as of right now, I’m not pulling for Johnny anymore.

I am, however, pulling for everyone’s favorite 29-year-old rookie, Irving Falu. This guy can play. Sabermatricians will hate him because he relies on a high BABIP to be successful. In 21 big league games last season (91 PA), he hit .341/.371/.435 with a .382 BABIP. He rarely walks, but he doesn’t strike out that often either. He puts a lot of balls in play, but in those 21 games, he had a 34.7 percent line drive rate. That means he was hitting a lot of line drives. It’s a small sample size, but I would love to see him get a chance in Spring Training to both make the club and see significant time at second base.

Tony Abreu also received some time at second base late in the season, but to me, he’s just a poor man’s Falu. He walks less and strikes out more. He also relies on a high BABIP, but even more so than Falu. In AAA last year, AAA mind you, he walked 3.1 percent of the time and struck out 15.2 percent of the time. That’s incredible. What’s even more incredible is that he did it while hitting .322. His BABIP was .365. In his major league time, he was considerably less effective with a BABIP of .298 and a batting average of just .257.

Right now, I’m thinking the answer is probably a platoon, Getz against righties and Falu against lefties (that is if Falu doesn’t win the starting job outright in Spring Training). Falu’s a switch hitter, but in a very small sample size against lefties last year he hit .385. Getz has, over his career, hit better against lefties, but that’s probably because he has around 800 more plate appearances against righties and only 288 against lefties in his whole career. Clearly, managers attempt to protect Getz against lefties.

Honestly, I’m not thrilled with the situation. I don’t want Getz playing at all, and though I like Falu and think he would make a fine utility infielder, I’m not sold on his ability to hit consistently with his inability to walk. He could certainly have success, and I really want him to. Vladimir Guerrero made a career off the approach Falu has, though he had much more power. If he can keep putting balls in play hard, he should take the starting job and keep it. If he can’t, the Royals will need to figure something out. Either a serviceable platoon situation or bringing someone in who can do the job.

It will be a subplot of Spring Training to follow, and a source of great anger in me if Falu is not even given consideration for a starting job at second base so that Yost can continue his love affair with the continually disappointing Getz.

I’d like to look more closely at Odorizzi because he is right on the cusp of not only being in the major leagues but reaching his potential as well, which is limited but not unimpressive.

July 8, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; USA pitcher Jake Odorizzi follows through with a pitch during the first inning of the 2012 All Star Futures Game at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: H. Darr Beiser-USA TODAY Sports via US PRESSWIRE

Let us begin with his very, very brief stint with the big league club last year. During that time, he pitched seven innings, gave up four earned runs, allowed eight hits, four walks, and struck out four. Not much to be learned from those numbers, but if you remember, he had some control issues and gave up a few hits. But let’s say the extremely limited sample size doesn’t allow us to take anything significant from the statistical data itself.

To find substantial data, I dug into his minor league numbers. They were pretty good if somewhat misleading. His AAA ERA, 2.93, looks great, but if you probe a little deeper you see a 4.19 FIP. You also see a pretty high BB/9 rate, 3.35 and a high LOB% as well 81.3 percent. The worry I had for Odorizzi last year was his high number of hits and walks allowed. Essentially, he was allowing runners on base and then getting out of tough jams. It’s good he was getting out of jams; it’s not good that hitters were reaching base so much.

His H/9 to me hint at a point of concern, a question really. Does Odorizzi miss enough bats? It’s been stated that he doesn’t have electric stuff, and that’s all that’s going to keep him from being a true ace. In the majors an inability to miss bats, relegates a pitcher to 4-5 starter range, and the Royals really don’t need anymore 4-5 starters. In his two starts at the end of the season, Odorizzi induced a swinging strike 6.6 percent of the time (small sample size I know). For comparison, Duffy induced a swinging strike 9.3 percent of the time last year. Justin Verlander has done so at a 9.8 percent clip over his career. Odorizzi’s looks low compared to those two, but keep in mind it was his first stint in the majors and the sample size is small. In Duffy’s first season, he got swinging strikes only 7.7 percent of the time.

Odorizzi has this pattern, you see. He gets a taste of a level, struggles on that level, and then comes back and dominates the next season. At least, that’s what he did with AA (I don’t know if you can call it a pattern if it only happened once). He struggled at Northwest Arkansas in his last seven starts of 2011, came back in 2012 and destroyed Texas League hitters to the tune of 11.13 K/9 and a 2.20 FIP. That’s incredible, especially considering the league.

I think Odorizzi will end up back in AAA. What I’m looking for is his bounce back. I’m looking to see if some of the problems that were covered up in AAA last season will be resolved this season. Will he get his strikeout rate back up (it dipped to 7.38 K/9 at AAA)? Will he get his walks and hits allowed down? This should allow him to fix one of his other problems from AAA last year, short outings. He had so many people on base, his pitch counts sored, and he often didn’t make it past five innings.

If Odorizzi starts hot in Omaha, I’d love to see him get a chance in late May or early June. He’s a smart, poised young pitcher. A little refinement, and the Royals could have the first two pieces of their in-house pitching solution in place (Duffy and Odorizzi).

September 10, 2012; Houston, TX, USA; Chicago Cubs starting pitcher Chris Volstad (32) reacts after a pitch in the fourth inning against the Houston Astros at Minute Maid Park. Mandatory Credit: Troy Taormina-US PRESSWIRE

A quick heads up for readers of this blog: 90 percent of what you read this offseason will be about starting pitching. For me, this is a good thing. The Royals need starting pitching so we should write primarily about starting pitching. I’m just warning you so you’re not surprised by the repetitive theme of starting pitching, starting pitching, starting pitching.

With that in mind I’d like to write about … starting pitching. Specifically, the Earth shattering move the Royals made last week, signing Chris Volstad off waivers. Michael already covered this briefly, but I’d like to think more about it because I just read a post by the great and wise Rany Jazayerli that got me considering the Volstad move.

Let’s first note where everyone is starting the conversation: Volstad is not very good. We can all pretty much agree on that. He’s about replacement level. Nothing special but not Kyle Davies. He was once a well thought of prospect who never matched the expectations people had for him. He’s 26, right handed, doesn’t throw overly hard, and is extremely tall. He relies heavily on his defense and isn’t a strikeout pitcher.

I’m not going to consider whether or not Volstad is a good sign. It’s really too early to know that or even speculate with certainty because of how unset the Royals rotation is. I want to consider whether or not there is any way Volstad can have success in Kansas City.

After having poured over statistics, and having watched him pitch for the Cubs last season, my answer is maybe but probably not. I would put his chances of success in Kansas City at 20 percent, which is better than I would have given him with the Cubs.

Why so low? For one reason, moving into the AL for the first time will probably hurt Volstad. He’s only ever pitched in the NL so his strikeout numbers, never very good, will probably slip a bit. He walks to many people, and in the AL that kills. His lack of strikeout stuff makes him a wannabe Derek Lowe without Lowe’s command (in his prime anyway).

So, why so high at 20 percent (which is 20 points higher than Luke Hochevar)? Because Volstad is only 26, and he’s had “success” before. I use “success” in its loosest form. He’s never been Justin Verlander, but he’s been a decent pitcher before. His sinker has decent movement. His only real obstacle, that is, to reaching his potential as a solid 4, potentially decent 3, is his lack of command. He walked 3.48 hitters per nine innings last year. That’s not good at all when he’s only striking out 5 or 6 hitters per nine (in the NL). In 2011, maybe his best year statistically (3.64 xFIP), he only walked 2.66 hitters per nine. He needs to be around the 2-2.5 range to be effective.

If he can locate his sinker down in the zone consistently and get ground balls without walking people, he can be successful in Kauffman Stadium with the Royals’ defense. That’s a very big if. That’s why he only gets 20 percent, but that’s better than Hochevar’s 0 percent.

The bigger questions still lie out there. Will Volstad make the rotation? Make the team? What role will he fill? Isn’t he just Luis Mendoza, only taller and maybe more volatile? These are all questions that need to be answered. Not now, but eventually.

August 19, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals pitcher Jeremy Guthrie (33) reacts in the dugout against the Chicago White Sox at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Peter G. Aiken-US PRESSWIRE

I’m not sure I really understand this. Jeremy Guthrie was the Royals’ best starting pitcher after joining the team in July. The Royals gave him a chance to right the sinking ship that was his career. He did it, and he was thankful for the opportunity. So thankful, he expressed his willingness to negotiate a contract extension as soon as possible. This was during the season.

What was the Royals’ response? We’ll wait.

Excuse me? Why? What is to be gained from waiting? It’s safe to say that among the most important goals the Royals should be reaching for is the re-signing of Guthrie. It’s the general consensus among Royals talking heads (myself included) that the Royals will need to find at least two starting pitchers who can range from 2-3 in the rotation to be competitive. This formula, though, is predicated on the re-signing of Guthrie. If the Royals cannot re-sign Guthrie, they need three new starting pitchers of 2-3 quality.

Finding two quality starting pitchers is hard enough. Finding three in one offseason is bordering on impossible, especially when considering the current state of Royals pitching prospects. Kansas City has players with plenty of potential: Jake Odorizzi, Yordano Ventura, Kyle Zimmer, Kyle Smith (who people sell short for some reason), John Lamb. But none of these players is Opening Day 2013 ready. Most are 2014-2015 prospects, which means none of them will be stepping up to fill the void for next season.

And really, you can’t have enough starting pitching anyway. Even if one or two of these prospects were ready to take the ball in April, the Royals should still be talking to Guthrie yesterday. My favorite theory of pitching development is to have as many quality pitchers as possible, have them compete for spots which makes them better, and then when someone inevitably gets hurt, the pitching staff can maintain. Bonus: the extra quality pitchers are trade commodities. This idea that one pitcher might block another is, as Joe Biden would put it, malarkey.

My fear is that the Royals missed a golden opportunity with Guthrie. By talking to him in September and making it clear they want him around, they could have squelched the pull of free agency, the pull to have teams bid for him. Certainly, they can overpay for him once free agency starts, but that type of short sightedness doesn’t help small-market teams. By talking early, they held the potential to keep his agent form putting feelers out and seeing what market demand might be, or at the very least, the gesture shows the level of support the Royals were willing to provide.

Every day a deal doesn’t get done, the pull of free agency grows. Other teams saw his turn around after being traded from Colorado. They know he can pitch under the right conditions, and other teams are more willing to utilize statistical analysis to understand just what they can get and should be willing to offer Guthrie.

So, I return to my question: Why didn’t the Royals start talking contract extension with Guthrie in September? Did they want to see him start one or two more games? If that’s the case, it’s ridiculous. One or two more starts won’t tell a team much about a pitcher. I’m thinking, as I puzzle over this question that truly confuses me, that maybe it’s a case of paralysis by analysis. Maybe the Royals front office was afraid of the downside of signing Guthrie and that froze them into passivity.

Small-market teams cannot be deliberate. They cannot wait and see. Some people criticize Dayton Moore for the quick moves he makes in free agency. I don’t mind this strategy. I don’t think it’s always the best, but I like the idea that he has a strategy that attempts to level the economic playing field. He needs to turn that strategy to Guthrie, to sign him before free agency opens, as soon as possible in fact. If he’s reading this, and I’m sure he is, he needs to stop and call Guthrie’s agent immediately, even before writing a snazzy comment about how awesome my idea is.

Sept. 16, 2012; Bronx, NY, USA; Tampa Bay Rays starting pitcher Matt Moore (55) pitches against the New York Yankees during the second inning at Yankee Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Debby Wong-US PRESSWIRE

Pitching, pitching, the Royals need starting pitching! Anyone who takes the time to read this blog, knows that. Anyone who saw the Royals play last year knows that. But the hard reality is everyone needs starting pitching. It’s the most precious commodity in baseball.

Terrific Royals blogger Rany Jazayerli recently wrote on his desire for the Royals to think outside the box a little in an attempt to obtain Dan Haren. I agree with Jazayerli that this should be the first option that Dayton Moore considers for acquiring a 1-2 starter (Haren’s actually a 2, but a 2 looks like a 1 when all you have is a stable full of 4-5).

Will the Royals execute this plan to obtain Haren? I doubt it. I have no evidence to support this doubt, other than experience watching the Royals’ very inside the box thinking when it comes to roster development.

So, instead, let us look at the tough choices the Royals may choose to make instead. I will focus my attention on one pitcher, but we can assume that this scenario, or one similar to it, could play out with any pitcher the Royals want. I will focus on Matt Moore.

Why Matt Moore? For many reasons. 1) Tampa Bay has a wealth of starting pitching, more than they actually need. 2) Tampa Bay needs hitting, desperately. 3) Both Tampa and Kansas City’s best chances at getting a decent player is through trade. This isn’t a steadfast truth, but it makes sense as a general principle of small market teams.

Also, I like Moore. He’s young, 23, under team control until 2019 (signed through 2016 with team options for 2017-19), and good with the potential to get even better. In 2012, he made 31 starts, had a 3.81 ERA, and had 8.8 K/9. But, he’s not so good that he’s un-gettable, which also means that at 23, he’s got room to improve. He had a 1.35 WHIP and 4.11 BB/9. His xFIP was 4.35, which puts him near the same boat as Bruce Chen last season.

I’m sure the Rays know how good Moore is, certainly better than I do and probably much better than the Royals do. But they also know where they’re weak. They were 18^th in runs scored, 20^th in SLG, and 27^th in batting average in 2012. To compete in the AL East, the Rays must know that they need to score more runs. Their DH spot was 13^thout of 14 AL teams in OPS at just .684. The slash line for their DH position was .229/.288/.396. That’s terrible for a position that is designated just for hitting (I know cuz it’s in the position’s title).

September 27, 2012; Detroit, MI, USA; Kansas City Royals designated hitter Billy Butler (16) hits a home run during the ninth inning against the Detroit Tigers at Comerica Park. Mandatory Credit: Rick Osentoski-US PRESSWIRE

Enter Billy Butler. I know; it hurts me just to think it. But in tough times, and these are tough times for the Royals in terms of starting pitching, tough decisions must be made. Let me state first that I love Billy. I think he is underrated and easily the best hitter in the Royals’ lineup. That’s the thing, he’s very good, and in order to get someone who is good, the Royals will probably have to give up someone who is good. Imagine what the Rays could do with a DH hitting .313/.373/.510 with 29 home runs and 107 RBI.

The question, for the Royals, should really revolve around if they can afford to lose Butler. Can they make up for his production if they trade him? The answer is maybe. If Eric Hosmer bounces back from his abysmal 2012, and the Royals remove heads from rectums on Wil Myers place in the organization by giving him a starting spot out of spring training, they could make up for Butler’s production, at least a little. Add to those the continued progression of Mike Moustakas and Salvador Perez, and the offensive production for the Royals looks fairly decent.

Who would take over at DH? That’s a good question. I think, for now, the best option would be a situational rotation. Since the Royals won’t be able to dump Jeff Francoeur, they could bat him against lefties and Clint Robinson against righties. I like that plan a little.

There is one caveat to this plan (besides the obvious that it is equal parts pipe dream and shroom fueled delusion): Butler alone is not enough to get Moore. That seems crazy when considering how productive and still young Butler is. But Butler really only has value as a DH, and his contract isn’t nearly as team friendly as Moore’s, though it is still team friendly. I tossed out this question to my brother to help me consider who, on top of Butler, the Royals might have to give up if the Rays were willing to trade Moore. Here are some names we came up with: Yordano Ventura, Jake Odorizzi, Louis Coleman, Aaron Crow, Tim Collins, Kelvin Herrera, basically anyone in the bullpen.

I would be ok with the Royals giving up Butler and any of the names above. It would sting to lose any of them, not to mention the punch to the gut of losing Butler, but to change I’m a big believer in the idea that if you always do what you always did you always get what you always got. Butler is a valuable to both the Royals and the Rays. If the Rays are even willing to talk about Moore, or if another team is willing to talk about a Moore-like pitcher (that’s young and a #2 starter with more upside), the Royals need to be willing to part with Butler to get him.

Note: Robbie at Rays Colored Glasses wrote a response to this piece, proclaiming that Moore is going nowhere.

It was hard this time finding out that the 2012 Royals were consistent losers. My question was Is there anything in the win-loss statistics that might provide insight into what the Royals might fix moving forward? A statistical anomaly that might explain why they lost more than I had hoped for and expected?

September 20, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals fans show their support as the team celebrates after the game against the Chicago White Sox at Kauffman Stadium. The Royals won the game 4-3. Mandatory Credit: Denny Medley-US PRESSWIRE

The answer? No there is not. It turns out the Royals were pretty much just losers across the board. They had a pretty even home-road split. They had a pretty even first half-second half split. I thought maybe in one-run games, but their numbers in one-run games are actually much better than their overall record (27-26). They didn’t get blown out much more than their overall record would indicate. They just lost a lot of three to four-run games.

Their win-loss numbers inside the division aren’t overly interesting. They had a good year against Chicago, a bad year against Minnesota, and everything else was pretty much expected—two games up on Cleveland and destroyed by Detroit. Overall, they were 34-38 in the division—not surprising and fairly boring.

I did learn that the Royals played a pretty tough schedule outside their division. Of their 18 opponents, 11 finished with records .500 or over, with Cleveland and Minnesota being two of the seven that didn’t. Against those winning teams, the Royals were 47-50, a pretty respectable record considering how bad the overall record was.

The one statistically interesting thing I found was how terrible the Royals win-loss record was against losing teams. Against losing teams, teams with records below .500, they were 25-40. That’s pretty bad, and much of that comes from the horrific years against Minnesota and Seattle. Combined the Royals were 8-18 against those two teams. That’s just sad. I think the Washington Generals could do better … at baseball I mean.

If you listen to the sabrmatricians, which more people should, they’ll tell you that win-loss records aren’t a great indicator of anything other than how many games a team won and lost. To a degree, they’re right. But what the win-loss records can do, sometimes, is show people big patterns about a team’s ability to win and lose. If they lose a lot of one-run games, a fan base might know that it’s a late inning problem or that those loses are a statistical oddity that might shake out the following year. If a team has an incredible win-loss in September, that says something as well, usually that they’re facing minor leaguers who will be selling insurance before too long.

The win-loss records from the Royals are somewhat enlightening if not encouraging. They say that the 2012 Royals were consistent losers with no statistical oddity (in terms of win-loss only) that points to an easily found culprit. Of course, we can point to starting pitching and management and timely hitting or whatever, and those might be the answer. But the answer to my question is simply that the Royals of 2012 were consistently terrible, not up and down terrible, but reliable in their losing.

August 21, 2012; St. Petersburg, FL, USA; Kansas City Royals manager Ned Yost (3) in the dugout during the first inning against the Tampa Bay Rays at Tropicana Field. Mandatory Credit: Kim Klement-US PRESSWIRE

We’ve heard it on repeat since before the 2012 season started, and we’ll continually hear it all offseason. The Royals need starting pitching. They need it bad. They need it like Zac Brown needs wool knit hats to cover his bald head.

But perhaps the focus on starting pitching is obscuring the fact that the Royals are an imperfect team in other respects as well. With that in mind, I give you a list of the other things the Royals need to make 2013 less of a train wreck than 2012.

A near elite offense

The lack of high level numbers offensively was a tough reality for the Royals in 2012. They’ve scored 669 runs in 159 games, that’s 4.2 runs per game good for 20^th in the majors. Compare that to last season when they scored 730 runs, 10^th in the majors, and 4.5 runs per game. In a season when people thought a great offense and a mediocre pitching staff gave them a chance at .500, the offense actually got worse.

To change this, a few obvious things need to take place. Eric Hosmer has to hit like he did during his time in the majors in 2011. Mike Moustakas has to take another step forward, especially with his plate discipline. It’s fine if he only hits .265, but if he does that, he has to hit for power and get on base a little bit.

Step two, Jeff Francoeur has to go (and hopefully I’m not telling you anything you don’t already know). He is terrible, and really there’s no other way to define him. Wil Myers should be the one to take his place, but a replacement level player would be an improvement. Francoeur has a -1.3 WAR this year. Yes, this man who has 587 plate appearances for the Royals is not even at replacement level.

If these things don’t happen, the Royals have no chance. They cannot put up average or even above average offensive numbers and compete. They must be near an elite level offensively to compete.

Even better defense

The defensive metrics for the Royals are probably pretty good. By most accounts the Royals have a very rangy defense with good arms in the outfield. They also have a stud defensive catcher who can greatly impact the game throwing out runners.

But from a consistency standpoint, 2012 wasn’t the greatest year for the Royals defense. We too often saw our All-Star caliber shortstop drop routine groundballs that for him should be like tying his shoes, and that was indicative of the number of routine mistakes the Royals made this season. In terms of fielding percentage, the Royals’ are 24^th in the majors at .982. Last year, they were 12^th with .985. Next year, they need to be top-8 and do well in the areas the metrics bring into play, which is almost a given unless something unexpected happens.

Because the pitching will be bad and they probably won’t strike out many hitters, the defense needs to be elite. Kauffman Stadium sets up well for pitchers like Jeremy Guthrie who have trouble with the long ball, but in order to neutralize a pitching staff that doesn’t strike anybody out, as much as they can anyway, the Royals need elite defense.

Better managing

Normally, I do not assign much value to managing in baseball. They don’t hit, pitch, field, or run so how on Earth can we say they win or lose baseball games? But after watching some of the atrocious decisions made by Ned Yost this season, I’m starting to change my tune a bit.

If anyone ever needed to just get out of his team’s way, it’s Yost. If there were a WAR for managers it would clearly show that Yost lost the Royals games this year. He bunts in ridiculous situations (apparently he still thinks he’s in the NL and has been transported to 1920). His dedication to Francoeur makes me physically ill, and he always seems to stick with a pitcher just long enough for him to put a game out of reach.

They won’t replace him, but if he could just see the error of his own ways … that won’t happen either. They might be screwed on this one.

Oct. 2, 2010; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals pitcher Zack Greinke watches from the dugout against the Tampa Bay Rays at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Mark J. Rebilas-US PRESSWIRE

Rumor: I heard that Zack Greinke secretly wears Royals underwear to bed. Clearly, he’s going to sign with the Royals this offseason.

Rumor: Well I heard, he’s been drawing pictures that look a lot like the Plaza so I think he’ll be signed for less than market value.

Rumor: Yeah, I think he’s probably gonna sign cuz he draws his power from the fountains at Kauffman. Without them, he will eventually wither away. Like Superman with the sun and everything.

This is how ridiculous everyone who believes Greinke is coming back to the Royals sounds. Normally, I would write a rational response to this belief. I would hedge my bets against being wrong and try to consider the reasoning behind the assertion that Greinke will sign in Kansas City. But I feel that would do more harm than good at this point. Those who believe in this fantasy need that belief smothered right now.

IT WILL NOT HAPPEN (watch it happen now).

But seriously. IT WILL NOT HAPPEN.

Greinke asked to leave this place. He didn’t want to be here, and his coming back is contingent on too many variables that are in fact tremendous obstacles. The first and simplest is that he probably doesn’t want to come here. He didn’t want to stay here so why would he want to come back? Because the Royals are poised to lose 88 games? Because the barbeque is so good? (That is tempting but no.)

The second obstacle? The Royals have to want him to come back. We all assume that they do, but maybe they don’t. We don’t know. Greinke comes with baggage. Dayton Moore has already had to deal with that baggage once, he may not think that dealing with it again is good for the team or worth the price tag.

Which brings us to the largest hurdle. The Royals can’t afford Greinke. A former Cy Young winner with Greinke’s dominant stuff in a market that will be starved for big-time starting pitching is going to command a salary the Royals can’t/won’t/shouldn’t give (choose one). The Royals cannot outbid anyone and certainly won’t be able to play in a bidding war the involves multiple big-market teams. Dayton Moore was unwilling to pull the trigger on a guy like Edwin Jackson last offseason. What’s changed so that now he’ll be able to offer even more money for Greinke?

I love the enthusiasm, and I love that people are thinking in the right direction. This team needs starting pitching in a bad way, but why is Greinke the answer? He isn’t, but why do so many people believe he is? There are other capable pitchers on the market who won’t cost as much and may be just as or only slightly less effective. So, why are people so fixated on Greinke?

I’m not going to answer that because either the answer is obvious (people are still attached to him because of the success he had here) or answering it serves no purpose. I’ll just say this. Drop the delusion. Greinke’s not coming back, and ponder this question instead. Why do you want him back?

August 25, 2012; Boston, MA USA; Kansas City Royals first baseman Eric Hosmer (35) is congratulated by a teammate after scoring a run during the seventh inning against the Boston Red Sox at Fenway Park. Mandatory Credit: Bob DeChiara-US PRESSWIRE

Does anyone else feel like it takes forever for a player to get through the Royals’ minor league system? I call it a “feeling” because as I’m writing this I have yet to do the research to confirm my theory (though I’m in the process). But it certainly feels like our prospects move at a snail’s pace through our minor league system, with the Royals always making decisions on the side of caution. Always favoring seasoning over challenging or trial by fire.

As it turns out though (research done), that may not be the case. If we look at two players from other teams as representative of an elite prospect (Jurickson Profar) and a very good prospect (Anthony Rizzo), we can see that their stays in the minor leagues were pretty comparable to most of the players the Royals have brought up, or should bring up at the beginning of next year, during their youth movement. (These are times spent in minors until major league debuts. It doesn’t include being sent back down).

Profar: 304 games played in two and three-quarters minor league seasons

Eric Hosmer: 291 in roughly roughly three seasons

Wil Myers: 404 in four seasons

Rizzo: 375 in four and a half seasons

Mike Moustakas: 438 in four and a half seasons

* Many of these include short stints in rookie ball

Profar and Hosmer seem to be the anomalies, as they moved more quickly through the minor league systems of their teams. Their situations, though, are different. Hosmer forced the hands of the Royals, while Profar’s call up seems unique. He was doing well at AA (.281/.368/.452), but not destroying the ball, as Myers did this year. It’s hard to say why he was called up. The Rangers may be the best team in baseball without him, and he’s done virtually nothing since coming up. Maybe, it’s part of their plan for getting him ready, having him experience adversity and getting a taste of the difficult challenge of the big leagues.

But a debate could certainly take place over the benefits of bringing up a player quickly. Hosmer is living proof that trial by fire burns like hell. He’s having a very difficult second year, struggling to make adjustments to the adjustments pitchers have made to him. In hindsight, maybe a little more seasoning would have helped. Or maybe not, who knows?

Rizzo got plenty of seasoning in the minors and still ended up struggling after his debut in San Diego and getting sent back down to the minors to adjust. It seems his extra time didn’t do much for him. Nor has Mike Moustakas’s extra time done much for him. He has yet to match the promise of his minor league numbers or his high draft pick. He’s been decent and much better than expected with his glove, but I don’t know anyone who can say he’s lighting the world on fire. And he’s got plenty of minor league time.

I think the truth that seems to be emerging for me is that players need to learn how to making failure learningful at some point, and for the best players that failure is tough to come by at any level other than the majors. Hosmer destroyed AAA pitching in his short stint there forcing the Royals’ hand, but his failure this year, at this point, seems like it was inevitable and we just didn’t want to see it. Most guys will never hit the type of skid Hosmer has, but it was inevitable that he would learn some hard lessons at the major league level because there was no opportunity to learn them in the minors where he could crush everyone and everything thrown at him.

To me, this is the greatest case for why the Royals should have brought up Myers in August (I don’t care about roster situations. Sell Francoeur at a flee market for all I care). Myers struggled for about a two-week stretch at AAA this year, but in order to get him where he needs to be, the Royals have got to let him face the fire of major league pitching. Some players just aren’t meant to learn great lessons in the minors. Profar will never learn a great lesson in the minors. Rizzo’s greatest lessons came at the hands of major league pitching. Hosmer’s and Moustakas’s too.

That said, I’m not terribly disappointed with the Royals’ approach. I didn’t look at any pitchers so I can’t make an assessment of how that’s handled (maybe in another post). But for position players, it looks like they’re on par with most others (but if you know of a study that proves otherwise let me know). I think it just feels agonizingly slow to Royals fans because we so look forward to our saviors. It’s like staring at the clock waiting for class to end. The more you stare, the slower it will go.

August 5, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals players Jeff Francoeur (21) and Brayan Pena (27) celebrate after Francoeur brought in the winning run against the Texas Rangers during the tenth inning at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Peter G. Aiken-US PRESSWIRE

A few days ago, I spoke to the class I teach about this very lyric: “The future’s so bright I gotta wear shades.” I used it as an example of how frequently we take something out of context and make that thing mean what we want it to mean. For those of you who do not watch those VH1 countdown shows about one-hit wonders, this song is often misunderstood as a song of hope for the future. It’s actually a song about nuclear escalation told through the excitement of a young scientist who knows his business will keep booming.

While the deepest parts of my heart want to look at the Royals’ success over the last couple of months and see a bright, bright future, this song and the idea of how people used it force me to rethink.

I don’t mean to be the wet blanket, and I want people to have enthusiasm about the Royals. But we’ve seen this story before. The Royals’ inconsistency digs deep holes they’re never able to get out of, but then, they play well when the games mean absolutely nothing. Last season, the Royals were (15-10) in September, their only winning month since April. Some thought this was a positive sign that after a season of ups and downs, they’d finally found the lineup that would lead them into the future.

This season clearly proved that hope a pipe dream. Why? Because, just like our favorite 1980’s one-hit wonder, people took that time out of context. It was September, a time when if you’re playing for nothing, winning gets a little easier. It’s also a time when teams with comfortable leads start using players who they otherwise wouldn’t to rest players for a playoff push. But to have a winning record in September while out of contention is like dominating in a recreation softball league. It would mean something … if it weren’t a recreation softball league.

It’s easy to see why fans do this. We really want a winner. We want a winner so bad we’re willing to see one in a team not ready to start winning. Coming into this season, fans knew that the starting pitching wasn’t good enough, but we allowed ourselves to believe the lineup would be great. It hasn’t been. It’s been slightly below average (18th in runs scored). We allowed ourselves to believe that a great lineup could give us a .500 season. Sure, injuries and ineffectiveness have plagued the Royals, but that’s the thing about the fantasy scenarios we construct, nothing goes wrong in them. Injuries and ineffectiveness happen to everyone. That’s reality.

Since August 1, the Royals are 24-19. That’s a respectable record, and for the Royals, it’s a very good record. The team is playing well. Jeremy Guthrie has looked like an All-Star. Eric Hosmer is turning things around. Some of the young players, like Tony Abreu and David Lough, are doing well during their opportunity. And what does all of this mean? Not very much actually. In a game built entirely on consistency over the course of an entire season, playing well for two months means virtually nothing.

Does that mean the Royals will be bad again next year? Not necessarily. But we can look at the roster and very safely say that it won’t be that much better than this year’s. Maybe the Royals have the good sense to resign Guthrie. Maybe Jake Odorizzi makes the team out of spring training and is effective immediately (though I’m increasingly thinking this won’t be the case). Maybe, the Royals sign a starter in the offseason (I doubt they sign anyone of significance). But what will be significantly different?

Well, Hosmer might not slump the entire year like he did this year. Perhaps Luke Hochevar will no longer be on the team. Maybe Jeff Francoeur will finally be asked to just stop, and Wil Myers will get his chance.

These are all ‘maybes” and “what ifs.” So, I guess what I’m getting at is that if we are to avoid the let down that this season feels like, we need to see the future through shades that are more tinted with realism. Hope is good. We should feel hope. But let’s not let hope invade the territory of how we see reality. They can be separated, I think, and as someone who hates the let down of a 12-game losing streak and terrible Hochevar performances, I’m going to try to do that. I’ll root very hard that they play well, and I’ll hope. But I won’t see moments of Royals success and assume this means overall success is just around the corner.

August 24, 2012; Boston, MA USA; Kansas City Royals second baseman Johnny Giavotella (9) bats during the fourth inning against the Boston Red Sox at Fenway Park. Mandatory Credit: Bob DeChiara-US PRESSWIRE

Question: have we all put too much faith in the abilities of Johnny Giavotella? I have to ask it. Don’t get me wrong, I hate to ask it, but I have to ask it at this point. I know 78 major league games isn’t a whole lot, but the picture that’s forming for the 25-year-old second baseman isn’t as rosy as many of us had hoped. And because he has yet to show the type of promise his very good AAA numbers indicate he has, it’s making me nervous.

I had extremely high hopes for Giavotella. I thought he might be a poor man’s Dustin Pedroia (with a little worse glove and a little less pop). His numbers in AAA over the last two seasons have been incredible (.323/.404/.472 in 2012 and .338/.390/.481 in 2011). He profiled as a high average, high on-base, gap power, offensive second baseman, which was great for the Royals, a team that is already strong up the middle defensively and sometimes has a tendency to over-value defense.

But he’s now had exactly 300 PA in the major leagues, and so far, it’s not looking so hot. His slash line, .237/.263/.331, is Francoeur-esque, and we knew his defense wouldn’t be anything to write home about. His BABIP is fairly low, .288 in 2011 and is .267 this season, which provides some hope. But he’s the one putting the balls in play.

Other than the balls not dropping, which I partially blame Giavotella for but not entirely, it seems his plate discipline isn’t what it was at AAA. I heard one of the radio broadcasters mention an interview with him in which he stated that pitchers are pitching him backwards now, and he’s struggling with that. It’s certainly reflected in his walk rate, which took an amazing dive after each call up to the majors, while his strikeout rate spikes soared. In 2011, his walk rate went from eight percent to 3.2 percent while his strikeout rate went from 11.3 percent to 17.1 percent. In 2012, same story—BB% from 11 to 3.5, K% from 9.6 to 16.8.

So, here’s my hypothesis on Giavotella’s issues. Yes, I think they’re throwing him more breaking balls, especially in fastball counts. I think he struggles with that. But I also think he’s putting pressure on himself not only to get on base but to hit. There’s no reason why that walk rate should plummet that far unless he’s pressing to swing the bat and make an impact. That pressure is causing him to swing a lot and not make contact all that often, which is also Francoeur-esque. He’s swinging at both good and bad pitches, which in the majors is not good.

The reality for the Royals might be that Giavotella will never hit the way they thought he would in the major leagues. That’s a tough reality because if he can’t hit, he can’t play. There are other options. I’m a big fan of Irving Falu. I don’t understand the assumption that he can’t be anything more than a utility player, especially considering his play indicates otherwise (I know he’s a little older than most rookies but why should that matter if he can play). His numbers are just as good as Giavotella’s at the minor league level and much better in the majors. There are other options as well—Tony Abreu, Christian Colon. But it might be that the Royals end up with more of a revolving door at second base, which wouldn’t be the worst thing in the world. Many winning teams have at least one position that is filled in a patch-work way. But it would be nice if Giavotella can fulfill the hopes many Royals fans had for him.

This doesn’t mean that I’m giving up hope on Giavotella; I’m not. It just means that the bar’s thinning out, and I’m starting to shift my gaze from the prettiest girls in the room to the ones more likely to produce.

April 10, 2012; Oakland, CA, USA; Kansas City Royals first baseman Eric Hosmer (35) loses his bat during the eighth inning against the Oakland Athletics at O.co Coliseum. Mandatory Credit: Kyle Terada-US PRESSWIRE

Late August is the hardest time to be a Royals fan. They’re out of any type of race other than a race for top draft picks in 2013.

They’re not calling up any young prospects of the future for at least a few days and maybe not even then. They’re stuck in this state of mediocre baseball and near hopelessness.

By now, we pretty clearly have a sense of who the 2012 Royals are: an extremely inconsistent team with players still learning what it takes to be successful at the major league level. Eric Hosmer has disappointed to a level I’ve never seen before when we consider expectations (granted I’m only 26). Mike Moustakas has been decent but not jaw dropping. He continues to struggle with left-handed pitching, and watching him swing and miss at the same pitches over and over again makes me want to throw objects at a television … my television to be specific.

I point to Hosmer and Moustakas only because they are the poster children for this new wave of talent meant to push the Royals back to prominence. But of course they are not the sole holders of blame. Starting pitching has been terrible (as most thought it would be). Jeff Francoeur has been atrocious (as many thought he probably would be). And some of the moves made by Ned Yost and Dayton Moore have been awful (as anyone with brain cells knew they would be).

Now, we’re stuck in this purgatory, a holding pattern, and it feels like eating plain bread. Nobody knows what Moore will do with Wil Myers. Nobody knows what Moore will do with Jake Odorizzi. Right now, all we have are dreams of the future, and those dreams are opaque at best.

That’s why I hate late August for the Royals. When we get to September, we can at least sink into the warm delusion of our strong Septembers. Last season the Royals went 15-10 with what many considered to be a glimpse into their lineup of the future. Salvador Perez, Johnny Giavotella, Hosmer, and Moustakas were all in the majors, and the Royals started winning. Fans could then delude themselves into thinking that this was proof of future success. I want that delusion to get here already. Much like in the movie Inception, I need the dream world because it’s much better than the real world (or something like that … I don’t know that movie was super confusing).

The only pieces of the puzzle left are Myers, Odorizzi, and a pitcher to be named. Maybe that pitcher will be John Lamb or Yordano Ventura or Kyle Smith or Kyle Zimmer. Who knows? Maybe it will be a free agent (I doubt it). But for now, we’re left only to stew in this place of wonderlessness.

You see, wonder is what drives the passion of Royals fans. We wonder what the future will bring (I’m using “wonder” as a double entendre). We look at our future with a sense of wonder. We look at players like Myers and Odorizzi with a sense of wonder. It’s what keeps us going as fans. If we can’t wonder, morale drops like Francoeur’s batting average after facing a righty for one game.

The wonder is off both Hosmer and Moustakas. I’m not saying they won’t be great players. They might be, and if they do become great players it will be wonderful. But it won’t be the same thing we feel when everything is possibility, as it is with Myers and Odorizzi, as it is with next season.

I need September to get here. I need to see the future Royals so I can replace the sense of stuckness I feel now with a sense of wonder.

Aug 10, 2012; London, United Kingdom; Solar panels on top of house boats on River Lee during the London 2012 Olympic Games. The boats where forced to move due to Olympic Park restrictions. Mandatory Credit: Andrew Weber-USA TODAY Sports

It’s odd how in the offseason there is very little news and yet we still find stuff to talk and write about. Roster analysis, trade rumors, free-agent signings, yada, yada, yada, the season starts.

But earlier this season a bit of actual, important news came from the Royals and was covered only briefly by local news outlets and some of the sports blogs. Did you catch it? There was an article by Steve Everly in the Kansas City Star about the Royals’ installation of solar panels as a way to help control energy consumption and benefit sustainability.

I actually wrote this post right after the article came out and sat on it. I wasn’t sure if it was something that people wanted to read about. But the other day I heard a radio advertisement form KCP&L touting their work on this project, and I got to thinking. Sport’s, and maybe especially baseball’s, position at the forefront of cultural and societal progress is extremely important, and that makes it important to talk about. So, I’m going to talk about it. The Royals’ installation of solar panels is a part of that.

What? Does that not seem important to you? I hope it does. It’s extremely important to me. I might be an idealist, but think about the conversations that this could start.

Child: Daddy. What are those things out there?

Father: Well, those are solar panels. They capture the sun’s energy and help run these lights and all the other stuff this stadium needs.

Child: Why do they need those though? We don’t have those.

Father: It’s a little better for the environment and a little less expensive I guess.

Child: Why don’t we have those?

Father: I don’t know. Maybe we should.

This is a little bit of a stretch, but the point is every kid who walks into Kauffman will now see that his/her favorite team tries to be environmentally conscious. That type of impression can reverberate for years as another drop in the bucket that turns the tide of an issue.

Sports have been at the forefront of progress in America for a long time. Think back to Jackie Robinson and racial integration. Think back to the conversation a father or mother and child might have had about the guy playing second who looked different than everyone else. Robinson helped create that dialogue, as did a number of other black players of that era. These breakthroughs preceded even the Civil Rights Movement (the mainstream “Civil Rights Movement” as it’s taught in many history classes anyway).

Sports operate in this interesting space of autonomy in some ways. Politicians, regardless of personal judgment, must lend an ear to those interests that fund their political campaigns. Often those interests are more apt to choose the status quo. But David Glass has no reason to care about the status quo of energy (if we’re thinking of him simply as a baseball owner). It’s more beneficial to him to save money on the light bills and enhance his image. Not many entities outside of sports influence those sports because the MLB, NFL, NBA are pretty self-sustaining enterprises (Turf industry? Is there a turf industry?). The fans do the funding in this arena, which is one reason why sports try to stay ahead of the populist ideal.

When obesity was just starting to become an issue, the NFL came out with its Play 60 campaign. Major League Baseball hopped onto he breast cancer cause as well, with the pink day that they do every year. I’m sure the NBA does some stuff too (I’m not a huge NBA fan. When they start rebounding and playing defense, I’ll start watching again.)

The cynical among us may cry that these things are only done to build each sports image. I can’t be sure if that’s true or not. I’m inclined to believe that these causes allow different sports to kill two birds with one stone. 1) Help people and progress. 2) Build an image. But even if it’s just to build an image, does that matter? Not really. The good is still being done. The messages, equality, charity, sustainability, compassion, are still being passed to future generations. Whether or not these messages were constructed for the right reasons doesn’t really matter.

I like the idea that sports can hold the position of autonomous vehicles for good. I like that they seemingly stand alone, in some ways the most democratic entities of our less-than-democratic society (we live in a republic people, always have). I’d like to see more ballparks do what the Royals did, and I think they will (I think the article mentions five teams now have solar panels including the Royals). It’s not necessarily the responsibility of sports to drive progress, but it may be in there best interest. And it may be their most important legacy.

July 8, 2012; Detroit, MI, USA; Kansas City Royals relief pitcher Everett Teaford (61) is one of the pitchers who make up the revolving door known as the Royals starting staff. Mandatory Credit: Rick Osentoski-US PRESSWIRE

Apparently, it’s important to strike hitters out without walking that many. Can we check to see if the Royals starters have gotten this memo? MLB.com posted an article yesterday explaining that this year’s strikeout to walk ratio is at its highest since 1884. That’s right 1884, not 1984. Back when Willie Nelson first started owing the IRS a ton of money and Teddy Roosevelt rode a dinosaur during his charge on Hitler’s bunker (I minored in revisionist history).

The SO/BB ratio is super high: 2.42. That means on average pitchers get 2.42 strikeouts for every walk. So, for a game if a pitcher has three walks seven or eight strikeouts. The upturn, seems to reflect a trend in pitching evaluation. Nowadays, with the prominence of statistical analysis, sabermetrics, and an emphasis on peripheral statistics for pitchers, more people are searching for strikeout pitchers, with the hopes of lowering their walk numbers if need be.

I think many people, and I count myself among them, look at the strikeout and the walk as polar opposites (even if they’re really not it’s easiest to understand them as such). A strikeout guarantees the hitter will not get on base (as opposed to a ball in play). A walk guarantees the runner will reach base (again as opposed to a ball in play). What a high SO/BB ratio means is that the pitcher is controlling that game in the positive. What a really low SO/BB ratio means is that the pitcher is also controlling that game in the negative.* If a pitcher has low strikeouts and low walks, they are kind of abdicating control of the game … kind of.

*Please note that I do believe the pitcher controls batted balls to a degree, but let us assume for the moment that he does not.

When I read the article on MLB.com, I wanted to see how the Royals’ pitchers are controlling the game with regards to their SO/BB ratio. As a team, the Royals’ SO-BB ratio is 2.08, which is below league average by a significant amount. A small section of the problem is that the Royals don’t strike that many guys out, 17th in MLB with 808. The big problem is that they walk way to many hitters, fifth most MLB with 388. Part of that was a certain terrible pitcher named Jonathan Sanchez (44 BB in 53 IP), but part of it is the high walk rates of Greg Holland, Tim Collins, Luis Mendoza, and the sometimes starters like Will Smith, Everett Teaford, and Danny Duffy.

Looking at the data, the picture is a little fuzzy but seems to point to the fact that Royals pitchers are not controlling the game in a positive way. Of their current starters, only Bruce Chen and Jeremy Guthrie have a SO-BB ratio better than league average (and they both serve meat balls with high HR/9 and BABIP numbers to prove it). Mendoza, the teams best starter for the last couple months, has a frightening 1.5 SO-BB ratio, but is saved by low HR/9 totals and good ground ball numbers. Smith also has frightening SO-BB numbers at 1.70.

In comparison, the best pitchers in the AL hang out from 3.70-4.00 for their SO-BB ratio: Justin Verlander (4.05), Jered Weaver (3.75), Felix Hernandez (3.70), Chris Sale (3.91). Right now, the Royals have none of these types of pitchers (not even Duffy as he has been so far). Guys like Mendoza, pitchers who keep the ball low and get a lot of weak groundballs, can work as fourth and fifth starters. But to compete at a playoff level, the Royals need pitchers who can be in the 3.70-4.00 range with their SO-BB ration. And those guys can’t be anomalies like Guthrie who are in the zone all the time but only to the hitter’s delight.

Looking down the road, it doesn’t look that much better. Jake Odorizzi’s got a 2.29 SO/BB ratio, which isn’t very good. Again, he strikes out a fair amount but walks too many (gives up too many hits as well). Kyle Smith in Low A has been good at 4.5 SO/BB, but that’s Low A. Yordano Ventura is another pitcher who could use fewer walks; he’s struggled since being called up to AA.

Right now, it looks pretty grim, especially if you believe that the Royals need someone who can serve as an ace, which I do. But we’ll see. Duffy has that potential if he stops walking so many hitters. Kyle’s Smith and Zimmer have that potential I think. But potential can’t play a game. It can’t win a pennant. When it can, the Royals will be set.

*All data from Aug. 11, 2012

Jul 4, 2012; Toronto, ON, Canada; Kansas City Royals manager Ned Yost (3) looks on from the dugout against the Toronto Blue Jays at the Rogers Centre. Mandatory Credit: Tom Szczerbowski-US PRESSWIRE

I use to have this football coach who was a little bit kooky, a little bit nutty in a down-home-Midwest-drill sergeant kind of way.  He had a flattop haircut decades after that was something people were still doing. He use to pad up and play scout team quarterback with us, which felt odd even at the time. He also had these incredible sayings that kind of made no sense. The one that’s sticking in my mind at this moment is “If you always do what you always did, you’ll always get what you always got.”

It seems true enough even if it’s completely false. Sometimes, you can in fact just keep doing what you’ve always done with differing results because the circumstances surrounding that action change. For example, a large group of people in New York continued to back mortgage futures into the mid 2000s, at first making billions of dollars and then losing billions of dollars when the housing bubble burst. Same doings, differing results.

That said, I think it might help Ned Yost to learn my old, zany coach’s lesson a little bit. Recently, he made a statement to Bob Dutton, my favorite beat writer of all time, that Dutton put in an article about Yost’s “steady as she goes” approach to losing many baseball games: “You don’t do crazy stuff that you wouldn’t do if you were winning ballgames. You try to stay as even-keeled as you can. You stay positive. You keep working. We don’t change anything.”

I read this, and immediately, the voice of my old coach popped into my head, “If you always do what you always did, you’ll always get what you always got.” Yes! Of course! When you experience sustained losing, you must change something or you will continue to lose. That seems like the most basic sports principle of all time, and yet, it alludes Yost. The principle behind Yost’s philosophy, I’m guessing, is to not be overly swayed by small sample sizes. Statisticians know the perils of this. But the Royals are 41-60. They’ve lost 21 of their last 27. That’s not a small sample size. It’s in fact a very healthy sample size when the question is should something be changed? Abso-freaking-lutely something should be changed!

There is a point when patience becomes impotence, when faith in the ability of your guys is clearly misplaced. As Royals fans, we know where that faith is misplaced: Jeff Francoeur and Yuniesky Betancourt. Are the Royals a winning team, even with an optimal lineup of the organization’s best players (yes I used “organization” intentionally as our best second baseman and right fielder are currently in AAA)? Maybe, maybe not. But to consistently repeat an action, like playing two players who are not effective, and expecting changing results when the circumstances surrounding that action never really change is willful ignorance (Some call it insanity; too me, that’s a slight on the truly insane like myself and Donald Trump).

Is Yost stupid? I don’t know for sure, but I doubt it. I’m guessing he’s a decently smart baseball guy. He’s just not wise. He’s clearly not a big picture guy, and that’s just crazy when the biggest picture he should be concerned with is doing whatever it takes to win baseball games. It feels like he’s more concerned with getting players to play well. It would seem like these two things are connected, but they really aren’t. He needs to get the team to play well. Sometimes, that means changing the team so it doesn’t include dead weight. And yes, he needs Dayton Moore’s help to do this.

Moore showed some signs that he might be a little wiser than Yost. He made a change today, trading Jonathan Broxton for a couple of solid minor league arms. Kudos for Moore for taking a player who had some value to other teams but not really to the Royals and turning it into some value for the Royals. Now, he and Yost need to figure out how to do that with players inside their own organizations or both of them may learn what the brutal winds of change their so hesitant to bring about feel like when they’re sweeping them away.

Kyle Zimmer is one of many young Royals players with promise.

The Royals are a cushy 1000 games out of first in the AL Central. They’ve been injured, ineffective, and impotent. I feel safe in predicting that they will not make the playoffs for the 26th straight season (not counting 1994).

So, as is the custom with Royals fans, it’s time to once again turn our gaze to the future. With that in mind, I give you five Royals low minor leaguers I’m particularly excited about. Some of them you probably know a lot about. Some of them, maybe not so much. But lately I’ve taken solace tracking their progress to let hope spring eternal in my badly wounded heart. I hope you can do the same.

*These are in no particular order. I just write them as they enter my lunatic mind.

1. Kyle Zimmer - SP

He was recently promoted to Kane County after pitching 10 innings in the Arizona Rookie League. In those 10 innings he gave up one run, struck out 13 and walked zero. That’s right, he hasn’t walked anyone. This type of domination is to be expected from a guy who was facing good college talent very recently and performing well against that talent.

Zimmer excites me so much for a few reasons. He has a very smooth, easy delivery, which could point to his ability to throw upwards of 200 innings a season. He has incredible polish for a guy who’s only been pitching for roughly two seasons. He doesn’t turn 21 until September. And everyone talks about what a great athlete he is, which is a big plus for a number of reasons, including his ability to stay healthy, a problem the Royals have dealt with too much this year.

Zimmer should blow away the Midwest League. His first real challenge will come when he hits Wilmington, but many Royals have found success in Wilmington because it’s a pitcher friendly league. I hope the Royals aren’t too cautious with him and prevent him from making the leap from low A to high A this season if he shows he can handle it.

2. Kyle Smith - SP

Two Kyle’s on the list. This Kyle isn’t quite the flamethrower the other Kyle is, but he’s showing he can deal at low A Kane County. In 28.2 innings, he’s got 39 strikeouts; that’s 12.4 K/9. His ERA is 3.77, which is really good but doesn’t necessarily drop jaws. This could be due to a high number of hits given up (27), which may be due to a small sample size or the free swinging nature of low minors hitters.

Smith is a strikeout pitcher. He doesn’t get too many ground balls, and right now, he walks a few too many. But if he can refine his command a little, he could be an answer to a team that desperately needs starting pitching. It will be a while before he makes it to the big leagues; he’s only 19. But it’s worth watching the box scores to see how Smith progresses.

3. Jorge Bonifacio - OF

This guys is really, really good for as little publicity as he gets. He just turned 19 in June, and like the two Kyle’s currently plays with Kane County. How talented is that team? Though young for his level, he’s hitting .296/.354/.461 with 10 home runs. That’s pretty impressive.

The question I have about Bonifacio is whether or not he’ll develop a distinguishing tool. Is he going to develop more power? Is he going to start hitting at a .330 clip? I’m not sure because I can’t tell the future. If I could I’d be slapping Warren Buffett with a stack of hundred dollar bills while drinking gold flavored chocolate milk. But we know from guys like Rany Jazerilli that players who produce while being young for their level are worth paying attention to.

4. Alexis Rivera - OF/1B

People are already talking about Rivera as a steal in this year’s draft. The Royals picked him up in the 10th round out of Puerto Rico. He just turned 18 in June, and he’s hitting at a very impressive rate in 24 games in Arizona—.411/.454/.537. He’s a big left-handed hitter at 6’2” 225 and already has seven extra base hits and seven steals.

Like many young hitters, Rivera doesn’t walk much, just nine times so far. But plate discipline is often the last thing to develop, and he’s got plenty of time. It’ll be interesting to see what kind of identity he takes on as a player, and he could end up being a good value pick for the Royals.

5. Bubba Starling - OF

I’m going to put Bubba on this list because he’s still very exciting. He just hit his fourth homerun of his career. He’s hitting .288, but the patience and power people thought might take a lot of time to develop is showing nicely. He’s got a .400 OBP and a .513 SLG.

He’s only played in 20 games so there aren’t many numbers to get too excited about. But the word on the super highway is that he takes to coaching very quickly and that his swing has transformed in a very short period of time. So far, it seems he’s been the embodiment of the type of prospect his is, showing flashes of brilliance and a lot of inconsistency; he’s struck out 27 times in those 20 games.

As usual for the Royals, the future looks pretty good. I’m going to remain optimistic, as always, but only because the alternative is pretty dark. If you have the energy, keep track of these guys. They could be the next wave of players you’re cursing and throwing things at.

July 10, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; American League infielder Robinson Cano (right) of the New York Yankees shakes hands with Billy Butler (left) of the Kansas City Royals before the 2012 MLB All Star Game at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Peter G. Aiken/USA TODAY Sports via US PRESSWIRE

Trenni Kusnierek hinted at it in her very good article earlier today, but I’d like to expand on it a little bit. We all know now that at the Home Run Derby and All-Star Game Robinson Cano was booed by Royals fans for reneging on his word to put a Royal on the Home Run Derby team. Predictably, the media and fans around the country called Royals fans classless and rude while never understanding the extent of the story—most thought the booing came from Billy Butler’s absence rather than Cano’s lie.

It was nice to see some more well informed journalists point out the national media and fans’ error in blame by making a case that it is more treacherous to be dishonest than to vocalize your displeasure with that dishonesty. But I’d like to point out why the sense of outrage took place, and it’s something that Royals fans are all too familiar with.

Kusnierek points out in her article that if the situation were different perception would be different. If a Royals player had done the same thing to a Philadelphia or New York player in Philidelphia or New York, those fans would have destroyed that Royals player, and the national media wouldn’t have said a word about it. The message the national media and fans were really sending to the Royals faithful with their backlash is “know your place.”

It’s perfectly fine for Phillies fans to be passionate for their team. It’s a crime for the Royals faithful to do the same. Why? Because we’re suppose to be the doormats. Doormats do not speak out about being walked out. They do not protest their role as a cleaner of the feet of the social elite. They do their jobs quietly.

At its essence, this is a conflict about the power structure of Major League Baseball, one that seems to hold the major markets up and the small markets in a position to serve them dutifully. A small part of me wants Kansas City fans to be seen as the bad guys in this drama. It says we no longer accept the role of irrelevant in the baseball culture. To me, those boos voiced the frustration of a culture that continually validates inequity. To me, those Royals fans stand as revolutionaries in a rebellion against all the systemic injustices that helped create 27 years of misery.

One of the standard bearers of this system is dishonesty. Major League Baseball has enacted policies and practices that run contrary to the pronounced goal of an equal playing field and a spirit of honest competition. When Cano voiced his desire to put Butler in the Home Run Derby, he was doing something that felt like a genuine gesture of good will. Going back on that statement amounted to a slap in the face from the rich kid whose dad paid his way through Harvard to the kid working nights to put himself through a state school.

I read people questioning, Did Cano deserve to be booed? My question is what would it say about the Royals nation had they remained silent, suppliant? I’m not sure if Cano is a good dude or not. He may be; he may not be. There’s really no way I can know that.. Everyone in the media seems to think he is because he smiles a lot. I’d smile a lot too if I was a millionaire playing baseball for a living. But he does stand as a representative of the New York Yankees who represent all the worst qualities of Major League Baseball. To simply let him lie to the Royals fan base with no consequences would have been to simply accept a place as a second-class organization meant to serve the interests of the Boston Red Sox and New York Yankees. To that I say, boo away, boo more often, and take the frustration even further.

July 10, 2011; Phoenix, AZ, USA; USA outfielders Matthew Szczur (4) , Bryce Harper (middle) and Wil Myers (right) celebrate after the 2011 Futures Game at Chase Field. USA won 6-4. Mandatory Credit: Jerry Lai-US PRESSWIRE

In today’s know-everything-first, savior-in-the-making, prospect pleasure land, people tend to over-hype everything. Media allows us access to high school football games (a lot of them), little league games, college sports, and so on. On the Internet, we can get analysis and scouting reports on children—read that line again and let it sink in. Think of Bryce Harper, the phenom of the moment. According to ESPN, Baseball America, the Washington Nationals, and Under Armor (he endorses them), Harper is the second coming of Babe Ruth or Willie Mays. According to Fangraphs, he’s hitting .274/.348/.471, which is exceptional for a 19-year-old.

My point, and I’d say it’s a point of criticism, is that we go to extremes with our perspective on players … especially prospects. Until they reach the majors, they are a relative unknown, which helps create our extreme views. We knew less about Harper the player before he got to the majors so that gave us the license to create the fantasy Bryce Harper in our imagination. And fantasy Bryce Harper is phenomenal, perhaps to an unobtainable degree.

If Harper stays the player he is today and finishes his career with the same slash line as right now, he will have been a relative disappointment. He will not have walked on water, leapt tall buildings, solved the debt crisis, and rolled back prices all while creating sweet catch phrases like “That’s a clown question, bro.” Even though his numbers so far this season would equal a pretty good major league player over the course of 15 seasons, it won’t be good enough.

Harper may live up to his hype. The media loves to help players reach it by exaggerating every small things they do as if no one has ever done it before (Remember when Harper hustled around the bases on a popout and ESPN gushed as if no one had ever ran out a popout? Boy, that was terrific journalism). But it takes a lot to get there. He’ll have to be a superstar, nothing else will suffice because people have already created the player they want him to be.

This all came to my mind while I was watching the Omaha Storm Chasers game this morning on MiLB.tv. I wanted to see Jake Odorizzi pitch; I watch most of his starts. The broadcasters mentioned that he would start the Futures Game, but they also talked about another guy who started in the Futures Game something like a decade ago: Josh Fields. Fields is playing for the Albuquerque Isotopes now so Odorizzi pitched against him on Monday.

As Fields, a guy with great promise in his day and plenty of major league opportunities, dug in, I thought to myself: Look at the contrast here. One guy’s star has faded another’s is shining bright. No one knew that Fields would bust at the big league level, but fewer people back then were paying attention to the minor league level. Fields was coming up just as fans started raising expectations on top prospects.

Today, we pin hopes to players in the minor leagues more so than ever. Many Royals blogs and news outlets reported Bubba Starling’s big day on Monday, hitting the first two homeruns of his professional career. Harper and Mike Trout are two of the biggest names in baseball and have been since they were in the low minors. We see these bits of news on rookie ball players like Starling, or Harper when he was down there, and let it fuel our hopeful frenzy. Oddly, when Bubba went 0-5 the other night, no one said much but when he hit two homeruns in one game, we started clearing a spot on our mantels next to Jesus and John McClain (Doesn’t everyone’s mantle have John McClain from Die Hard on it?).

I’ll admit, it’s fun to be hopeful. I spent all this morning looking up stuff about Bubba and dreaming of he, Wil Myers, and Alex Gordon in the outfield. But to do so without critical thought is not fair to the player, the team, or yourself as a fan. Gordon felt the pressure that comes with people pinning their hopes to him. Everyone knew he’d be the next George Brett. Everyone knew he’d be great. And for a long time, he wasn’t, and fans were mad at him for it. Was our disappointment his fault? No. It was ours. We created the fantasy Alex Gordon, and he folded under the pressure of trying to be that thing.

I notice this more as I think about the All-Star Futures Game. The Royals have three young players in it: Odorizzi, Myers, and Yordano Ventura. I’ve already given my thoughts on Myers (good and bad). I know very little about Ventura. So, I’ll give you my thoughts on Odorizzi, and more importantly, I’ll try to do it in a realistic way.

Feb 29, 2012; Surprise, AZ, USA; Kansas City Royals starting pitcher Jake Odorizzi (49) poses for a picture during the Royals photo day at Surprise Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Rick Scuteri-US PRESSWIRE

I’ve seen most of his starts this year, and I’m excited like everyone else. To me, his greatest weapon is his fastball. He commands it well, especially up in the zone as an outpitch. If I’m excited about one aspect of his game, it’s that he can use his fastball effectively, something that not too many Royals starters have. He’s poised on the mound and consistent. Sometimes his breaking pitches get a little wild, and they don’t have the type of hard-breaking, late movement associated with aces like Justin Verlander and Felix Hernandez. But they’re pretty good.

Here’s what scares me about Odorizzi: he gives up a lot of hits. He’s given up 52 hits in 47.2 innings at Omaha this season. When I watch him, he’s always pitching with guys on base. He’s always pitching out of jams. He usually gets out of them because he can strike guys out, which makes his ERA look fine. It’s 2.83 in Omaha, but his opponent’s BA is .274. But it’s far from a guarantee that he’ll be able to do that against top-flight talent in the majors.

That’s why I’m excited to see him in the Futures Game. I want to see him get tested against the best hitters in the minors. I want to see him have a few guys on with nobody out and see if he can work out of that jam. In the majors, he’ll face tough hitters like Miguel Cabrera with runners on base, not random Albuquerque Isotopes players … well … like Josh Fields

It’s easy to look at Odorizzi and become unreasonably excited. From that comes unreasonable expectations and unreasonable disappointment. It makes more sense to be realistically optimistic and contextually open-minded than to hang our hopes and dreams on a kid, and then rip the kid for not delivering.

Jun 27, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; A general view of Kauffman Stadium during the game between the Tampa Bay Rays and the Kansas City Royals. Mandatory Credit: John Rieger-US PRESSWIRE

Tuesday night, when the Royals laid a beating on the Rays 8-2, I had an opportunity to hang out in the Fox Sports Kansas City suite at Kauffman to watch the game. To give you a sense of how unique this opportunity is for someone like me, let me state that I’ve spent many a night sleeping on the floor. I’m a person of the floor, both figuratively and literally.

I was granted the opportunity by Geoffrey Goldman of Fox Sports to check out the new version of Game Connect they’ve launched—to be clear he invited Michael Engel who couldn’t go so I called dibs. Until very recently, I hadn’t heard of Game Connect but apparently it’s a free supplemental program run through the Fox Sports Kansas City website that allows fans to get a TON of extra cool information while watching the game.

Walking in I saw a group of guys huddled around their lab tops about 10 minutes prior to the first pitch. Craig Brown of Royals Review and Bill Ivie from I-70 Baseball were talking about something Royals related with a few guys from Fox Sports. Game Connect sat on each of their screens and they talked about all the information that it provides.

Real quickly, I’ll give you the four things I like most about Game Connect:

1)   Pitch count tracker – One of the things that bothers me about the TV broadcast is that there is no permanent pitch counter. Game Connect has a pitch counter AND stats on how many pitches a pitcher throws on average per outing. It comes in the form of a gas gage that lets you know when the pitcher is ‘gassed’.

2)   Great stats – Almost anything you could want to know about a given moment statistically in on Game Connect. It gives numbers on a given pitcher-hitter matchup. It gives different splits. It gives clutch-hitting stats. It gives player salaries … which blew my mind and I love.

3)   Game talk – Game Connect has a feature called “Game Talk.” Using fancy-dancy computer stuff that I don’t understand, all the tweets that have something to do with the game, either team, any of the players, and so on come up in a feed so you can read what people are tweeting about the game. It’s awesome. It’s like watching the game with the planet, including fans of the other team.

4)   Usability – I’m terrible with computers … much better with books. So, that Game Connect is very graphics oriented and easy to use is really important to me. If it were overly complex or demanding I wouldn’t use it.

Here’s the link to try it out (click on ‘Game Connect’ just below the photo): http://www.foxsportskansascity.com/pages/royals

What the Fox Sports guys stressed, and what I found out the more I used it, is that Game Connect isn’t like MLB Gameday. It’s not ANOTHER way to watch the game. It’s a supplement to watching the game. You use it while watching or listening to the game to get all the information you wish you had while watching the game. I’ve watched two games and listened to one using it, and it enhances that experience.

But walking into the Fox Sports suite I wasn’t really thinking about baseball. I was wondering when someone who looked like a Secret Service agent was going to tell me I was in the wrong place and ship me to Guitmo. It just looked too nice in there. Free food, free drinks, my choice to sit inside or out just behind home plate. This may seem old hat to people who experience this regularly, but to a guy like me it was like being invited to stay in the Lincoln bedroom at the White House.

The night was filled with highlights really. Talking to Craig and Bill, both very nice and smart guys, about baseball was a lot of fun. Meeting Joel Goldberg and Jeff Montgomery and talking baseball with them was cool. But probably the greatest moment was standing in the suite with those guys and seeing my twin brother Mike catch Yuniesky Betancourt’s homerun on TV. He has season tickets, and when I saw the ball headed for his section, I thought Wait, that’s headed for Mike I think. Next thing I know, he’s barreling through old ladies and children to get to the ball (George Costanza style).* I must have jumped like a gazelle screaming “That’s my brother! That’s my brother!”. I know, right? How professional.

*Note: My brother did not actually knock over people to get to the ball, but that is how I will tell the story for the rest of my life. He also gave the ball to a kid per the laws of human decency.

Now that my time among the mighty has passed, I will move back to the seats of the general populous. It was a nice vacation, a great place to visit, and I’ll take that opportunity whenever I can. But really, is there any bad way to watch a game. My brother was down in the stands where he always is, just beyond the Royals bullpen. When I saw him after the game, he was elated. He’d caught a homerun. He’d watched a great game. He’d experienced a beautiful night in Kansas City. And when he left the stadium, just like me, he was smiling.

May 07, 2012; Kansas City, MO, USA; Kansas City Royals catcher Brayan Pena (middle) is congratulated by teammates after scoring in the seventh inning of the game against the Boston Red Sox at Kauffman Stadium. Mandatory Credit: Denny Medley-US PRESSWIRE

So, I’m randomly walking through LAX in March, catching a connecting flight to Las Vegas for a friend’s bachelor party. Yes, it was wild. Yes, it was fun. No, it wasn’t like The Hangover. While walking, I do the stupid thing and try to read Royals news on my cellphone, risking a collision in the process. All of a sudden, I hear my brother start yelling.

“Hey, Salvy! It’s Salvy Perez. Hey man, feel better! We’re all hoping for a speedy recovery!”

Rolling through the terminal at LAX was Salvador Perez. He was in a wheelchair after having injured his knee. He was smiling like he always does and waving at us. In my mind, he was happy to see Royals fans way out in the wild west. In my mind, he wanted to grab a drink with us, but he had to catch a plane *delusional*.

Since that injury, Royals fans have waited and waited and waited for Salvy to return. Since that day at LAX, it feels like we’ve had the bachelor party, the wedding, the honeymoon, and three kids. That’s how long this wait for Salvy’s return has felt. And now that he’s back, I’m glowing.

But I’m also worried. One of the pillars of strength during our dark Salvy-less days was Brayan Pena. More than ever, we’ve gotten an up-close look at his electric personality and charm. I root like crazy for Pena because he writes cheesy tweets about pulling together and overcoming obstacles, stuff you find on really bad motivational posters. But he’s so sincere and genuine that I can’t help but love even the most cheddar-filled tweets, stuff like “A Great LEADER is not the one who speaks the Loudest,but the One who Speaks the most Sense. I believe in my TEAMMATES, We all SHOULD.“ From him, it doesn’t sound so phony, so cheesy.

The thought that the Royals might lose him soon makes me very nervous. I know he’s just a backup catcher, but it’s clear that he means a lot to this team, even in a backup role. Other players talk about him like an older brother. The Royals have made it clear that their backup will catch a significant number of games for the rest of the season as they remain conservative with Salvy’s recovery. The Royals backup catcher will get playing time this year, and the worry among many bloggers and fans is that they’ll choose to keep Humberto Quintero to justify trading for him in the first place.

Here’s why they should not—besides the fact that Pena’s an awesome clubhouse guy and fan favorite I mean. If we look at it strictly from a player comparison standpoint, the question comes down to which gap is bigger. The gap between Quintero’s superior and Pena’s inferior defensive abilities? Or the gab between Pena’s superior and Quintero’s inferior offensive abilities?

This gets at a larger question of what the backup catcher’s function is. Traditionalist thinking is that the backup catcher is a defensive player, meant to call a good game, throw out baserunners, and hit .220—Henry Blanco is a terrific example of this player. Why this became the understood narrative, isn’t completely clear to me, but I’d guess it’s because guys like Blanco made good careers doing this and so an archetype was crafted. This archetype is powerful in the minds of decision makers, especially those who view baseball in its traditionalist sense like Ned Yost often does. Certainly, having a guy who can handle a pitching staff is important, and that pressure only adds to the narrative that a backup must be a defensive guy. Also, the imbalance of capable major league hitters to capable major league fielders plays a role in constructing this notion that backups are defensive players.

Pena doesn’t fit that mold. He’s not the world’s worst defensive catcher, but he’s not Yodier Molina. Fielding metrics are pretty unreliable, especially for catchers, so I’d say he’s probably average in the field, maybe slightly below based strictly on the eye test. But really, Quintero’s not much better. Pena’s thrown out 33 percent of base stealers in his career. How does that compare to Quintero? It’s actually exactly the same. Quintero’s thrown out 33 percent of base stealers as well. Yet, Quintero has a great reputation as a “catch-and-throw” guy. Overall, they have about the same fielding percentage too.

I’m not suggesting that Pena isn’t inferior defensively; I think he is. I’m suggesting that the difference isn’t tremendous. In terms of handling the pitching staff, their CERA (catching earned run average) is nearly identical for 2012 (4.02 for Pena, 4.13 for Quintero). So, clearly Quintero doesn’t have some sort of special connection to the pitching staff that Pena does not.

Though Quintero isn’t leaps ahead of Pena defensively, Pena is significantly better than Quintero offensively. Here are their slash lines for their careers: Pena (.253/.291/.357), Quintero (.234/.267/.323). Across the board, Pena’s numbers are 14-34 points higher. I’m no scientist, but I believe that’s called statistically significant. Quintero has had a little power surge this season, but the small sample size and the large set of data previous suggested that it wouldn’t last, and he has cooled to Arctic levels since starting hot.

The real question should be what value does Quintero have? The real answer is very little to none. That’s no knock on him as a guy or a player. He seems like a pretty good dude. We rented him for three months and needed him to be what he is, a stopgap. We overpaid in prospects for him, but that ship’s already sailed and sunk. This is more a criticism of how Yost and Dayton Moore see Quintero, with value goggles. They gave up real value to get him in a desperate situation and now they may believe he’s actually worth what they gave up. He is not.

I like that metaphor. Imagine that the Royals are drunk and it’s last call. They’re looking to get a little somethin’ somethin’. Quintero looks pretty good because they’re desperate and hammered. The problem is they already have a significant other in Pena. If they choose to make a commitment to Quintero, they’re only going to wake up to the realization that they had the right gal, made a huge mistake letting her go to get with Quintero, and now it burns when they pee … metaphorically.

July 10, 2011; Phoenix, AZ, USA; USA outfielder Wil Myers drives in a run with a ground out during the 2011 Futures Game at Chase Field. Mandatory Credit: Jerry Lai-US PRESSWIRE

This is going to sound crazy. It kind of sounds crazy to me. But I’m going to make the case for why Wil Myers should not be brought up.

Let me start by stating that I believe it’s time to bring Wil Myers up. I think the Royals are still close enough in the race, only six back, to compete, and I think Myers is probably as ready as he’s going to be and a better option than Jarrod Dyson in center. His development can only continue at the major league level … more on that later.

But there are concerns I have that I wonder if others are noticing, and the best way for me to express those concerns is to imagine a reasonable argument for leaving him in AAA for the time being. This argument is based on the assertion that he will struggle when he gets to the major league level for the reasons I’m about to present. So, here it goes.

I’ve watched a number of Myers’ games this year via MiLB.tv. During these games, there were at bats where Myers’ looked incredible—I’m talking perennial All-Star good. But there were also at-bats where the trademark patience wasn’t there. He was chasing pitches from both AA and AAA pitchers. I saw him strike out on three pitches, I think, in a game with the Storm Chasers, and it looked like he was hell bent on swinging and hitting the ball out of the park.

To put it bluntly, Myers’ has become less patient. Some probably see this as a good thing. There were rumblings that maybe he was too patient and letting hitter’s pitches go by. In the last three seasons, his strikeout percentage went from roughly 17.4 percent in 2010, to 20.9 percent in 2011, to 24.1 percent in 2012 (2010 and 2012 split between two levels). So, Myers is striking out quite a bit more than when he built his reputation as a patient hitter.

Anything I can do to get a picture of Alex Gordon in my articles I'll do. Mandatory Credit: John Rieger-US PRESSWIRE

Perhaps even more telling is the drop in walk numbers. Frankly, I can live with strikeouts if a guy gets on base a lot. Alex Gordon strikes out a lot, but I don’t really care because he walks a lot. Adam Dunn is the same way, as are many hitters in today’s game. Myers was thought to be the same type of patient walk-taker without the high strikeout numbers when he was walking at 15.9 percent clip in 2010. But that number dropped to 12.5 percent in 2011 and 10.2 percent so far in 2012. Surprisingly, his walk rate is lowest at AAA, 9.7 percent in 113 at bats, despite the monster year he’s having. One might think that he’d be pitched around more, though admittedly, Omaha’s lineup is very good protection for him.

These numbers clearly indicate a change in approach. He’s being more aggressive. This isn’t necessarily a bad thing, but it’s not good either. This year, that aggression has paid off. He hit .351/.421/.739 at AA, and he’s currently hitting .327/.398/.693 at AAA. But this year everything he puts in play is falling for a hit. His BABIP at Northwest Arkansas was .425. At Omaha, it’s .343. Last season, when he struggled mightily at Northwest Arkansas, his BABIP was a more reasonable .312, his walk rate was 12.5 percent and his strikeout rate was 20.9 percent. Striking out more and walking less was a problem last season, and many analysts noted it. This season, he’s striking out even more and walking even less, but apparently it’s not a problem anymore? It doesn’t seem like one because the average and countables (homeruns, RBIs) are there, because seemingly every pitch he touches with a bat leaves the ballpark—just like every doughnut I touch with a finger leaves this world.

Of course, I’m a champion of the belief that BABIP isn’t based on “luck” (Miguel Cabrera has a career .346 BABIP. Is that 10 seasons worth of “good luck”?). Myers’ BABIP is high, partially, because he’s hitting the ball insanely hard and when hitters do that their BABIP goes up. But well struck balls won’t come so easily in the majors. Using my eyes, I’ve seen him take some tough pitches, location-wise, and drive them out of the park this season. That won’t happen so much at the big league level when those pitches are moving more with more velocity. Frankly, he’s not going to be able to hit any pitch thrown once he’s called up. He’ll need to drive the three good pitches he gets to hit in an entire game. In order to pick those pitches out, he needs his discriminatory eye back.

So, I’ve made the argument to show you what concerns me about calling him up. Now, let me tell you why he should be called up (It’s a world of gray people don’t expect hardline certainty). I think Myers has hit the point where even AAA baseball can’t help him develop. I think he could continue striking out too much, walking too little, and crushing the ball at AAA for as long as he wants. Sometimes in order to develop, players need to be shown through failure that what they’re doing can’t keep working. Players find failure and make adjustments (see the transformation of Alex Gordon). He needs to move up, fail a little at some point and adjust. Or maybe he already knows that he can dominate AAA pitching and will adjust when called up. I doubt that, but who knows. Either way, it’s about time to call him up

Allow me to end by stating that I hope my concerns mean absolutely nothing. I hope Myers comes up, destroys major league pitching, and continues the new era of hope and prosperity for Royals baseball. I hope minstrels write songs of him and Wilt Chamberlin blushes at the thought of his virility. But lets not make it a given just yet. Let’s not ignore his issues the way we ignored Eric Hosmer’s, crowned him a deity, and were shocked to learn he still had adjustments to make.

May 22, 2012; Bronx, NY, USA; Kansas City Royals manager Ned Yost (3) in the dugout against the New York Yankees during the seventh inning at Yankee Stadium. Yankees won 3-2. Mandatory Credit: Debby Wong-US PRESSWIRE

I remember thinking about how the Royals might go about winning games with such a terrible starting rotation before the season began. It’s hard to win when you can’t pitch, and it looked like for a majority of their innings they’d be getting bad pitching. I thought then that with such a good offensive lineup they would need to win a significant number of high scoring games—6-5, 8-6 and so on.

Right now, the Royals are 23-30, not good, but not out of the realm of where most people thought they should be—especially considering the 12-game losing streak. But when I reflect on how they’ve won those games, the high-scoring battles aren’t ringing any bells. Why? Because they haven’t won any.

That’s really not fair; they have won one. Yes, one. The Royals record when their opponent scores 5 runs or more is 1-20. That’s not very good for a team whose lineup was suppose to carry them.

Now, obviously, the offense hasn’t produced as expected. They’ve scored 214 runs all season, that’s 4.03 runs per game. Eric Hosmer has been a shell of himself, though he’s shown some signs of life lately. Alex Gordon struggled early and is starting to turn it around. Jeff Francoeur also struggled early. The Royals also had an abysmal time hitting with runners in scoring position (though their overall team batting average is good enough for ninth in MLB, another piece of evidence to support the notion that BA isn’t everything).

The offense has been weaker than expected, but that alone doesn’t tell the story either. In Saturday’s loss to Oakland, the Royals got down early thanks to another Luke Hochevar-like effort by Luke Hochevar. They were down 6-1 after the fourth inning. I’ve heard players on this team say they have the fire power to come back from deficits like this, which is good because they’re going to have plenty of them.

It all fell apart though after the Royals scored two runs to make it a game at 6-3. At that point, it looked like they might actually mount a comeback, but they couldn’t make those 1-run innings 3-run innings. Then, Louis Coleman, Aaron Crow, and some really terrible defense gave us a glimpse of Royals teams past, and it was over 9-3.

As those of you who watch baseball know, the game is played in context. Different elements of each game impact other elements of that game. Think about the rally-killing sac-bunt Ned Yost called for in the fourth inning tonight. That had huge ramifications throughout the game. That took a potential 5 or 6-run inning and made it a 3-run inning. If Yost had been thinking about how his team would probably need many more runs to win that game, he probably wouldn’t have called for a sac-bunt.

So, the issue isn’t that the Royals aren’t scoring a lot of runs—they’re not—but that they aren’t scoring a lot of runs when they need to. This isn’t necessarily a solvable problem, but it’s not necessarily something to be written off as unsolvable either. People would be very wrong in tossing this issue aside by saying Well they can’t control when the runs come. They come when they come. Not true.

Managers have a pretty good idea of when they’re going to have to play for 7 or 8 runs (anytime Will Smith is pitching for example). Maybe that means fewer sacrifice bunts or playing more offensive players on a given day. Maybe it means running less to wait for extra base hits, knowing that a stolen run won’t do much for you. Maybe it means keeping spirits high when the team is down by the third inning.

For players, this issue seems more psychological. Last season, when the team was 8-20 through 53 games when opponents scored 5 or more runs, it felt like they were in every game—even when they were down 5 runs. The same sort of “overcoming all odds” mentality is lacking this season. Maybe it’s because some players have struggled at the plate, and they feel less confident about their ability to recapture a lead. I’m not sure. But it just doesn’t feel the same.

Obviously, a team is going to lose more games than not when it gives up at least 5 runs. But for this very unique team, they have to win more high scoring games than they are currently. They have to feel comfortable playing from behind. With a bad rotation, that’s going to happen a lot. Yost needs to make decisions with this in mind. His mentality with virtually every starter, except maybe Bruce Chen and Felipe Paulino, needs to be one that focuses on getting into the other teams bullpen early and playing for big innings. Otherwise, this team will not flirt with .500 this season like they should.